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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation presents a political a nd economic history of t he 
federal gove rnment 's program to commercialize photovol tai c energy fo r 
terrestria l use . Chapte r 1 is a detailed history of the pr ogram. Chapter 
2 is a brief review of the Congr ess i onal rol l call voting l iterature. 
Chapter 3 develops PV benefit measure s at the state a nd Congressional 
district l evel n ecessary for an econometric analysis of PV r oll call 
voting. Chapter 4 pre sents the econometric analysis. 
Because PV power was considera bly more expensive than conven tional 
power, the progra m was des igned to make PV a significan t power source i n 
the long term , e mphasizing research a nd development, although sizeable 
amounts have bee n s pent for procurement (direct government purchases a nd 
indirectly through tax credits). The decentralized R&D program pursued 
alternative approaches in parallel, with s ubsequent funding d ependent on 
earlier progress. Funding rose rapidly in the 1970s before shrinking in 
the 1980s . Tax credits were introduced in 1978 , with the last of the 
credits due to expire this year . 
Major issues in the program h ave been the appropria t e magnitude of 
d e mons trations and government procurement, whether decentral ized, 
residential u se or centralized utility generation would first be econ o mic, 
the rol e of storage in PV, a nd the rol e of PV in a utility 's generation 
mix. 
Roll cal l votin g on solar energy (all votes a n a l yzed occurred from 
1975-1980) was influenced in a c ross-sectional sense by a ll the influences 
predicted: party and i d eology, local econ omi c benefits of the techn ology, 
i v 
local PV federal spending and manufacturing, and appropriations committee 
membership. The cross-sectional results for ideology are consistent wi th 
the strongly ideological character of solar energy politic s and the timing 
of funding increases and decreases discussed in Chapter l . Local PV 
spending and manufacturing was less significant than ideology or the 
economic benefits of the technology. Because time series anal y sis of the 
votes was not possibl e, it is not possible to test the role of economic 
benefits to the nation as a whole. 
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In response to t h e Arab oil embargo a nd resul ti ng quadrupling o f 
world oil prices in 197 3 -1974, t he federal governme nt accelerated r esearch 
on a wide variety of ener gy technologies. The work presented below 
exa mines the government support of one of these energy tec hnologies --
photovoltaic s, o r the direct production of electricity from s unlight. Of 
part icular interest are the reasons f o r dramatic f unding increases in the 
1970s and declines in the 1980s. 
One hypothesis is that the level of f unding is a function of the 
likely economic benefits resulting from government support of t he 
technology. These benefits, in t urn , depend on whether g ove rnme nt 
involvement is appropriate and on the economic benefits of the technology 
itself . The threefold economic rationale for government involvement 
remained relativel y constant throughout t h e period. First, reliance on 
nonsecure foreign sources of energy imposed security externalities such 
as effects on U.S. fore ign policy toward the Middle East. Increased PV 
use would reduce these effects, but the benefit of so doing would not be 
captured by PV producers. Second, reducing dependence on foreign energy 
required long term research and development pro jects . If t he social 
discount rate is less than the private discount rate, then government 
support of R&D can increase research and development to the socially 
optimal level . Since the effect of this d ivergenc e will be greatest for 
long term R&D, support is especially justified. Third, because the price 
of world oil since 1973-1974 has been far above cost, the possibili ty of 
large price declines could discourage private domestic energy research if 
protective measures, such as an oil import fee , could not be relied on . 
While the rationale for government involvement remained relatively 
2 
constant, the other key determinant of the economic benefit of government 
support of the technology, the likely benefits of the t e chnology itself, 
changed dramatically . The economic benefits of PV are the c ost sav ing s 
resulting from replac ing more e xpensive source s of electricity, the costs 
of which are highly positively correlated with oil prices . Thus, t he 
large increases in oil prices in 1973-1974 i ncre ased the benefits of PV 
whereas the oil price declines of the 1980s lowered them. 
In addition to the economic hypothesis, there are two political 
hypotheses concerning the funding pattern. The first is that the changing 
party and ideological composition of the Administration or the Congre ss 
affected the level of program funding. There are several strands of 
evidence for this hypothesis. The sharp change in ideology and party of 
the Administration and Senate in 1981 occurred just prior to the declines 
in funding . Furthermore , much of the popular discussion of solar energy 
in the 1970s had a strong ideological dimension and the Reagan 
Administration believed in less government involv ement . In addition, the 
initial political justification for involvement was a public, facing 
gasoline lines and higher energy prices, which clamored for government 
action in several areas, including government involvement in energy 
research . In the 1980s, public concern was foc used on othe r matters . 
Another political hypothesis is that the level of PV funding was 
influenced by "pork barrel" effects . Under this hypothesis , the 
probability of support for a program by a Member or Senator is positiv ely 
related to the federa l dollars from the program going to his or her 
district or state. Furthermore, programs with strong pork barrel aspects 
are more likely to be continued (at least for awhile) if other factors, 
such as economics , take a downward turn. 
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After a detailed history of the program is presented in Chapter l , 
the remainder of the chapters atte mpt to test t hese t hree h y potheses 
regarding the determinants of the level of PV funding t hrough a cross-
s ec tional econometric a na l ys is of Congr ess iona l roll call voting on 
photovol t aics. In order that this an a l ysi s reflect the best practice in 
the field, a comprehensive survey of previous roll call studies was 
undertaken, and Chapter 2 reports the findings on the key method ological 
issues, particularly the appropriate measure to test the ideology 
hy pothesis . Chapter 3 develops the appropriate measures to test my oth e r 
two hypotheses (economic and pork barrel). Chapter 4 presents t he 
econometric analysis and a brief conclusion. An appendix describes t he 
data used in the econometric analysis. 
The cross-sectional analysis indicates that ideology and local 
economic benefits affect voting in the predicte d direction , with the 
results for ideology most significant . The coefficients of the pork 
barrel variables are insignificant , although generally of the right sign. 
Time series analysis was not attempted due to noncomparability of the 
votes and difficulties in constructing time series for several variables, 
especially ideology . 
Although my results are generally consistent with roll call studies 
on other issues , three differences should be noted . First, Kalt a nd Zupan 
(1984) found that for Senators where the Kalt-Zupan vote model predicted 
the actual vote incorrectly, the proportion of cases where Senators were 
voting contrary to ideology was higher where Senators were facing 
reelection. They interpret their results to mean that ideological 
"shirking,", i.e. voting one's ideology rather than one's constituency, 
was less prevalent for Senators facing election than for the rest of the 
4 
Senate. Applying their methodology to my data, I f ind that fo r Senators 
whose vote is predicted incorrectly by my vote model , t he extent of voting 
contrary to ideology is the same for those facing elec tion and those not . 
However, what exactl y their methodology is measuring is not c l e a r , for 
their vote model used to predict votes includes an ideology varia bl e . 
Using a simpler, more direct approach on my data, I f i nd that the ideo l ogy 
variable is more significant the closer the election, which is the 
opposite of what one might expect from the Kalt and Zupan results. 
Second, previous roll call studies on energy policy (oil and gas 
deregulation, coal strip mining) have shown the importance of local 
economic benefits in voting on regulatory programs which have large 
immediate economic implications for current resource owners and consumers. 
Local economic benefits have also been hypothesi z ed to be important in 
voting on distributive programs such as highway construction, categorical 
grants-in-aid, urban renewal, mass transit, and sewage treatment plants 
(Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981)). The picture is less clear for 
long term energy technology development programs such as the breeder 
reactor, synthetic fuels, and PV. Cohen's study of the breeder found that 
local e c onomic benefits were unimportant, whereas her study of synthetic 
fuels found an effect (see The Technolo~y Pork Barrel). The lack of an 
effect in the breeder may be due to the fact that local economic benefits 
are measured by the presence of nuclear plants , and this presence also 
motivated opposition by environmental groups . Al t hough my results seem 
to suggest that local economic benefits are important for a long term 
program such as the PV R&D program, all of the vote s analyzed included 
funding for programs with short-te rm economic benefits a s well. 
Third, with the exception of the correlation analy sis of Bernste in 
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and Anthony (1974) and Arnold (198lb), previous published studies have 
looked for "pork barrel" effects in spending at t he entire government 
level (Peltzman (1985)) or at the agency level for large agenc ies ( t he 
Department of Defense and the De pa rtment of Hea lth , Education , and 
Welfare)--see Kau and Rubin (1979a), Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) , and 
Navarro (1984). Government-wide and agency spending is generall y 
insignificant in these studies. Furthermore, no published regression 
analysis examines s pending at the program l evel, although a number of 
studies in draft form find positive effects at the program level--see the 
studies by Banks, Cohen , a nd Edelman in The Technology Pork Barrel a nd 
Krehbiel and Rivers (1988a). The positive results for PV spending are 
consistent with the results of these latter studies. 
The analysis presented here suggests that ideological, loca l 
economic benefit , and "pork barre l" factors are all important in 
determining the federal support of a program over time. The photovoltaic 
program employed a decentralized , semi-competitive strategy for the 
allocation of funds . This meant that the program was unlikely to founder 
based on the outcome of particular awa rds and was structured to achieve 
cost reductions and technological progress . However, it also meant that 
t he progra m was more likely t o be buffeted by the changing winds of 
ideology or ex ternal economics than if a strong pork barrel component had 
been present. Thus, the strategy that contributes to technological 
s uccess of the program may also contribute to its political failure. The 
structure amenable to achieving economic benefits is precisely the one 
that fails to create a political constituency that l asts l ong enough , in 




HISTORY OF THE PHOTOVOLTAICS COMMERCIALIZAT ION PROGRAM 
Photovoltaic (PV) devices convert sunlight directly into 
electricity . The first significant use of photovoltaics occurred in the 
U.S. space program to provide power for satellites , beginning with the 
Vanguard in 1958. 1 In response to the energy crisis in the e arl y 19 70s , 
the federal government initiated a program , which has continued to the 
present day, that attempted to commercialize photovoltaics for g eneration 
of electricity on earth.2 
Spending less than a million dollars a y ear in fiscal years 1972 and 
1973, direct federal expenditures (excluding tax credits) on photovoltaics 
grew to $150 million in FY 1980, before shrinking to less than an ave rage 
of $50 million per y ear in the eight Reagan budgets . 3 
The goal of this program was to reduce dramatically the cost of 
photovoltaic energy. The original cost goals of the program have not been 
achieved, nor is PV power currently competitive for other than remote 
applications . However, there have been a number of achievements in 
photovoltaics. Costs have dropped substantially, and, as shown in Table 
1 , U.S. photovoltaic module production and domestic use have grown 
substantially. Although changes in the definition of the categories used 
1 Solar Energy Research Institute (1982 , p. 8) The SERI book with 
the same title published in 1984 is an expanded version of this document . 
2 Smith (1981) and Redfield (1981) prov ide good summaries of the PV 
program. 
3 Dollars are in current dollars throughout this paper , unl e s s note d. 
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Table 1 
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Shipment figures include imported modules . 
unencapsulated PV cells . 
aLast six months only. 
Figures do not include 
bDoes not include shipments of modules for space satellite applications, 
which generally account fo r 5-15 percent of all module shipments. 
Sources: 1982-1986 total and 1985-1986 export figures from U.S. Department 
of Energy (1987b), p. 22 . 1983 - 1984 exports from U. S . Department of 
Energy (1985c), p. 24. 1981-1982 exports from U.S . Department of Energy 
(1984b), p. 23. 1981 from U. S . Department of Energy (1984b), p. 23; 1980 
from U. S. Department of Energy (1983d) , p. 26. 1979 from U.S. Department 
of Energy (1979c), p. 25 . 
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to collect data on e nd uses ( Table 2) complicates the comparison. 4 the 
most inte resting change is the decline of "central power" from 44-70 
percent in 1982-1984 t o 9 percent for "utility '' in 1985-1986 . Sinc e t he 
f o rmer category is ac tually less i nclus i ve than the l a tte r , this indicates 
a significant decline. Two like ly explanations for this are c hanges in 
tax credits and les s federal support for d e monstration projects. Earlier 
data show substantia l growth in utility inv olvement in photovol ta i cs 
(Table 3) . 
EARLY HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM 
Although photovol taic cells were used extensively in the space 
program, federal support f o r all terrestrial applications of solar energy 
(including other programs as well as photovoltaics) a vera ged only about 
$100,000 per year during the 20 year period from 1950-1970. 5 In the early 
1970s, the primary federal s upport for solar technology for terrestrial 
use came from the National Science Foundation (NSF) . In 1975, the program 
was moved to the Energy Research a nd Development Administration (ERDA) 
which in 1977 became part of the Department of Energy (DOE ). The budget 
for PV grew dramatically in the 1 970s but shrank considerably i n the 1980s 
(Table 4) . 
4 The cat egories were differen t for 1985-86 t han 1982-1984. 
"Residential" measure d l e ss than 5 percent fo r 1 982 - 84 and 31- 32 percen t 
for 1 985-1986 (growi ng in a bsolute terms from 492 peak kW in 1984 to 1 800 
in 1985) but the latter category includes nong r i d applications, whereas 
the former does not ; thus it is d ifficult to know how much change has 
take n place . 
5 Estimate of Dr. John Teem, t h e n Assistant Administrator fo r So l ar , 
Geothermal, and Advanced Energy Sys tems, Energy Research a nd Development 
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9 .4 59 1 
6.4 419 
22 . 4 1 ,375 
4. 2 294 
1.9 101 
















100 . 0 






Specialty ... . 470 
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Tota l 9912 
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44 . 1 
100.0 
a nd intermediate 
Sources : 1985-1986 figures from U . S . Department of Energy ( 1 987b ), p . 24 . 
198 2- 1984 figures from U.S. Department of Energy (1985c), pp . 21, 26 . 
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Table 3 
Number of Utilities Involved in Photovoltaic Projects, 197 5 -1983 
Year Number of Utilities Number of Projects 
1975 na 1 
1976 5 5 
1977 10 12 
1978 23 30 
1979 24 32 
1980 32 48 
1981 40 68 
1982 41 74 
1983 41 74 




Federal Government Expenditures on Terrestrial Photovoltaics 
(millions of dollars) 
Fiscal Year Current Dollars Constant FY 74$ 
1971 small or none small or none 
1972 .33 .37 
1973 .79 .85 
1974 2 . 4 2 . 4 
1975 8.0 7 . 3 
1976 21.6 18.4 
1977 64.0 50.1 
1978 76.5 57.0 
1979 118 0 8 81.4 
1980 150 .0 94.6 
1981 139.2 80.1 
1982 74.0 39.7 
1983 58.0 29.9 
1984 50.4 25 .0 
1985 57.0 27 . 3 
1986 40.7 19.0 
1987 40.4 18.3 
1988 35.0 15.3 
1989 35.5 15.1 
TOTAL (1971-89) 972.6 582.1 
Note: Figures include the effects of supplementals and rescissions. 
1976-1989 figures represent appropriations. 1971-1975 figures probably 
represent costs (approximating outlays). Appropriations figures would be 
somewhat larger because program is growing at this time. For 197 2 -88 , 
constant dollars are computed by constructing the fiscal year deflator as 
the average of the GNP implicit price deflator for the quarters in t he 
fiscal year (the quarterly figures can be found in Survey of Current 
Business) . FY 89 inflation assumed at FY 88 rate (3. 1 %) . 
Source: 1971-1975 figures from Herwig (1974, p. 1251), with actual figures 
for 1971-1974 and estimated for 1975. 1976-1989 figures from Table 21. 
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Early Assessments of PV 
During the NSF period, five key studies assessed the long- t e rm 
prospects for solar energy and photovol taics. 6 Four of these studies 
estimated the contribution that solar energy sources would make in the 
future. Separate estimates were made for different solar technologies, 
including photovoltaics. The estimates for photovoltaics are shown in 
Table 5. This table also shows , for comparison , estimates that were made 
later, in 1979-1980. 
Although these studies reflect varying degrees of optimism regarding 
solar energy and photovoltaics, they all foresaw a very limited 
contribution of photovoltaics through at least 1985, with significant 
penetration of PV by the year 2000. This combination of very limited 
short-term potential and large long-term potential reflected an assessment 
that large cost reductions (a hundredfold reduction) were necessary to 
make PV economic but that these cost reductions were achievable given 
sufficient time and R&D expenditures. 
Table 6 shows various estimates of the federal expenditures required 
to achieve these cost reductions. These reports attempted to justify 
these federal expenditures by a rudimentary cost-benefit calculation which 
compared the total dollar savings in fuel costs resulting from the a ssumed 
level of PV use with the federal research and development costs for PV. 
This comparison was done implicitly in the NSF/ NASA report in 1972 which 
6 The studies are (1) NSFjNASA (1972) , (2) Subpanel IX Report (1973), 
( 3 ) National Science Foundation (1973, 1974a) and Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (1974b), (4) MITRE (1973, 1974) , and ( 5) U.S. Federal Energy 
Administration (1974) . 
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Table 5 
Contribution of Photovoltaics 
(1015 Btus Per Year--Quadrillion Btus or "Quads" ) 
Study 1 980 
NSF / NASA ( 1972) 0 




Solar Energy Task 
Forc e (1974) 
0 
0 


















































a "-" means that no projection for that year was made. l KWH 
Total U.S. energy consumption in 1974 was 72.6 quads. 
3412 
Sources : NSFjNASA (1972), Table 3, multiplying by factor of 0 . 3 to get 
solar energy production equal to the fossil fuel displacement fi gures 
given. Subpane1 IX (1973), Figure 29, p. 4 11. MITRE (1973), pp . 178, 
180. Solar Energy Task Force from U.S. Federal Energy Administration 
(1974), pp. I-7, 9. Different figures for these studies were given in a 
table prepared by a Congressional committee. 
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Table 6 
Estimates of Federal Photovoltaic Program Budget Requirements 
(Millions of Dollarsl) 
Source 
Office of Science and 
Technology (1972) 
NSF/NASA (1972) 
Cherry Hill (1973) 




Solar Energy Task 
Force (1974) 
NSF Testimony (1974) 
NSF Report (1974) 







39 . 6 
72.9 
No budget given 
8154 
816 




first 5 years 
first 10 years 
first 25 years 
first 7 years 
first 7 years 
1 0 
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Sources : Office of Science and Technology (1972). Cited in American 
Institute of Aeronautics and As tronautics (1975), p. 57. NSF/NASA (1972), 
p . 65. Cherry Hill figures from Wolf (1974), Tabl e 9. Wolf ' s figures 
summarize those in the executive report of the conference--Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (1974b), pp. 9, 13, 19, 22, 23, 26. Subpanel I X Report (1973), 
Figure 24, p. 405 in hearing document . MITRE figures from MITRE (1974), 
pp. 439-441 in hearing document . NSF Testimony from NSF written answers 
to questions at hearing (Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1974, p. 
131). NSF Report from National Solar Energy Program (1974), p. VII-25. 
Notes: 
1 . The reports do not indicate whether figures are in constant or cu rrent 
dollars , or whether these are discounted present values . 
2 . This estimate does not include estimates for some categories for the 
final six years of the proposed program. If these were included, the 
expenditure requirement would probably be about $30 million more . 
3. The MITRE report says that this is the amount to conduct all of the 
research tasks for PV . It is unclear what would be achieved by 
expenditure of the amounts shown and what support beyond the initial 7 
years will be required--especially since elsewhere in the report MITRE 
predicts that PV will cost from 1 to 4 times as much as conv entional 
energy in the year 2000 . 
15 
Table 6 (cont . ) 
4 . This is the funding required from publ ic and private sources to 
establish a market price of about 50 cents per peak watt. It was expected 
that federal funding would dominate in the 1970s and privat e funding i n 
the 1980s , if progress continued. This figure appears to conflict with 
the 816 figure given in the NSF Report in the same ye ar since the la tte r 
only estimated federal funding requirements. 
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showed annual dollar savings in fossil fuel ($750 million in 2000, $16 
billion in 2020) with total federal funding required ($780 million). The 
Solar Energy Task Force Report , done as part of the large Pro ject 
Independence Blueprint in 1974 , made this comparison explicitly, perhaps 
for the first time. 7 The report states 
.photovoltaic conversion systems would be expected to be 
producing more than 1% of the nation's energy by the year 
2000. Estimates indicate that this 1% . . would require an 
annual consumption of about 400 million barrels of fuel oil 
by oil-burning plants. At $11 per barrel, this could mean a 
saving of over $4 billion worth of fuel oil per year. These 
anticipated savings for one year are considerably more than 
the total costs anticipated for the entire PEPS [photovoltaic 
energy power systems] program . 8 
These forecasts of PV use in the short term, the medium term, and 
long term emerged from an assessment of the outlook for substantial cost 
reductions in photovoltaics. Cost goals were first adopted at the Cherry 
Hill photovoltaics conference in October, 1973. 
The consensus of the experts at the conference was the following:9 
1) A 10-year program to establish the commercial prac ticability of 
photovoltaics should be conducted and funded by the federal government. 
2) The primary emphasis of this program should be on single-crystal 
silicon technology, but other syste ms should also be developed. 
7 Dr. John Teem, Assistant Administrator for Solar, Geothermal and 
Advanced Energy Systems of the Energy Research and Development 
Administration , reaffirmed this approach in prepared Congressional 
testimony the next year . Teem (1975) , pp . 207-208. 
8 U.S. Federal Energy Administration (1974), p. VII-10. Although 
the report does not say it, "costs of the PEPS program" refers only to 
federal costs since the tables on pages VII-4 and 5 of the report indicate 
that the capital costs of the PEPS in service by the y ear 2000 will range 
from $80 to $440 billion. 
9 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1974b), pp. 1, 2. 
17 
3) The participation of electric utilities should be obtained as 
early as possible. 
4) For single-crystal silicon technology, a 50 cents/ peak watt cell 
can be achieved by 1985, with 10 cents per watt by the year 2000. 
5) For CdSjCuS2S, 20 cents per peak watt is a reasonable goal for 
1985 with 5 cents possible for 2000. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these studies and testimony is that 
there was a consensus among solar energy experts and advocates in the 
early 1970s on a number of points: 
1) Photovoltaics could generate very little electricity by 1985, but 
could generate a significant amount of electricity by the year 2000 . 
2) This could be accomplished by the expenditure of approximately 
300 to 800 million dollars by the federal government. 
3) This federal expenditure should be undertaken because the 
savings in fossil fuel costs that would result would be far larger than 
the federal expenditure required . 
4) Costs of the existing technology (flat-plate , single-crystal 
silicon) could be reduced substantially. However, ultimately other 
technologies would probably be required to reduce the costs of 
photovoltaics sufficiently for the widespread use envisioned by the year 
2000 . 
COST - REDUCTION AREAS 
As part of the plan to achieve cost reduction , the program very soon 
defined cost-reduction activ ities across the entire program. A brief 
discussion of these areas will illustrate how the cost-reduction problem 
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was disaggregated into several cost-reduction problems:lO 
Existin~ Technolo~y 
The existing technology consisted of single-crystal silicon cells. Five 
major subactivities were defined to reduce silicon module costs. 
Reduce solar-cell-~rade silicon from $65 per kilo~ram to $10. 
To make a silicon cell, the starting raw material, quartzite, which 
is 90 percent or more silica (Si02), must be refined and its impurities 
removed. This involved procedure was quite costly. 
Increase efficiency of solar-cell fabrication (over 75 percent of 
the silicon material was bein~ wasted) . 
The purified silicon resulting from the above step is 
polycrystalline. The photovoltaic properties of polycrystalline silicon 
are less desirable than single-crystal silicon in which silicon atoms are 
arranged in a perfect lattice, rather than being randomly packed. Single-
crystal silicon can be produced from polycrystalline silicon by the 
Czochralski process, where a cylindrical ingot, typically 7.5 centimeters 
in diameter, is slowly grown. The next step in the process is to cut the 
ingots into wafers 0 . 5 millimeters thick using diamond saws. Because the 
saws are also about this thickness, this means at least half of the 
single-crystal silicon material will be lost during slicing. 
Improve the ratio of cell to array area (packin~ factor). 
An unfortunate consequence of the cylindrical nature of the 
Czochralski ingots is that the resulting wafers are circular. Putting 
10 U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (1976), pp. 
2-3. The description of solar - cell technology is drawn from Solar Energy 
Research Institute (1984). 
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circular cells on an array means that a substantial portion of the array 
surface will not be covered by cells and thus is of no value for 
electricity generation. This unused surface area increases the cost of 
PV electricity due to the fact that the cost of the support structure 
depends on the surface area of the array. 
Develop encapsulation materials to increase array lifetime. 
PV arrays ideally have low operating costs. With a high capital 
cost to operating cost ratio, the cost of PV electri city is critically 
dependent on the lifetime of the array. Lightweight encapsulation 
materials are important so as to not to increase the cost of support 
structures. 
Automate production of silicon solar-cell arrays. 
Hand fabrication of PV arrays was expensive . 
only be reached if the process were automated. 
Conduct Thin- Film and Novel Materials Research 
Cost targets could 
In addition to reducing the costs of the current technology, the 
program pursued the use of alternative materials . Thin films using 
nonsilicon materials offered a number of theoretical a dvantages to 
silicon: 
a) Different solar-cell materials have different "characteristic 
energies," the energy required to free electrons , a necessary step to 
generate electricity. The sun's spectrum consists of a wide variety of 
energies . To maximize the efficiency of a cell, one wants a material in 
which the maximum amount of energy in the sun's spe ctrum is just great 
enough to free electrons. Silicon is good in this respect , but not ideal. 
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b) Some other materials are more light-absorbing than silicon. This 
permits the use of thinner films, saving on material costs , and enhancing 
the electrical properties of the cell . 
However the efficiency of these cells (the ratio of the electrical 
energy produced to the light energy striking the cell) was low. Lower 
efficiency means that more cells (costly in themselves) and a larger 
support structure is required to generate the same amount of electricity. 
Develop Concentrators 
In addition to exploring alternative materials, the program also 
pursued different approaches to gathering light . As an alternative to the 
traditional "flat-plate" approach, mirrors or lenses can be used to 
"concentrate" light. The reason to do this is that sunlight is relatively 
diffuse and thus large numbers of cells and large support structures are 
required to generate large amounts of electricity . The use of lenses or 
mirrors to concentrate the light provides a way to generate the same 
amount of electricity but with far fewer cells. 
However, concentrators have problems that raise their costs: 
Temperature. The efficiency of solar cells varies with temperature. 
Silicon flat-plate collectors, without the use of concentrators, operate 
at relatively efficient levels. In the absence of cooling, concentrators 
could raise the silicon cell temperature so muc h that the photoelectric 
effect would disappear. Cooling is therefore essential. 
Trackin~. Concentrators require tracking the sun. This can be done 
along one axis or two. 




The key aspects of R&D management in the PV program were its use of 
decentralization , coordination, competition, and decision criteria . 
Decentralization 
Federal R&D programs are typically organized with one, two, or three 
levels of decision making . An example of a single-level structure is 
government in-house research and development. A two-level approach is 
the standard government-contractor form, and the three-level approach is 
the government-contractor-subcontractor form. The PV program used a 
three- and four-level form throughout its history . In this structure, the 
primary management of the program took place in several "Level II" lead 
centers and "Level III" field centers rather than from Level I 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. The lead and field centers, in turn, 
awarded contracts to "Level IV" private contractors . ll 
The "Level I" headquarters of the PV program resided with the 
Research Applied to National Needs Program in the National Science 
Foundation until January 1975, when responsibility was shifted to the 
newly created Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). 1 2 
11 Level I, I I , and I I I terminology does not appear in program 
documents. The terminology is used in the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and is used here for convenience and to draw 
explicit parallels to current NASA practice. 
12 Responsibility for photovoltaics was transferred to ERDA through 
three 1974 Acts . ERDA was established by the Energy Reorganization Act 
of 1974 (P . L. 93-438, October 11 , 1974) which transferred the NSF solar 
heating and cooling and geothermal power development programs to ERDA . 
The Solar Energy Research , Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974 
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Responsibility for all ERDA programs, includin g photovoltaics, shifted to 
the Department of Energy in October 1977 as a result of the Department of 
Energy Organization Act (P .L . 95-91, August 4, 19 77). 1 3 
The number of Level I I lead centers and their responsibili ties 
c hanged over time. At the height of the program in 1980 , the two l ead 
centers were the Solar Energy Research I nstitute (S ERI ) i n Golden , 
Colorado (lead center for Advanced Re search and Development) and the J e t 
Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena , Cal ifornia ( lead center for Technol ogy 
Development and Applications and the Federal PV Utilization Program). As 
lead center for technology development and applications, JPL had 
management responsibility over a number of other "field" centers . These 
"field" centers which JPL directed as of January 1981 , and their 
responsibilities , are shown in Tabl e 7. 14 In addition to t he centers 
listed in the table, the DOE Albuquerque and Oak Ridge Operations Offices 
a nd the Oak Ridge National Laboratory had management responsibility for 
a number of PV demonstration projects.l5 
Coordination 
Private-sector research is usually characterized by duplication 
among firms . Government R&D typically assigns each contractor or 
(P . L. 93-473, October 26, 1974) authorized a federal research , 
development, and demonstration program to commercialize solar energy and 
provided for these funct ions to be carried out by ERDA. These 
responsibilities were further amplified in t he Federal Nonnuclear Energy 
Research and Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-577 , December 31 , 1974) . 
13 U.S. Department of Energy (1981), p . 2-l. 
14 U. S . Department of Energy (L98l) , p. 2-4 . 
15 U.S. Department of Energy (l984a), pp. 319 - 338 . 
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Table 7 
Field Centers Directed by JPL as of January 1981 
FIELD CENTER 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Pasadena , California 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Low Cost Solar Array Collectors 
Sandia National Laboratories Systems Design 
Albuquerque, New Mexico Concentrator Collectors 
Subsystem Development 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory 
Lexington, Massachusetts 
Aerospace Corporation 
El Segundo , California 




Upton, New York 
NASA Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Intermediate Load Center Applications 
Residential Applications 
Central Station 
Mission and Policy Analysis 
Environmental Health and Safety 
Requirements 
Remote Stand Alone Applications 
International Applications 
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laboratory a specific part of the project to avoid duplication of effort 
and battles over "turf." For example, in a standard defense contract , one 
contractor may get the engine contract , another the radar, etc. Because 
successful completion of all parts is required for success, the program 
is only as strong as its weakest link. 
The PV program used the standard approach of assigning different 
responsibilities to each organization within a level. The Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL), the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI), and Sandia 
National Laboratories (Sandia) were the most important centers. Each was 
assigned responsibility for one of the three major technical alternativ es 
for PV--flat-plate single-crystal silicon (JPL), other materials (SERI), 
and concentrators (Sandia). Other field centers were assigned differe nt 
responsibilities . In some cases their responsibilities were 
complementary. For example, Brookhaven's work on environmental effects 
complemented the JPL work on reducing the cost of flat-plate single-
crystal arrays. In other cases, the tasks assigned to different 
organizations were substitutes . For example, although exotic materials, 
concentrators, and flat-plate single-crystal silicon were unique 
technically, they could potentially serve the same economic function. In 
either the complementary or competitive case, the element of coordination 
was that no other organization could undertake technically overlapping 
work . 
Competition 
The distinctive aspect of the PV program was that competition 
existed within the program. As noted above, different Level III 
25 
organizations had responsibilities for competing technologies. Inevitably 
therefore the conflict had both a technological and institutional basis--
not only was single-plate silicon competing with concentrators and exotic 
materials, but JPL was competing with Sandia and SERI. The competition 
was heightened by the fact that the competitive strength of these three 
technologies was roughly even. 
Within each of these technologies, several technical alternatives 
were pursued. In flat-plate single-crystal silicon arrays, there were 
several ways to obtain the silicon material and to make the cells. For 
non-single-crystal silicon arrays, there were polycrys talline and 
amorphous silicon alternatives, as well as a variety of other materials 
and cell types. Within the concentrator approach, there were three 
primary alternatives: parabolic trough, linear point-focus Fresnel lens , 
and point-focus Fresnel lens.l6 
The program was designed to support multiple concepts in parallel 
during the initial R&D phases, and as each concept progressed, the menu 
of alternatives was to be gradually reduced.l7 This approach offered a 
number of advantages. First , it increased the probability of success. 
While the outcome of any one approach was uncertain, the chances of a 
favorable outcome from at least one approach was good as long as the 
probabilities of success were independent. Second, approaches (and the 
16 Maycock and Stirewalt (1985), p . 52. 
17 This approach was described as early as October 1973, the same 
month as the Cherry Hill conference on photovoltaics discussed above, by 
Lloyd Herwig, Director of Advanced Solar Energy Research and Technology, 
Research Applied to National Needs , National Science Foundation, who 
described the NSF R&D strategy as a "phased program planning approach." 
Herwig (1974), p. 11. Cited in Gates (1988). 
26 
firms undertaking them) would not be funded in later stages if earl y 
results were not encouraging. Thus there was a competitive spur to 
achieve good results . Third , because of budget constraints , pursuing 
multiple paths meant smaller projects and that smaller firms. groups or 
individuals could undertake specialized research on a single aspect of the 
problem . 1 8 The ability of small organizations to compete was also aided 
by the decentralized nature of the program , in which the effort was 
decomposed into numerous specific tasks. The result was that all, or 
most, research centers and firms in the industry could have a piece of the 
action, thus minimizing any distributive liabilities from the award 
process. 
The latter point is particularly important because a potential 
political danger in a parallel contracting approach is that because the 
process was designed to develop "winners" and discontinue "losers," the 
losers in the process could have run to their Congressional allies, as 
happened in the communications satellite program, 19 to prevent the winners 
from reaping their rewards, one of which would be to alter the relative 
competitive position of firms in the industry. I did not find any 
evidence of challenged awards . One likely reason for this is that, unlike 
the satellite program, no single award was so large as to be pivotal. 
Another possibility is that new opportunities existed in the program 
18 Smith (1981), p . 1478 . 
19 Cohen (forthcoming) . 
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because it combined parallel and serial elements.20 
The evidence regarding the number of contractors during various 
years of the PV program is interesting in this regard. The data do not 
show the declines that one might expect from a competitive program where 
losers are discontinued and which underwent sharp budget cuts (Table 8). 
There are several likely reasons for this. First , the losers from earlier 
years could be taking advantage of the new opportunities that were funded 
in later years. Second, since a number of firms had multiple PV 
contracts, the cutbacks in the number of contracts implied by the parallel 
approach would have less of an impact on the number of firms (only if all 
of a firm's contracts were discontinued would it drop off the list of 
firms). Third, the funding declines of the 1980s accompanied a shift from 
constructing production lines and demonstrations and toward basic 
research, and thus many of the contracts could be much smaller than 
earlier. Fourth, the data may be inaccurate. 21 
Criteria for Decisions 
Decision criteria differ between private and government entities. 
Government decision makers have political objectives that play little or 
20 In an optimally run program , the extent to which alternatives 
should be pursued in parallel is a function of how much hurry there is to 
develop the technology. If one has plenty of time, the program should be 
tilted toward serial development , and conversely . 
21 I counted the number of "current contractors" listed in each 
year's program summary for the program. A few of these, perhaps 10-20 
percent, are not currently receiving funds, but are finishing work that 
was funded in prior years. Another potential difficulty is that when 
funding for all contracts listed in the program summaries was totaled, the 
sums were less than PV spending in those years. Although discrepancies 
in funding totals probably result for other reasons, these discrepancies 
cast some doubt on the number of contractors data . 
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Table 8 
Number of Current Contractors in Photovoltaic Program 





















Source: Annual program summaries , i .e. , Energy Research and Development 
Administration (1976), U. S . Department of Energy (l978b, 1978e, l980a , 
1981, 1982 , 1983b , 1984a, 1985a, 1985d , 1988b) 
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no role in the private sector, and are presumably less informed about the 
market implications of their activities. Government expenditures 
sometimes have "pork barrel" characteristics, i.e. , funding decisions are 
made on a political basis, and the key political benefit results from 
government expenditures, not from whatever benefits flow from successful 
completion of the project. 
Several factors limited pork barrel aspects in the PV R&D program . 
First, decisions on award of contracts to the private sector were made by 
the lead and field centers, not NSF, ERDA, or DOE headquarters . The 
decision makers in these field centers would be less politically attuned 
or subject to political influence than headquarters personnel and would 
be more technically competent . Second, in the SERI/JPL/Sandia case 
discussed above, the competitive nature of the technologies would lead 
decision makers in these centers to give significant weight to efficiency 
in decisions since the success of the technology could influence both the 
future funding of the lab and its prestige. 
The program was noteworthy in the development of analytical tools , 
particularly at JPL, to guide decision making. As noted earlier, tasks 
were often broken into smaller , complementary pieces . For these subtasks, 
the program had to decide how to set reasonable goals for each task. It 
did this through an allocation of the overall module price goal to each 
of the subtasks, with "equal pain" for each . 22 To assess the progress of 
research toward these goals, the program developed the Solar Array 
Manufacturing Industry Costing Standards (SAMICS). Developed by 1978, 
22 See U.S. Department of Energy (1980d), pp. 2-30 through 41, for 
a description of this process. 
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this permitted a standardized me t hod of cost comparison for differen t 
manufacturing processes. 23 
Nevertheless , the assignment of lead and field center 
responsibilities entire l y to government l abs may not have been 
appropriate. JPL, Sandia , and the Midwest Research Institute , which 
operates SERI, were experienced in government R&D , but not 
commercialization. Although JPL clearly had experience in the use of PV 
technology in space , application to terrestrial uses is diffe rent in 
several respects. 24 First, the space technology was designed for one 
user, the government, whereas adoption of the earth technology would 
require the separate decisions of many users , each with different 
c ircumstances. Second, the space applications were far more tolerant of 
cost overruns and/ or changed economics. There was no substitute product 
on the shelf for space use that would be used if space PV turned out to 
be somewhat more costly than anticipated. If the devices worked 
technically, the project was a s uccess. For earth use, the technology 
would be successful only if users decided that the new technology had 
economic advantages over a wide array of a lternatives. 25 For these 
reasons, some us e of private firms as lead and/or field centers might have 
been wise. 
23 Callaghan , Henry, a nd McGuire (1985) describe some of the way s 
the SAMICS model was employed . 
24 Landsberg ( 1979), pp . 4 2 -43. 
25 The concept of success for PV will be di scussed at greater l ength 
at the end of this chapter. 
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NON-R&D APPROACHES TO COST REDUCTION 
The photovoltaics program always has been primaril y a researc h and 
development effort aimed at bringing down the costs of photov oltaics . A 
number of different approaches were possible , each with accompany ing 
advantages and disadvantages. The strategy emphasized improving the 
existing technology (flat-plate single-crystal silicon) whi le funding 
longer-term alternative approaches involving other materials and 
concentrators. In addition to this parallelism among basic a pproaches , 
parallelism existed at lower levels, with the funding of multiple options 
within any one technology . 
In addition to this "supply-side" focus , there have been three 
significant efforts on the demand side: government procurement, utility 
restrictions, and t ax credits. Table 9 summarizes the chronology of these 
actions . 
Government Procurement 
The most important issue in the photovoltaic program in the 1970s 
was the appropriate mix between procurement vs . research and development 
to achieve cost reductions . ERDA in 1976 had en v isioned a program of 
government purchases as an important means to a ch ieve cost reductions. 
There were two reasons a dvanced for cost reduction through 
government purchases : economies of scale and the learning curve. The 
economies of scale argument was that government purchases would provide 
the industry with a large initial market and thus solar- cell manufacture rs 












Chronol ogical Summary of Demand Stimulus 
Measu res Applying to Photovoltaics 
Action 
House approves Tsongas amendment authorizing $28 
million for federal purchase of PV systems 
House approves Tsongas amendment appropriating $1 2 . 2 
million for federal purchase of PV systems 
DOE Act of 1978 authorizes $13 million for purchase of 
cost - effective PV for federal facilities 
National Energy Act signed into law in 5 Acts. 
--The National Energy Conservation Policy Act authorized 
$98 million over FY 1979-81 for federal PV purchases 
--The Energy Tax Act of 1978 established a 10 percent 
business credit which applied to PV; it established a 
residential tax credit whi ch did not 
--The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 
limited oil and gas use in electric utilities. 
--The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
required utilities to buy power from cogenerators and 
small producers (such at PV) at avoided cost 
The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980 enacted which 
--raised the residential tax credit to 40 percent of the 
first $10,000 and applied the credit to PV 
- -raised the business tax credit to 15 percent and 
extended the credit for 3 year s 
Tax credits expire 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 restores business credits at 15 
percent in 86, 12 percent in 1987, and 10 percent in 
1988 
Technical Corrections and Revenue Act of 1988 extends 
10 percent credit through 1989 
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However, the principal argument made for government purchases was 
the "learning curve" in other technologies, particularly semiconducto rs , 
in which unit production costs decline with cumulative firm or indus t r y 
produc tion . Since semiconductors operate on the same principle as 
photovol taic cells , the sharp declines in c osts due to 1 earning in 
semiconductors gave rise to optimism about the cost reductions that would 
result from government purchases in PV. Furthermore , without g ov ernment 
purchases, these cost reductions might happen very slowly because of a 
lack of intermediate markets with costs between those of remote uses and 
central-station or residential use . Thus photovoltaic production might 
be locked in at low levels in the absence of government purchases . 
Government procurement plans expanded during the late 1970s . In 
1976, ERDA anticipated that purchases by government agencies would reach 
a cumulative total of 11 MW by FY 1983. 26 I n September 1977, Congress 
adopted an amendment by Representative Paul Tsongas (D. Mass) to authorize 
$28 million for federal purchases of photovoltaic systems and $10 million 
for technological development . In October , a Tsongas amendment to 
appropriate funds for these photovol taic, wind-energy , and education 
programs was approved. However, the amounts had been reduced below the 
level in the authorizing amendment. Only $19 million would b e spent on 
photovoltaics (half the authorized amount) of which $12 .2 million would 
be for government procurement (44 percent of the amount authorized). 
The procurement program received additional impetus from two 1978 
laws . Section 208 of the Department of Energy Act of 1978 ( P.L . 95-238, 
February 25, 1978) authorized $13 million in FY 1978 to purchase 
26 U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration (1976), p . 2. 
34 
photovoltaic systems for use by Federal agenci es i n applications that were 
cost-effective on the basis of life -cycle costs.27 The National Ene rgy 
Conservation Policy Act ( P.L. 95-619 , November 9. 1978) expand e d this 
program. Title 5, Part 4 of this Act established the Federal Photovoltaic 
Utilization Program ( FPUP). This program required the Department of 
Energy to stimulate photovoltaic energy commercializat ion though 
accelerated procurement and instailation of photovoltaic sol ar e l ectric 
systems . The Act authorized $ 98 million over a three -year period from 
October l, 1978, to September 30 , 1981 (FY 79- 81) for t h is purpose. 
DOE was require d to schedule this procure ment to "stimulate the 
early development of a permanent low-cost private photovoltaic production 
facility in the United States , a nd to stimulate the private sector market 
for photovol taic power sys t e rns . " 2 8 The scheduling r equirement was no 
doubt a response to the argument of opponen ts that procure ment ran the 
risk of freezing current technology by creating large surges in demand 
that would result in capa city expansion of the existing technology. Once 
in place , this capacity would retard t he devel opment and introduction of 
new technology. 29 
Opponents of procurement also a rgued that t h e analogy to 
semiconductors was mi s leading. Cost r eductions in semiconductors had 
27 U.S. Department of Ene r gy (1980f), p . 65. 
28 P.L. 95 - 619, section 565 , 567 . 
29 On the other hand, one could argue that limited encouragement of 
manufacturers to expand capacity to serve existing marke ts or create new 
ones through lower costs, mi ght b e appropriate. Roessner (1982) reports 
that PV industry official s clai med that i nv estments in plant capacity were 
not be ing made becau se of the fear t hat if the rapid price reduction goal s 
of the PV R&D program were me t , the capacity would rapidl y become 
obsolete. 
35 
resulted largely from making things smaller ( reducing material 
requirements) whereas this was not poss i ble in photovoltaics because t he 
output of a photovoltaic cell was proportional to its surface area and its 
eff iciency . Although efficiency gains were possible, thus permitting 
smaller cells, the theoretical max imum improv ement in efficiency was about 
a factor of three, rather than the orders of magnitude experienced in 
semiconductors. 
Although the proponents of procurement had prevailed in t he 
authorization process in the Congress, the going was more difficul t 
e lsewhere . In January, 1979 , the American Physical Society released an 
influential report on photovoltaics which argued that "efforts to 
stimulate a larg e-scale, low- cost industry a re premature . " 30 
Appropriations for FPUP were far l ess than the $98 million authori z ed . 
Through FY 1981, purchases of approximately 600 peak kilowatts had been 
funded under FPUP . 31 
In the 1980s, the Administration sought to eliminate demonstrations, 
in keeping with its overall philosophy about government support of R&D. 
This effort was not completely successful. I n the 1986 appropriation, 
Congress earmarked $2 million for the Austin , Texas, residential 
experimental station and $1 mill ion for the Massachusetts Ph otovoltaic 
Center . 32 Far more has been spent recently on central - station projects. 
In keeping with the program's e mpha sis on cen t ral-station applicat ions 
since 1983, the primary focus of recent de monstrations has been on 
30 American Physical Society (1979), p . 16 . 
31 U.S. Department of Energy (1982), p . 1 - 16. 
32 U.S. House of Representatives (1985), p. 40. 
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central-station applications. Millions of federal d ollars we re s pe n t 
during the Reagan Administration on the SMUD project ( origi n a ll y pl anned 
to be 100 MW), the Georgetown University 300 KW National Exe mplar . a nd 
most recent l y on the PVUSA projec t ($4 million in 1 98 7 and $4 milli on i n 
1988 for PVUSA). Although the Georgetown project is an on- s ite use , i ts 
large scale and long horizon distinguish i t from residential a pplic a tions . 
Despite incomplete implementation of the FPUP program, approxima tely 
$121 million in current dollars has been spent to date on f e d e ral 
purchases of PV systems. 33 This r e pre sents approximately 12 percent of 
the total 1971-1989 appropriations of $973 million . Assuming that R&D is 
a more effective way to reduce costs than procurement , the 1 2 pe rcent 
figure is clearly too large for an optimally run PV program. 
Demonstrations, when required to l earn about the technology , can be 
inexpensive because of the modularity of PV s ystems . However, given the 
experience in other programs, the 12 percent figure may hav e been a 
reasonable price to pay for Congressional support of an R&D program . PV 
manufacturers strongly supported government procurement programs, and 
objected at times to the bulk of the PV money going to research firms . 
The major federally supported PV projects (Table 10) reveal three 
features of the demonstration program. First, most of the projects were 
uneconomic. Only the remote projects (Mt . Laguna, Natural Bridges, and 
the Papago Indian village) could possibly be justified economically. 
Second, only two central-station utility projects received direct federal 
33 Personal communication, Andrew Krantz , Department of Energy for 
non-PVUSA expenditures . PVUSA from Conference Report to accompany H.J. 
Res. 395, Continuing Appropriations FY 1988, December 22 , 1987, p. 751. 
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Table 10 









Arizona Public Service 
Science Applications 
Lea County Electric 
Cooperative 








AM Radio Station 
New Mexico State 
Papago Indian village 
MIT Energy Laboratory 
Size 
Location Application ( Peak kW) 
Davis, CA Utility ? 
Sacramento, CA Utility 1000 
Washington, DC University building 300 
Bly theville , AR College 250 
Phoenix, AZ Airport 225 
Oklahoma City, Science and art 150 
OK center 
Lov ington , NM Shopping center 100 
Beverly, MA High school 100 
Utah National Monument 100 
community 
Kauai, HI Hospital 60 
Mt . Laguna, CA Radar station 60 
Albuquerque, NM Office building 47 
Dallas, TX Airport 27 
Mead, NE 
Bryan , Ohio 
El Paso, TX 




AM Radio Station 
25 
25 




3 . 5 
Table 10 (cont.) 
Florida Solar Energy 
Center 





Las Cruces, NM 
Southeast Residential 
Experimental Stat ion 
Southwest Residential 
Experimental Station 
Source: Maycock and Stirewalt (1985) except for PVUSA project. List does 
not include Northwest Mississippi Junior College, a $6.6 million project 
in Arkansas never completed due to fraud. 
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assistance. (However these have been two of the largest and the most 
recent.) All other projects were for intermediate-load- center a nd 
residential applications. 
dispersed. 
Third , the projects were geographically 
Utility Restrictions 
Demand for photovoltaics was stimulated 
restrictions on conventional power faced by utilities. 
was restricted in a variety of ways. 
through numerous 
Fossil fuel use 
1) Clean Air Act restrictions, which could be satisfied through 
scrubbers or low-sulfur coal or oil, increased the cos t of coal and oil 
generation relative to solar technologies whose costs were unaffected 
because they do not emit pollutants. 
2) Direct restrictions on the use of petroleum and natural gas in 
utilities were adopted . This was first done in 1974 in the Energy Supply 
and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 (P .L. 93-319 , June 22, 1974), 
which gave the Federal Energy Administration authority to mandate 
conversions from oil or gas to coal for utilities that had coal-burning 
capabilities. Since ESECA mandated switching to coal, no boost was given 
to solar. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (P.L . 
95-620, November 9, 1978) restricted oil or gas use in all electric 
utilities, but without specifying the alternative technology to be used 
(thus coal or nuclear, as well as renewable technologies, could be used). 
3) The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 
t hreatened to increase the cost of coal rail transportation (particularly 
important due to the importance of low-sulfur western coal in meeting 
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environmental restrictions). Similarly , the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 197 7 could increase the cost of strip-mined coal. 
The other major conventional alternative , nuclear , was beset with 
a variety of problems. Both coal and nuclear pla nts faced long licens ing 
and construction times , a problem which was heightened by the fact t hat 
many states restricted the i nclusion of construc tion work in progress 
(CWIP) in t he rate base .34 
All of the above provided indirect support for pho tovoltai c s. More 
direct support was provided by requirements that utilities purchase powe r 
from cogenerators or small generators. Section 210 of the Public Utili ty 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ( P.L . 95-617, November 9 , 1978 ) required 
electric utilities to purchase power from cogeneration and small power 
production facilities at "avoided cost , " the cost to the electric utility 
of the electric energy which, but for the purchase of t he power from the 
cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or 
purchase from another source. The "avoided cost" provision of PURPA has 
generally been viewed as a stimulus to these alternative power sources . 
Tax Credits 
In addit ion to trying to lower the cost of photovoltaics through 
research and development , federal procurement , and restrictions on 
electric utilities, the federal government subsidized the private 
procurement of photovoltaic systems through tax credits and accelerated 
depreciation for the purchase of photovolta ic s y stems. Credits were f irst 
34 The relevance of coal transportation, coal strip mining, long 
licensing lead times for coal and nuclear, and financing is from U. S. 
Department of Energy (1980h), Section 2.4 . 1. 
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enacted in the Energy Tax Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-618 , November 9, 19 78 ), 
expanded in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 ( P.L . 96- 223, 
April 2, 1980), restored in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P . L. 99 - 514 , 
October 22, 1986), and extended in the Technical Corrections and Revenue 
Act of 1988 (P . L. 100-647, November 10, 1988). Provisions were not 
enacted solely for PV, but included other renewable technologies. The 
credits for individuals have been different from those of corporations, 
and eligible technologies and amount of the credit have changed over time . 
The credits for PV in the Energy Tax Act of 1978 were limited in two 
important respects . First, the residential credit35 did not apply to 
equipment which generated electricity, such as PV. Second, eligibility 
for the business tax credit36 did not extend to public utilities,37 state 
3 5 The credit was for renewable energy source expenditures made in 
the principal residence of a taxpayer after April 20, 1977, and before 
January 1, 1986. Taxpayers were entitled to a nonrefundable credit of 30 
percent of the first $2000 in expenditures and 20 percent of expenditures 
of the next $8000, for a maximum total credit of $2200 . The credit 
applied to solar and geothermal energy used to heat, cool, or provide hot 
water to the dwelling, or to wind energy for residential purposes. 
36 The Act provided a 10-percent refundable energy credit (in 
addition to the permanent investment tax credit) for business equipment 
which used solar or wind energy to generate electricity or to provide 
heating, cooling, or hot water in a structure . The credit was to apply 
to investment made between October 1, 1978 and December 31 , 1982. See 
U.S. Department of Energy (1980f), p. 296. 
37 Although public utilities are still excluded from the credit by 
subsequent legislation, central-station activities have received the 
credit through "third-party" owners, who are neither the 
supplier/manufacturer of the systems nor the buyers or consumers of the 
electricity produced. Solar companies have built plants and sold them to 
parent companies, which then sold the power to electric utilities. In 
another mechanism, the business credits were marketed to individuals as 
a tax shelter by United Energy Corporation of Foster City , California. 
Several megawatt systems were to consist of 2.5 kilowatt modules with each 
module owned by a specific investor, with the electric power to be sold 
to electric utilities. See U. S . General Accounting Office (1983) , p. 1 , 
and Maycock and Stirewalt (1985), pp. 193-196 . 
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and local governments, most tax-exempt organizations, and holders of 
federal grants.38 
The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 expanded the PV 
c redits in s everal ways. First, t he res idential c r edit now applied to 
electricity generation . Second, the res triction in the 1978 Act that 
components which served a dual purpose (structural and energy-re l ated) 
were not eligible for the credit, was eliminated for the resident ial 
credit but retained for the business c redit. 39 Third , the amount of t he 
credit was increased--the residential credit was i n c reased to 40 percent 
of the first $10,000 in expenditures and the business credi t was increased 
to 15 percent. Fourth , the business c redits were extended until t h e e nd 
of 1985 , which was the expiration date of the residential credits as 
prov ided for in the 1978 Act. 
The Tax Equity a nd Fiscal Re sponsibili ty Act (TEFRA) of 198 2 ( P . L. 
97- 248, September 3, 1982), effectivel y r e duce d the value of t he business 
energy tax credit by 20 percent . The "basis a djustment" provision in this 
Act required businesses to reduce the tax basis (and h ence allowable 
Although Maycock and Stirewalt do not explain the r eas on for t h e 
sale to parents, two reasons occur to me . The most likely reason is t hat 
the 1980 Act (discussed below) repealed the refundable nature of the 
business credits under the 1978 Act . Friedmann and Mayer (1980), p. 499. 
Thus the sale might increase the n et present value of t he credit, e ither 
by prov iding income from the sale so that t h e full c r edit could b e taken 
right away by the subsidiary , or per haps by allowing the parent to utilize 
the c redit. Another possibility is t hat if the parent could u tilize t he 
credit, the amount of t h e credit might be determined by the sale amount, 
which might be larger than the investment made by t h e subsidiar y. 
38 Internal Revenue Code Sections 48 ( 1) ( 3)( B) and 46( f)( 5) and 
Friedmann and Mayer (1980). 
39 This rule meant tha t solar panels installed as a roof were not 
eligible. See Frie dmann a nd Mayer (1980) . 
43 
depreciation) of any asset acquired after 1982 by half the a mount of any 
energy , investment , or rehabilitation tax credits claimed wi t h re s pect to 
the asset. 40 
Efforts to e xtend the energy tax credits beyond 1985 began i n l a t e 
1982 but did not succeed till the passage of the mammoth Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 in October 1986 . Although DOE supported e xtension , Treasury was 
opposed . 41 Although credits were eventually extended f or three more y e a rs 
(two in the case of biofuels) , three limitations were adopted . First , t he 
level of the credit was reduced over time from 1986 to 1988 for biofue ls , 
geothermal, PV, and solar thermal (for PV, 15 percent for 1986 , 12 percent 
for 1987 , and 10 percent for 1988). Only ocean thermal remaine d constant 
at 15 percent . Second, the residential credits and all wind credits were 
not extended. The wind credits had attracted considerable attention as 
40 Moore (1985), p . 19, Code Section 48 (q). 
41 The Treasury position is described in the statement of J. Gregory 
Ballentine, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Analysis), Hearings on S . 1 396 
before the Subcommittee on Energy and Agricul t ural Taxation of the Senate 
Committee on Finance, June 17, 1983 , pp. 17- 23. He states , 
In 1978, at the time the energy tax incentives were enacte d , 
price controls and supply allocations were in effect on both 
crude oil and natural gas and there wa s substantia l r e sistance 
to decontrol. Because of price controls, business firms had 
insufficient incentive to invest in a lte rnative energy 
sources . Therefore , in the absence of free market prices, an 
economic rationale existed for energy tax incentives . 
However, since the enactment of the energy credits, crude oil 
prices have been decontrolled and natural gas prices are b e ing 
d e controlled and are approaching, and in some cases exceeding , 
fr e e market l evels. As a result , t he tax c r ed i ts, wha t ever 
their original justification, are no longer n eeded. 
Reprinted i n Moore (1985), p. 53 . 
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a tax shelter. 42 Third, the affirmative commitment rule of prior law 
(allows business credit through 1990 if certain steps are taken by certain 
date) was not provided for in the extension. 4 3 
Due to expire at the end of 1988, the solar , geothermal, and ocean 
thermal credits were extended at their 1988 levels in November 1988 for 
another year by the Technical Corrections and Revenue Act of 1988.44 
Although the tax credits have received the most attention, other 
provisions of the Tax Code benefit solar energy. An analysis by the 
Congressional Research Service (Lazzari and Gravelle (1984)) indicated 
that the effective tax rates for solar and wind property without the 
business energy tax credit were still lower than the effective rates for 
oil, gas, and coal extraction and refining and were much lower than the 
rates for conventional electric and gas utilities. According to this 
analysis , these differences arise from the difference in treatment in the 
Tax Code between equipment and structures and the differing proportion of 
equipment/structure in these industries . Investment in equipment can be 
depreciated over 5 years and receives a 10-percent investment credit 
whereas investment in structures is recovered over 15 years and receives 
no investment credit. Electric and gas utilities use relatively more 
structures than oil, gas, and coal extraction and refining , with wind and 
42 "Dear Colleague" from Representative Pete Stark; Letter to editor 
of Sun Up (Energy News Digest) from Rep. Stark, October 1984 ; DeMott, John 
S. "Of Windmills, Cattle and Form 1040," Time, March 19, 1984, p . 48; 
Paris, Ellen "The Great Windmill Tax Dodge," Forbes, March 12 , 1984, pp. 
39-40; all reprinted in Moore (1985). 
43 This paragraph is based on Moore (1985) and Sissine (1988). 
44 Special Analysis G, The Budget for Fiscal Year 1990, January 1989. 
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active solar assets using fewer still. 4 5 Another provision of the Tax 
Code benefiting solar and wind energy property is that the at- risk 
limitation for the regular and business energy investment is less 
stringent than the rules for the regular investment tax credit for 
ordinary equipment.46 
In addition to the federal provisions, 28 states had income- tax 
incentives for solar in 1983 . Except in California, New York, and 
Massachusetts (credits of 55, 55, and 35 percent , respectively), all the 
state credits could be added to the federal credit. California limited 
residential credits to $3000, with no limit for commercial. In New York 
and Massachusetts, only residential was eligible for credits with limits 
of $2750 and $1000, respectively. In 1983, California reduced the credit 
to 50 percent and extended it through 1986, with the maximum credit 
unchanged. 4 7 
To the best of my knowledge, no data or estimates exist for the 
dollar cost to the Treasury of the PV credits. 48 However, an order of 
magnitude and pattern over time can be inferred by examining estimates for 
45 Although Section 168(e)(3)(B)(vi)(I) and paragraph 4 of Section 
48(1) of the current Internal Revenue Code explicitly provide for 5-year 
solar depreciation, and Section 168 was completely revised by Section 
20l(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the pre-1986 Section 168 did not 
mention solar energy, the discussion of 5 - year solar depreciation in 
Lazzari and Gravelle (1984) and Maycock and Stirewalt (1985) clearly 
indicates that this provision existed prior to 1986. 
46 Lazzari and Gravelle (1984), p. 25 . 
47 Godolphin (1983). 
48 This paragraph is based on my examination of the published data 
I describe, as well as phone conversations with individuals in the 
Departments of Energy and Treasury , the Internal Revenue Service, and the 
Joint Tax Committee. 
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larger aggregates . The cost of tax expenditures is estimated in the 
special analysis of tax expenditures that annually accompanies the 
President's budget (see Table 11). As shown in the table, this 
information is only provided for "supply incentives" and "conservation 
incentives" for the "residential energy credit" and "alternative , 
conservation, and new technology credits." PV credits would appear only 
in the "supply incentives" portion of both . 
It is instructive to compare the magnitude of these tax expenditures 
with direct outlays on renewable energy. The estimated total revenue loss 
from these "supply incentives" to date (FY 79-90) is $3 . 81 billion in 
current dollars. If the FY 79-90 tax expenditures were measured on an 
outlay equivalent basis (see description in table), they would likely 
exceed the total current dollar outlay for renewables for FY 73-87 of 
approximately $4.5 billion. 49 Aside from the obvious implication that 
total federal "spending" on renewables is approximately twice the outlay 
number, the magnitude of the tax expenditures means that for renewable 
programs as a whole, probably at least half of total federal "spending" 
went for procurement, since the renewable tax credits went entirely for 
procurement . 50 
For both of these reasons, to determine total " spending" and the 
relative emphasis between procurement and R&D, it would be desirable to 
have estimates of PV tax expenditures. Unfortunately, no precise 
estimates are available . What can be inferred is described below. 
49 Outlay figures are from Table 2 in Sissine (1988). 
50 This calculation ignores research and development tax credits and 
other features of the tax code that are not specific to renewables. 
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Table 11 
Revenue Loss Estimates for Primary Renewable Energy Tax Credits, 1979 -90 
(millions of current year dollars) 
FISCAL YEAR 





Individuals 75a 55 150 250 325 325 330 315 45 5 
Conservation incentiv es 
Corporations ----------------------------------------------
Individuals 570a430 425 360 285 270 245 190 * * 
Alternative, conservation, 
and new technology credits: 
Supply incentives 
Corporations 100al40 180 205 215 195 175 265 140 80 30 20 
Individuals * 10 b b 35 25 95 15 10 
Conservation incentives 
Corporations 120al90 220 220 45 10 * * * * * * Individuals * b b 5 * * 
Supply Total 175 205 330 455 575 545 600 595 195 85 30 20 
Grand Total 865 825 975 1035 910 825 845 785 195 85 30 20 
Supply Total (FY 79 - 90) 3 . 81 billion; Grand Total 7.40 billion 
Footnotes: 
a Residential credit of 645 and alternative of 220 not broken out 
between supply and conservation in special analysis; 1980 ratio used 
b Corporate/individual split not available; shown here in corporate 
* Less than 2.5 or 5.0 million , depending on year 
Source: Annual (FY 81-90) Special Analysis chapter on tax expenditures. 
Note: Residential credits expired December 31, 1985 . However, FY 86 began 
October 1, 1985 and unused credits can be carried over to two subsequent 
taxable years . Moore (1985), p. 39. Beginning with the FY 1983 budget, 
tax expenditures have been estimated in terms of "revenue losses" and 
taxable "outlay equivalents . " I have used revenue losses in order to 
provide a consistent series for the 1979-1990 period. Outlay equivalents 
permit a comparison of the cost of tax expenditure programs with other 
Federal government expenditures, which are pre-tax magnitudes . Outlay 
equivalents are often larger than revenue losses (e . g . , for 87, total 
above would be 240) . These differences can arise for two reasons. The 
first, where the tax provision is equivalent to a tax-free grant, does not 
apply here because the grant is contingent on individuals' consumption 
decisions, and thus operates as a price reduction, not an increase in t he 
individuals' taxable income . The second is where revenue losses are 
partially offset by the loss of a tax benefit. Special Analysis G, The 
Bud~et for Fiscal Year 1989 . 
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Although no figures are available, one would expect the suppl y 
portions of the tax expenditures shown in Table 11 to be dominated by non-
PV credits . This conclusion is supported by the data on renewable powe r 
facility filings with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ( Table 12). 
The largest category , biofuels , was eligible for business credits from 
September 30, 1978, until the end of 1985. 51 The second largest, small 
hydro, was made eligible for business credits by the Crude Oil Windfall 
Profit Tax Act of 1980, with the credit available for 1980 through 1985.52 
The third largest, geothermal, was eligible for residential credits from 
September 30, 1978, until December 31, 1985, and for business credits from 
September 30, 1978, through the end of 1989. The fourth largest, wind, 
was eligible for residential and business credits from September 30, 1978, 
until December 31, 1985. The fifth largest, solar, includes solar 
thermal, which has received the same treatment as PV. 
In addition to the power generation sources shown in the FERC 
filings, the tax-credit figures in the "supply incentive" include ocean 
thermal, cogeneration, and solar heating and cooling . All of this 
suggests that the PV portion of the estimated $3.81 billion in "supply 
incentive" tax credits may be relatively small. On the other hand, data 
from a recent court case suggest that the PV amounts are not 
inconsequential. Forty-four hundred investors invested a total of $200 
million in the United Energy Corporation scheme discussed above. However, 
51 This paragraph relies on Friedmann and Mayer (1980), Sissine 
(1988), and the Conference Report, Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 
1980, House Report 96-817, March 7, 1980. 
52 The credit was also available for the years 1986-1988 if the 
application for the project was docketed by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission before January 1, 1986 . Conference Report, pp. 126-128. 
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Table 12 
Renewable Power Facility Filings 
(fiscal year, in megawatts) 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 TOTALS 
Biofuels 0 284 420 540 708 1,078 1,849 1,107 5 , 986 
Geothermal 76 80 74 119 1 68 164 1 , 327 138 2,146 
Sma l l Hydro 108 39 62 397 372 305 177 106 3 , 163 
Sol ar 0 0 0 92 94 42 62 30 320 
Wi nd 76 24 1 27 325 270 60 298 212 1. 936 
Total s 260 427 683 1,473 1,612 2,193 5,310 1 , 593 13' 551 
Note : These f i lings are designed to represent year - by-year additions to 
capacity. However, recent figures suggest that actual installed capacity 
is substantially l ower than suggested by these data . For example, solar 
inst allations are currently about 155 MW and wind about 1430 MW. 
Source: Sissine (1988, p. CRS - 6). 
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many of the modules were never built , in 1985 the company filed f o r 
bankruptcy, and in 1987 a U. S. District court ruled that Uni t ed Energy was 
an abusive tax shelter that defrauded the government and the public. The 
estimated tax loss from this fraud was $90 million.53 
The difficulty in determining PV credits from Special Analysis 
estimates occurs in other sources as well. Information on these credits 
is broken out by income class for individuals and SIC code and size of 
assets for businesses in the Department of the Treasury 's Statistics of 
Income. Here, as in the annual Special Analysis, the PV credit, for 
both residential and business, is published only as part of a larger 
aggregate. For the residential credit, the SOl reporting unit is 
"residential energy credit." This includes conservation credits as well 
as "renewable energy source" expenditures . Business energy tax credits 
are not published in SOl data, but instead are reported in investment tax 
credits as a whole. In both of these cases , PV is likely to be a small 
portion of the aggregate, and year-to-year changes in the aggregate cannot 
be attributed to PV . 
In fact, the data problem is more fundamental than Treasury 
reporting. The tax forms themselves generally do not request that the 
taxpayer identify the specific technology (such as PV) when claiming a 
credit, and thus Treasury has no way of knowing the cost of PV credits . 
For these reasons, a precise estimate of PV tax e xpenditures is not 
available. If the tax loss in United Energy was $90 million , then 
53 The Justice Department charged that United Energy ran a Ponzi 
scheme in which money from new investors was used to pay off previous 
investors. Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1986, pp . 1 , 9 ; March 5 , 1 987 , 
p. 43 (Eastern edition). 
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spending on PV procurement through the tax system likely exceeds the 
direct federal spending of approximately $121 million on PV procurement. 
However, because solar heating and cooling use has been great er than PV 
use, and because of the FERC filing statistics cited earlier, it seems 
highly unlikely that the PV tax expenditures approach the level of direc t 
outlays, as is the case with renewables as a whole, and thus the program 
as a whole is still predominantly a research and development program. 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENTS 
The economic assessment of photovoltaics changed over the life of 
the program. Economic assessments throughout the 1970s were generally 
optimistic, whereas the assessments in the 1980s have become more 
pessimistic . Accompanying this change has been a decrease in the variance 
of the assessments. 
The precise reasons for changes in assessments are not generally 
clear for three reasons. First, changes in the economic assessment have 
occurred due to changes both in assumed values of variables and the 
methodology for incorporating these variables into the economic 
assessment. Second, most economic assessments of PV never discuss 
previous economic assessments. Finally , poor documentation, particularly 
in the early studies, makes comparison difficult. 
This section interprets the assessments during the life of the 
program in terms of a common conceptual framework. This framework is not 
taken from any particular study; most of the studies discussed below in 
fact only use parts of the it. In this framework , a PV economic 
assessment consists of a number of s e parate steps : (1) module cost ; (2) 
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system configuration; (3) cost of electricity resulting from this module 
cost and system configuration ; and (4) economic value of PV electric i t y 
at this cost. 
Module Cost 
Module costs in the photovol taics program have most often been 
expressed in terms of cents per peak watt. This measure of costs refers 
to the costs of a PV module in relation to its electrical output under 
ideal , standardized insolation and weather conditions. Module costs are 
to be distinguished from system costs, which equal the sum of module costs 
and "balance of system" costs (e . g. , costs of land , support structure, and 
power conditioning, as well as of batteries for systems not connected to 
grid power). System costs also have generally been expressed in terms of 
dollars per peak watt . 
The primary emphasis of the program has always been on reducing 
module costs . Module and balance-of-system costs contribute to system 
costs in a _symmetric fashion, and balance-of -system costs were often 
estimated to be perhaps 50 percent of system costs. Nevertheless, balance 
of system costs were viewed as dictated largely by the technology of a 
mature industry, the construction industry. Consequently, research and 
development was unlikely to significantly reduce balance-of-system costs. 
The PV program always has set goals for the price of modules . These 
price goals were not expressed as projections or expectations . 
Congressional testimony or reports sometimes contain qualitative, but 
never quantitative, statements about the likelihood of attaining these 
goals. The purpose of the goals was both to set a target for cost 
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reduction and to establish a criterion to be used in judging the progress 
of the program. 
Evolution of Price Goals 
The photovoltaics program has operated under two different 
approaches to formulating module price goals . The first approach chose 
a module price goal, and then derived the energy cost resulting from this 
module price . The second approach chose an energy cost , and then derived 
the module price necessary to produce electricity at the desired cost. 
The program used the former approach from 1973 to 1979, and the latter 
approach after 1983. From 1979-1983, the program used a combination of 
the two approaches . The former approach sets goals in terms of technical 
possibilities and challenges whereas the latter stresses economic 
competitiveness and tradeoffs among the variables that affect the energy 
cost of PV . 
The former approach was first used in October 1973 at the Cherry 
Hill conference , which adopted the goals of 50 cents per peak watt for a 
single-crystal silicon cell by 1985 and 10 cents per peak watt by the year 
2000. 54 
The foundation for these numbers is unknown; however the conference 
report states: 
Estimates of commercially acceptable prices for arrays have 
varied from <$0.50/peak W to $0.10/peak W not only because the 
impacts of the other cost factors, such as land, supporting 
structure, and maintenance , are difficult to define 
quantitatively but also because the basis for comparison, the 
extrapolations of the prices of electricity generated by other 
54 50 cents by 1985 was deemed to be achievable with a suitable 
development program and 10 cents by 2000 was viewed as possible. Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (1974b), p. 1 . 
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means , are uncertain. Nevertheless, array cost elements have 
been used as objectives for development programs and as a 
means for formulating the tasks, milestones, and budgets for 
these programs. Hence , the economic val i dity of the 
utilization of photovoltaic electric power plants rests on the 
assumption of the range of competitive prices f o r 
55 arrays. . . 
The Cherry Hill goals were altered only in minor ways as the scale-
up of the federal program proceeded. In June 1974, JPL developed a 
program plan for a Low Cost Silicon Solar Array Program whose primary goal 
was "to develop the technological and industrial capability for producing 
more than 500 MW of single crystal silicon solar photovoltaic arrays per 
year at a cost of less than $0.50 per peak Watt by 1984."56 In November 
1974, the Solar Energy Task Force Report of Project Independence, prepared 
under the direction of NSF, proposed an implementation schedule of 50 
cents per peak watt in 1985 and 10 cents per peak watt in 1995.57 After 
the program was transferred to ERDA , the year of attainment of the 50-cent 
goal was pushed back to 1986. 58 
The first National Photovoltaics Program Plan was issued in March 
1978, and it separated the module price goals into near term (1982) , 
midterm (1985), and far term (1990) goals. It retained the goal of 50 
cents per peak watt in 1986, and added the goals of $2 per peak watt in 
55 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1974b) , pp. 3 - 4. 
56 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1974a), p . 1-1. 
57 U.S . Federal Energy Admini s tration ( 1974) , p . VII-15 . 
58 U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration (1976), p . 1. 
The reason for the change in the year of the g oal from the Cherry Hill 
conference (1973), to the Solar Energy Task Force (1984), to the JPL plan 
(1984), and finally to the ERDA Program Summary (1986), is not apparent. 
It may r e flect the distinction between a developing of a manufacturing 
capability in 1984 vs . actual selling prices in 1986, but this is 
speculati on . 
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1982 and 10 to 30 cents per peak watt in 1990. These goals were specified 
in 1975$ whereas earlier goal statements had not spec ified which year 
dollars were being assumed. 59 Meanwhile, Congress entered the g oal -
setting process , and shifted the focus to system prices. Section 2 of t he 
Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 
1978 (P . L . 95-590, November 4, 1978) provided that the purpose of the 
research, development, and demonstration program established by the act 
would be "to reduce the average cost of installed solar photovoltaic 
energy systems to $1 per peak watt by fiscal year 1988 . " Instead of 
adopting a set of goals for a single year as provided for in the Act , the 
program documents continued to provide different goals for different years 
(1982, 1986, and 1990) as provided in the 1978 Program Plan. However, 
consistent with the Act's emphasis on system prices, the goals were now 
stated for both arrays and the entire system. The array goals were (all 
in 1980$)6° $2 . 80 per peak watt in 1982, $0 . 70 in 1986, and $0.15 to $0.40 
in 1990. The system goals were $6-13 per watt peak in 1982, $1.60-2.60 
in 1986, and $1.10 to 1 . 30 in 1990_61 
59 U.S. Department of Energy (1978a) , pp . 5, 7. 
60 During 1979 , the program recalculated goals in 1980 dollars, which 
raised the module goal from $0 . 50 to $0 . 70 per peak watt and the system 
goal from $1 to $1.40 per peak watt. U.S. Department of Energy (1980e, 
Vol. I, p. ES-12 ; Volume II, p. 12-5) . Final data show a 41 . 3 percent 
increase in the Gross National Produce Implicit Pr ice Deflator from 1975 
to 1980 . Economic Report of the President, U.S . Government Printing 
Office, February 1982. 
61 Program documents in 1979 - 1980 contain different versions of these 
goals. Some omit a 1982 goal--e.g. , U . S . Department of Energy (1980c), 
p. 4-4; (1980e), Vol. I, p . ES-12, and Smith (198Gb) , Vol. 1, pp. 26 - 27. 
These three documents also state the 1986 goal as a point estimate (1 . 60) . 
Finally, the 1990 central station goal appears to have soon been change d 
to 1.10-1 . 80 . 1 . 30 is used in Smith (198Gb), Vol . 1, p. 27, citing U.S. 
Department of Energy (1979a), p. 2-3 . 1.30 is also used in U. S. 
Department of Energy (1980c), p. 4 -4. 1.80 is used in U.S. Department of 
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An interesting feature of these new goals was that , for the first 
time, goals for a particular year were keyed to particular applications: 
remote in 1982, distributed (grid-connected) in 1986, and central-station 
in 1990. In addition, the goals were designed to satisfy two constraints 
simultaneously: the level of prices necessary to compete with conventional 
sources, and the extent of PV cost reduction believed to be possible. 62 
Thus the program operated under the same module price goal enunciated at 
Cherry Hill and a system price goal, believed to be consistent with the 
module goal and derived partly from considerations of competitiveness. 
The 1979-1983 period thus represents a transition between the 
technological "what is possible to achieve" approach and the cost 
competitiveness approach. 
In 1983, the program goals appeared to become driven entirely by 
cost competiveness. In the Five Year Research Plan issued in May 1983, 
the program adopted 15 cents per kilowatt hour (1982$) as a long-term goal 
for photovoltaic power , based on work done by Roger Taylor of the Electric 
Power Research Institute. 63 Starting from this energy cost goal, the Five 
Year Plan derived goals that related module cost targets to conversion 
efficiency. Modules achieving 13-percent conversion efficiency must cost 
no more than $40 per square meter, and modules achieving 17-percent 
efficiency must cost no more than $75 per square meter . 64 
Energy (1980a), p. 9 ; (1980b), p. 3; (1980d), p . 1-5 ; and (1981) , p . 2-8 . 
62 Smith (1980a) , pp. 104-105. 
63 U . S. Department of Energy (1983a), pp. 28 - 29 . Taylor (1982), 
Taylor (1983a,b). 
64 Module efficiencies are measured at 28 degrees Centigrade and air 
mass (AM) 1 . 5 . U . S. Department of Energy (1983c), p. 32 . The amount of 
sunlight hitting the cell is a function of the air mass, o r atmosphere, 
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These are more ambitious module price goals t han the 50-cent - per-
peak-watt goal that had been used 1973-1983. To see this , one must 
calculate the module area required to generate 1 kilowatt of AC power . 
As given in the Five Year Plan, this area (A) is given by: 
A = 1/(average peak insolation x system efficiency ) 
where system efficiency equals the product of balance-of-system efficiency 
and module efficiency. The Five Year Plan assumes that average peak 
insolation is 1 kW;m2 and balance-of-system efficiency is 0.81. With 
these assumptions, A= 9.50 m2 for 13-percent modules and 7.26 m2 for 17-
percent modules. Multiplying by the module cost goals of the Five Year 
Plan expressed in dollars per square meter, and dividing by l. 69 to 
convert to 1975$ gives a cost of 22.5 and 32 . 2 cents per peak watt (1975$ ) 
for 13-percent and 17-percent efficient modules, respectively, compared 
to the original 50-cent-per-peak-watt goal. This calculation is 
relatively easy to make, so it is noteworthy that the old and new module 
goals are not compared in the text of the plan,6 5 although graphs in the 
through which the sunlight must pass . AM0 is the applicable condition for 
use of PV in space. AM1 refers to the air mass under the high-noon sun 
on a clear day . Higher air-mass figures refer to the "thicker" 
atmospheres associated with the sun not being directly overhead on such 
a clear day. In addition to reducing the overall amount of sunlight , the 
atmosphere selectively absorbs certain wavelengths . Since PV cells made 
of different materials exhibit differing abilities to absorb various 
elements of the spectrum, the relative performance of material s ma de of 
different cells will depend on the air-mass conditions . See SERI (1984), 
pp. 5-7, 27. 
65 The draft of the Five Year Plan prepared by JPL indicates in the 
t ext that the new goals are more strict than the old goals because "they 
are aimed at long-term economic viability and at achieving significant 
levels of energy production from photovoltaics. The change in goals , of 
course, reflects the change in the program's objective, t hat is, to 
conduct long-term, high-risk research with the pot ential f or high payoff . " 
U.S. Department of Energy (l983a), p. 39. This language does not appear 
in the final Plan released in May. 
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Five Year Plan imply that 50-cent-per-peak-watt modules canno t a ttain t he 
15-ce nt-per-kilowatt-hour target with the assumptions ma d e concerning 
other parameters.66 
Following the is s uance of the Five Year Plan , JPL argued that the 
modul e goals in the Plan a re tighter t han needed to attain the goal of 15 
cents per kilowatt hour. They felt the following goals would attain the 






Using these revised module goals and parameters68 in the above calculation 
yields module costs of 28.0-31.1, 40.7-44.9, and 50 .3-57.1 cents per peak 
watt (1975$) for 10-, 13-, and 17-percent-efficient modules, respective ly. 
66 U.S. Department of Energy (1983c), p . 30. Note that the dashed 
curves represent module costs in 1980$. The 50-cent-per-peak-watt goal 
expressed in 1980$ is 70 cents . 
67 Efficiency measured at 1000 kWhjm2;yr . irradiance and 25-degree 
cell temperature. The lower end of the range is given in Crosetti, 
Jackson, and Aster (1985), p. 33. The higher end is given in Borden 
(1984b), p. 2. 
68 A temperature adjustment factor (0 . 88) x module efficiency x BOS 
efficiency is used to derive the A factor. See Crosetti, Jackson , and 
Aster (1985), pp. 7, 11. 
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Thus the JPL-suggested goals for the Five Year Plan are more strict than 
the original 50-cent-per-peak-watt goal, except for 1 7 -percent- e ffi cient 
modules.69 
The significance of the JPL analysis i s best understood i n terms of 
the program's emphasis on single-crystal silicon (conducted at JPL ) and 
more high risk approaches (conducted at SERI). To derive module and 
efficiency goals from energy price goals, one must assume values for about 
ten other parameters , some of which are rather uncertain. Thus, a wide 
range of goals could be justified by seemingly plausible choices of values 
for other parameters. The JPL analysis implies that the Five Year Plan's 
choices with respect to these parameters result in overly strict module 
cost and efficiency goals, which could only be achieved through SERI's 
high-risk research, rather than JPL ' s efforts to refine current 
technology. 
A new Five Year Plan, issued by the program in May 1987, tightens 
the module efficiency and cost goals somewhat.70 This appears to result 
69 The argument that the Five Year Plan goals are more strict than 
the Cherry Hill goals is made in another form in a recent paper by JPL 
staff members . Callaghan , Henry, and McGuire (1985). I prefer the 
comparison I made above. The latter comparison associates with the Cherry 
Hill module price goal of 50 cents per peak watt, an efficiency goal (10 
percent) and lifetime goal (20 years) which do not appear to be part of 
the original single-crystal silicon goals from Cherry Hill . See Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (1974b). Nor were these efficiency and lifetime 
goals adopted by the program--see, for example, the initial program 
summaries, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (1976) and 
U.S. Department of Energy (1978b). Since I do not associate e fficiency 
and lifetime goals with the Cherry Hill module goal, I prefer to compare 
this module price goal to current module price goals, with the same 
assumptions regarding all other parameters, including efficiency and 
lifetime. 
70 U. S . Department of Energy (1987a). The goals are actually loosened 
for concentrators, but for brevity the discussion of the goals throughout 
this section has been on flat-plate systems. 
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f rom a more stringent electricity price target of 5.27 cents per watt 
compared to the former 6.5 cents per peak watt ( both 1 982 do1lars ) _71 A 
number of assumptions concerning other paramete rs were a lso chang ed. The 
new goals for flat-plate s ys tems are set fo rth below: 
Year 2000 Goal 
( 1986$) 
Module efficiency 15-20 perce nt 
Module cost $45 -80j m2 
Balance-of-system costs 
area-related $ 50-l00j m2 
power-related $150/ kW 
System Life Expectancy 30 yrs. 
In addition , the new Plan e stablishes a set of goals for module efficiency 
and cost for the early 1990s based on an electricity price twice that of 
the year 2000 electr icity price, a price that may be cost-effective for 
peaking applications, export markets , and non - grid-connected 
applications.72 
71 Levelization divides the total cost of producing electricity over 
a plant's lifetime by the lifetime , so that the cost per year is the same . 
Levelization is performed e ither in current- year dollars or c onstant-year 
dollars . The former presents the costs in terms of current-yea r dollars; 
the latte r in terms of constant dollars. The figure of 15 cents per watt 
from the 1983 plan was levelized in current - year dollars; levelized in 
c onstant 1982$, it was 6 .5 c e nts . The new goal in leve lized 1986$ is s i x 
cents per watt. 
72 U.S . De pa rtment of Energy (1987a), p. 9. 
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Probability of Attaining Module Price Goals 
Congress received numerous as surances during the i ni t ial years o f 
the prog ram that the 50-cent-per-peak-watt goal was achievabl e. Fo r 
example: 
and 
1985 appears to be a realistic dat e in order to achieve 50 
cents per watt for the solar arrays . 73 
Thus, in the photovoltaic program, an intermediate ($500 per 
peak kW) and a long-range objective ($100-$300 per peak kW) 
were established. It is judged that the silicon array price 
can be brought down with the l owest risk to the intermediate 
objective by 1985. ( ERDA written response to subcommittee 
question] 74 
In August 1978, JPL published, for the first time, an analysis using 
a detaile d costing methodology of a candidate manufacturing sequence that 
could meet the goal of manufacturing 50-cent-per-peak-watt flat-plate 
silicon photovol taic modules in 1986 . 75 With all these assessments 
generally optimistic and the lack of any quantitative probability 
assessments , no obvious trend in the assessments existed in the 1973-1978 
period. In 1979, two guardedly optimistic assessments a ppeared: 
and 
flat plate silicon module costs using technology now 
foreseeable will approach the price range 50-75 cents/peak 
watt. 76 
Reaching the 1 986 program goals and later the objectives of 
the act will be a difficult challenge Some solar 
industry officia ls and scientists d oubt that the existing 
73 Testimony of John Goldsmith , Group Supervisor, So l ar Energy Group , 
Jet Propulsion Laborato r y . Goldsmith (1974), p. 75 . 
74 Committee on Science and Technology (1976) , p. 269 . 
75 Aster (1978) . 
76 American Physical Society (1979), p. 6. 
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industry can expand that rapidly or reduce array costs by such 
a large factor. Similarly, during deliberations on t he bill 
H.R. 12874 leading to passage of the "Solar Photovoltaic 
Energy Research, Development and Demonstrati on Act of 1978," 
a number of Congressmen v oiced concern relating to the 
ambitious nature of the object i ve s set f orth . Nevertheless, 
they generally agreed that t he objectives could be met with 
a well-conceived, carefully planned and executed program of 
research, development, and demonstration. 77 
By 1982, the prospects for achieving the 1986 goals had dimmed. The 
General Accounting Office issued a report on the effects of fiscal year 
1982 budget reductions on achieving the cost and production goals of the 
Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development , and Demonstration Act of 
1978 (P.L. 95-590) . The GAO concluded 
Our review showed that the act's goals had little likelihood 
of being achieved prior to the fiscal year 1982 budget 
reductions; however, due to these reductions, the goals now 
have even less likelihood of being reached. Specifically , 
--achieving the $1.40 per peak watt s y stem cost goal was 
unlikely without budge t reductions , although there was 
some optimism that it could have been reached. 78 
As noted in the previous section, in 1983 the Department of Energy 
abandoned the previous goals and adopted more ambitious cost targets, but 
set these for the late 1990s , whereas the goals in effect at that time 
were for 1982, 1986 and 1990 . In 1987, these goals were again tightened, 
and delayed slightly to the year 2000. 
The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project a t JPL was terminated in 
1986. Because of the importance and length of this project , several 
"valedictory" statements have been made that the FSA project essentially 
achieved the Cherry Hill module price goal . For example, the manager of 
the FSA Project claimed that the project essentially achieved the Cherry 
77 U. S. General Accounting Office (1979), p . 4. 
78 U.S . Gene ral Accounting Office (198 2 ), p. 2 . 
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Hill goals with approximately 50.2 percent of the budget recommended by 
the Cherry Hill conferees. 79 These claims are based on projections using 
SAMICS (Solar Array Manufacturing Costing Standards), an e laborate costing 
model developed by JPL for estimating manufacturing costs . SAMICS 
estimates are based on the best production techniques thought to be 
available for incorporation during that year, and cover a ll costs of 
producing modules , including competitive rates of profit. Table 13 shows 
SAMICS cost estimates for most of t he life of the PV program. 
Actual market prices have been higher than SAMICS estimates for 
three reasons. First, SAMICS produces "technical readiness" es timates. 
JPL assumed that it would take two to three years to get these techniques 
into commercial production. Second , the estimates often assume a plant 
size which captures economies of scale. Actual plant sizes were generally 
smaller than this , primarily due to the small market for PV at these 
prices . Third, the prices were FOB plant and excluded the sizable costs 
of marketing and distribution . 
Two time serie s of actual prices are useful to compare with the 
SAMICS estimates and to indicate how technical progress was affecting 
prices. One indicator is the prices in the "block buys" that JPL 
conducted during the course of the program. Photovoltaic manufacturers 
submitted PV arrays which were tested by JPL . The decline in average 
prices for each block buy (see Table 14) provides evidence that costs were 
being reduced. The measure is imperfect, however, for two related 
79 Callaghan, Henry, and McGuire (1985), p . 3. Others argue that 
FSA funding was only 44.1 percent of funding recommended in the 1978 
National Photovoltaics Program Plan , and only 39.4 percent of the fundin g 
recommended in the original plan for the project in 1974. See Maycock 
(1986), Table 3. 
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Table 13 
SAMICS Estimates of Production Costs for Flat-Plate Silicon Modules 






SAMICS Price Estimate 
(1980 $/Peak Watt) 





Source: Jeffrey L. Smith (1980b), Vol. III, p. 32; Henry (1980, 1982); 
Callaghan, Henry, and McGuire (1985). 
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Table 14 










14 . 56 
4.24 
Source: Prices for 1975, 1976, and 1977 are for JPL Block Buys 1-3 g i ven 
in Slonski and Easter (1979). Price for 1983 is for lMW Sacramento 
Utility District (SMUD) purchase given in Callaghan, Henry, and McGuire 
(1985). 
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reasons. First, these represent prices for relat ively small numbers o f 
modules; prices for larger orders could be lower due to greater 
automation , or higher, if firms were not breaking even on the block buy s. 
Second, firms selling modules might reasonably have concl uded that the 
prices in these buys might affect future Administration or Congressional 
policy, and this consideration could have affected how firms priced their 
modules in the block buys . The 1983 price is a better indicator than the 
block buys since the purchase is larger and there is less reason to 
suspect that firms might be pricing to influence future Administration 
policy. However, since the purchase represents only 1 MW of the 100 MW 
planned for the project, "buy ing in" behavior can not be r uled out. 
A more complete indicator of price is found in the annual Energy 
Information Administration survey of photovoltaic module manufacturers. 
The average price of single-crystal silicon modules declined from $5.75 
per peak watt in 1985 to $5.19 in 1986.80 
System Configuration Issues 
What type of power system the PV modul e would be a part of has been 
an important issue in the PV program. The two most important system 
configuration is sues have been t h e role of storage and the choice between 
on- site (distributed) a nd utility (central - station) applications. The 
storage issue was resolved in the late 1970s, and on-site vs. central-
station by 1983. The later date for the second issue reflects its greater 
complexity as well as its more contentious politics . 
80 U.S. Department of Energy (1987b), p . 22 . Although price 
information was collected in the 1984 survey, EIA did not r e port the 
results. U.S . Department of Energy (1985c) , p . 33. 
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Stora~e. A recurrent problem in the analy sis of PV systems i s how 
to treat the fact that the output of the s y stem , unlike con ventional 
sources, is highly variable. PV s ystem output depends on t he available 
light, which varies in a regular way during the day a nd throughout t he 
year, with additional variation due to weather conditions. Although the 
NSF staff paper pre sented at Cherry Hill did not explicitly consider the 
issue of whether storage should be included as part of a photovoltaic 
s y stem, most early PV studies assumed that storage was a necessary part 
of a photovoltaic s ystem. The MITRE study, t he Solar Task Force , and the 
1979 Resources for the Future energy study all include storage costs, with 
the latter finding that economical storage "is critical to making solar 
energy economic on a large scale."8l 
Subsequent analysis of the interaction of PV with electric grids, 
and of the high costs of storage , r eversed this view. The new consensus 
is that the cost of PV without storage should be compared with the value 
of the electricity generated, which depends in turn on how the addition 
of PV affects the optimal generation mix of the utility.82 The early 
studies contained an element of truth in the sense that a utility system 
with PV as a very high percentage of its generation would require a 
reliable source of power (e.g., storage) fot the remainder. But this 
remainder need not be provided by storage . Thus, including the cost of 
storage in PV costs is no more appropriate than including it in the costs 
of other generation options_83 
81 Landsberg (1979), p. 493. 
82 Smith (1980b), Vol. 1, p. 5 . 
83 Metz (1978) provides a good introduction to this issue . 
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This mistake concerning storage costs probably did not have a maj o r 
adverse effect on the program. The mistake was r ecognized ear l y . 
Moreover , its effect was to make PV look less economic during a period 
when the program probably was growing too fast under overly o ptimist i c 
predictions of its success. 
On-site vs. Utility Applications. A major issue in the program fr om 
1973-1983 was the relative emphasis to be given to on-s i te (termed 
"distributed" by the program) vs . utility (termed "central-station") 
applications of photovoltaics. The program underwent two shifts in what 
it viewed as its first significant market (beyond remote applications ) . 
Initially the program did not appear to take a definite position regarding 
the relative economics of distributed vs. central-station applications. 
In 1978, the program came to view the residential market as the first in 
which PV would be economic. In 1983, the program reversed itself and 
declared central-station uses as the first market that would become 
economic. 
Early studies were divided on this issue. The 1973 Subpanel IX 
Report to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that 50 
cents per peak watt in 1985 would be competitive in residences and 10 
cents per peak watt in 1990 would be competitive in central-station use. 84 
This belief that residential systems would be economic before central-
station applications was echoed by the NSF presentation at the Cherry Hill 
conference, which showed a lower energy cost for residential uses than for 
central-station, with the same array costs for both (Table 15). On the 
other hand, a study done for NSF by the Aerospace Corporation in 1975 
84 Subpanel IX (1973) , pp . 402, 411 in hearings. 
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Table 15 











$0 . 50 




















30 1. 2 
20 1.6 
30 1.0 
Note : All figures in original table have been converted to a 1-peak-watt 
bas i s. System cost includes array cost but excludes operating cost. 
Source : Bleiden (1973), pp. 88 , 96. 
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concluded t hat "on-site and c entral station missions a re about equal ly 
attractive as future (1990) applications for photovoltaic sol a r energy 
conversion . " 85 
Al though the program did not have at this time an offic ial pos i t i on 
regarding t he relative economics of dispersed vs. central station uses , 
a number of commentators in the l a tter half of the 1970s argu ed t ha t 
ERDA's approach to solar energy as a whole was too oriented toward solar 
electricity and centralized systems a nd t hat what was needed was a more 
balanced approach . This criticism was made in a 1975 Off ice of Technology 
Assessment review of the 1975 ERDA Plan and Prog ram, as well as in 
populist magazine articles and books on e nergy . 86 
This populist criticism r eveals an important component of the 
pol i tics of solar energy. Solar energy is a "soft technology" (small-
85 Aerospace Corporation (1975), p. 112. The basis for this 
conclusion is not obvious from the report due to the differences in 
methodology between the residential and central -station analys is. The 
residential analysis computes a break-even array price to compete with a 
coal alternative (at an unspecifi ed electricity price). The central-
station analysis assumes an array price , and compute s an energy cost from 
that. 
86 Office of Technology Assessment (1975), p . 143, which was a r eview 
of U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (1975a, b). See 
also Lov ins (19 76) , and Hammond and Metz ( 1977) , p . 197. The case for 
dispersed PV systems was strongly made by Barry Commoner (1979), p . 44: 
However , unlike conventional energy sources , t here is no 
economy of scale in the acquisition of solar e nergy . . a 
large , centralized solar plant produces energy no more cheaply 
than a small one (aside from minor savings in maintenance 
costs). Thus , with transmission costs eliminated or at least 
greatly reduced, the small plant is by far the most efficient 
way to deliver the energy. 
Commoner's position was attacked in McCracken (1979) . The controversy is 
reviewed in Kidder (1980) . Despite the emphasis in the rnid-1980s on 
central stations , some advocates of the populist , distributed position 
r e main. See Maycock and Stirewalt (1985) . 
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scale, distributed, renewable) as opposed to conventional sources which 
are "hard technol ogies." The support for soft technologies is 
philosophical, not based on safety or economi c s. A di s persed energy 
s ys tem allows indiv idual s greate r self-determination, whe r eas large scale 
tends to concentrate political and e conomic p ower in a few organizations 
and p e ople. As put by Amory Lov ins , the l e ading proponent of the soft 
energy path, 
If nuclear power were clean, safe, economic, assure d of a mple fuel , 
and socially benign per se , it would be unattractive because of the 
kind of energy economy it would lock us into.87 
The "residential-first" pos i tion was buttressed by the appearance 
in the late 1970s of a number of studies which concluded that the 
photovoltaic residential market would be competitive prior to the central-
station market . The first of these was the Aerospace Corporation revision 
in March 1977 of the ir 1975 analysis (which had showed on-site a nd 
central-station equally attractive) to take into account the differing 
ownership possibilities in the central-station vs. residential market. 
This later analy sis stated that central-station would be cost-competitive 
in the U.S . sun belt in the 1986-2000 period at array pri c e s in the 
$100-200/kWp range. Break-even array prices for on-site residential 
photov ol taic systems were estimated t o be $250-600/kWp if the system was 
owned by the homeowner, $100 -300/ kWp if owned by the utility, largely 
because the utility company must pay dividends on equity capital and 
income taxes on revenues generated to pay dividends . 88 As noted in a 1980 
87 Lov ins (1977), cited in Congressional Research Service (1983), p . 
6. The preceding paragraph borrows heavily from the latter. 
88 Leonard et al. (1977), pp . vi and ix. 
considerations underlay the conclusion in 
Corporation report that single family uses 
The same financial and tax 
an August 19 78 Aerospace 
would be economic before 
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JPL report, a number of studies reached similar conclusions in 1978-1979, 
generally due to differences in the financial and tax situation of 
residential vs. central-station applications.89 
However, this point of view was not immediately adopted by ERDA or 
DOE. The annual program summary issued in November 1976 and the National 
Photovoltaic Program Plan issued in March 1978 do not prioritize 
applications. 90 The first ERDA or DOE report that implie d that 
residential would be economic before central-station uses was issued in 
December 1978. It stated that the mid-term goal of 50 cents per peak watt 
in 1986 would produce energy costs of 5-8 cents/kWh, which would be cost-
effective for residential uses. The far-term goal of 10-30 cents per peak 
watt in 1990 would produce energy costs of 4-6 cents per kilowatt hour and 
would be cost-effective for utility applications.91 
The shift in 1978 toward residential programs was reflected in a 
commercial uses . Leonard et al. (1978), pp. ix , 39. 
89 Smith (1980b), Vol. I , p. 28. Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1980), 
p. 16, cites Carpenter and Taylor (1978), General Electric Company (1979), 
and Westinghouse (1978) as the studies which s howed higher break-even 
costs for on-site appl ications, and thus these applications as more 
economic. 
90 U.S . Ene rgy Research a nd Development Administration (1976), U.S. 
Department of Energy (1978a), p. 5. 
91 U.S. Department of Energy (1978b), p. 5. This position was 
refl ected in the National Energy Plan released in May 1979 which stated 
that utility applications would be economic at the lower end of the 10-50 
cents per peak watt range, and dispersed (residential) applications at the 
higher end of the range. See U.S . Department of Energy (1979b), p . VI-11. 
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c hange in (1) the organization of the solar energy program, 92 (2) elect r ic 
utility purchase requirements , and perhaps (3) solar tax policy . 
(1 ) Or~anization of the Solar Ener~y Pro~ram 
From 1975 to 1977 , t he Division of Solar Energy was d ivided into a n 
office of solar electric applications (which include d branches for 
photovoltaics, ocean thermal , solar thermal , and wind) and an office of 
direct solar conversion (with branches for solar heating a nd cooling, 
agricultural and process heat , and biomass). 93 Thus the organizational 
structure was neutral with respect to applicat i ons of PV. In 1978, the 
photovoltaics program (along with biomass and wind) became part of the 
Division of Distributed Solar Technology.94 In 1980-1981 , the 
photovoltaics division became part of the Office of Solar Applications for 
Buildings . 9 5 Both of these organizational structures reflected an 
emphasis on distributed s y stems for PV . 
(2) Electric Utility Purchase Reguirement 
The 1978 PURPA utility purchase requirements discussed above aided 
residential PV by requiring electric utili ties to purchase power from 
small power systems at avoided cost. One such system is a residential PV 
system which, at some periods during the day, generates power in excess 
of residential need and sells power back to the utility. This provision 
92 Smith (1980b), Vol. I, p. 29, examined the link between program 
emphasis and organizational structure in 1980 . He notes elsewhere that 
"photovol taics has been classified by DOE primarily as a distributed 
option intended for use on buildings . " Smith (1980a), Supplement, p . 96. 
I expand Smith's analysis to other points in the program's history. 
93 Jet Propulsion Laboratory ( 1975), p. 5 a nd Buck (1982). 
94 U.S . Department of Energy (1978b), p . iii . 
9 5 U .S . Department of Energy (1980f), p. 18; (1981 ), p . 2-3 . 
74 
provides a strong boost to residential PV since "sell back" revenues r e duce 
the net cost of the PV system. 
(3) Solar Tax Provisions 
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 provided a larger percentage c redit for 
solar e nergy residential uses (30 percent of the first $2000 and then 20 
percent of the next $8,000, for a maximum credit of $2 ,200 ) than for 
business use ( 10 percent in addition to the normal investment tax credit) , 
but the residential credit did not apply to PV. Thus , the 1978 act 
encouraged central-station PV over residential . In 1980 the residential 
credit was raised to 40 percent for the first $10,000 and the busine ss 
credit to 15 percent, and the r e sidential credit was extended to PV. 
Such a change could have a number of possible effects. First, there 
are corner situations where the prov ision would have no effect--e.g., if 
PV were so uneconomic that the tax provisions were irrelevant, or the 
before-tax economics and other tax provisions (investment tax credit, ACRS 
provisions, marginal tax rates, treatment of imputed income , and 1978 PV 
business credits) were so unequal that the relative afte r-tax economics 
of residential vs. central station PV were not affected. Second, since 
PV systems are modular and since the marginal credit was 0 for residential 
systems over $10 ,000 , the provisions could encourage the building of 
residential systems up to $10,000 and encourage the use of PV in utilities 
for the remainder of residential requirements and other requirements . 
Since Treasury does not publish data on the utili zation of PV credits, it 
is difficult to know the magnitude of these increases relative to the base 
amounts, and thus whether the 1980 provisions we re a boon to residential 
or utility PV . 
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The shift in the photovoltaics program toward distributed s y s t ems 
was not universally welcomed. The critics focused on cost differe nc es 
between the applications other than purel y tax and f inanc ial 
considerations. An Office of Technology Assessment study in September , 
1978 , discussed the advantages and disadvantages of distribute d v s. 
centralized systems. 
(1) Advanta~es 
-Reduced transmission and distribution costs and losses in some 
cases 
-Minimization of the land required 
-Increased use of thermal output of collectors 
-Reduced interest and inflation during construction due to shorter 
construction times 
- Matching of reliability to local needs 
(2) Disadvanta~es 
-Poorly engineered designs 
-Inability of organizations other than utilities to raise capital 
for investments with relatively long payback times 
- Uncertainties about maintenance costs 
The study concluded that "Given the uncertainties inherent in a n analysis 
of this type, it was simply not possible to establish that there either 
clearly were or were not e conomic advantages for small solar s y stems . .. 96 
The American Physical Society Study Group Report on phot ovoltaics 
concluded that central-station us e s would be more economic than on-site 
96 Off i ce of Technology Assessment (1978), pp. 1 2 -14. Henry Kelly, 
technical a ssistant to t h e director of OTA , apparently c oncluded that 
dis t ributed s y stems we r e most e c onomic. Se e Kelly (1978) , p. 642 . 
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applications . 97 The APS Report reached this conclusion through an 
examination of cost factors other than financial and tax ones. The Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory's review of the APS Report disagreed with this 
conclusion, but did not appear to necessarily endorse the opposite view 
that residential would be more economic. 98 A JPL critic of the emphasis 
on distributed systems noted in 1980: 
While land area can be conserved through the use of available 
roof space in distributed applications and structure costs may 
be reduced, almost all other cost factors work against 
distributed systems. Syste m installation, maintenance, sales, 
distribution, power conditioning , safety features, controls 
and displays, and insurance are all likely to cost more per 
unit in distributed applications. Building codes , product 
standards and liability, solar access, zoning restrictions , 
aesthetics, utility system maintenance , operation , emergency 
procedures, utility interconnection, PV installer training, 
and other complications are introduced or exacerbated in 
distributed applications. Thus it is not at all clear that 
distributed PV s y stems are more attractive on a cost/benefit 
basis than central s y stems. On the other hand , strong 
legitimate arguments have been made in support of a 
distributed emphasis Many would prefer distributed 
photovol taics because it could reduce the monopoly power 
utilities hold over electric generation sources; others would 
like to reduce the remoteness and impersonality of electricity 
supply or decrease the economic and ~olitical power of 
utilities and "big business" in general.Y9 
The views of the Office of Technology Assessment, the American 
Physical Society Study Group, and Jeffrey L . Smith of JPL cited above did 
not prevail in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The emphasis on 
residential was developed further in 1979 when the program stated its 
97 The APS study argued that the major advantage of on-site systems 
was the opportuni ty for cogeneration of heat and e lectricity from a single 
system , but that only cogeneration systems at large load centers or 
certain industrial sites would have an economic advantage. American 
Physical Society (1979), pp. 23-24. 
98 Jet Propulsion Laboratory ( 1980), pp. 15-16. 
99 Smith (1980b) , Vol. I, p. 29. 
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goals in terms of three markets rather than two (residential a nd central-
station). This was first done in June 1979, in the National Photovo1ta ics 
Multi-Year Program Plan draft prepared f or DOE by JPL. This document 
proposed system readiness price goals of $1.60 per watt peak in 1986 f or 
residential and selected intermediate load centers and $1.10-1. 30 for 
central-station uses in 1990 .100 These price goals were designed as 
break-even prices at which the total cost of supplying electr ic ity with 
photovoltaics is equal to the total cost of supply ing the electricity from 
the best alternat ive source.101 Thus, these goals implied that 
residential and intermediate load centers would be economic at the same 
PV s y stem price , and would be economic before ( and at higher PV prices) 
than central-station (utility) uses. 
Although the 1979 goals remained in force until 1983, 102 the first 
indication of retreat from the orientation toward distributed uses 
occurred in 1981. The photovoltaics division was returned to the Office 
of Solar Electric Technologies, 103 thus returning to the type o f 
organizational structure that existed from 1975 to 1977 and that was 
neutral with respect to applications. The final act in the drama occurred 
with the issuance of the Five Year Plan, which has governed the program 
since 1983 . It did not set separate goals for different categories of 
100 U.S . Department of Energy (1979a), pp. 2 -3 , 4. As discussed in 
note 61, the central-station goal was soon changed to 1.10-1.80. 
101 Smith (1980b), Vol. 1 , p. 25. 
102 These goals were repeated in the January 1981 and 1982 annual 
program summaries. See U.S. Department of Energy (1981), p. 2-8 and U.S. 
Department of Energy (1982), p . 1-8. 
103 Compare U.S. Department of Energy (1981), p. 2-3; ( 1 982), p. 1- 3. 
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uses, but argued that central- stat ion uses would be the most economic 
because they had the lowest balance-of-system costs and lowest indirec t 
costs (including marketing and distribution) _1°4 As is true of other 
aspects of the plan , this conclusion was based on the work of Roger Tay l or 
at EPRI. 105 
Thus the program went through four phases on the issue of the 





Neutral Emphasis in Organization and Goals 
On-Site Emphasis in Goals and Organization 
Neutral Organization; On-Site Goal Emphasis 
Neutral Organization; Central-Station Goal Emphasis 
Energy Price Goals 
The program has always formulated its goals in terms of module or 
system prices. Since 1983, energy price goals have been the basis fo r the 
module price goals, so that the resulting energy price has bee n known ~ 
priori. Prior to 1983, the energy price estimates were less prominent. 
This section will rev iew the evolution of energy price estimates from 1973 
t o the present. 
The first power cost estimates were presented by NSF at the Cherry 
Hill conference in October 1973. NSF presente d power cost estimates 
derived from 50 cents per peak watt in 1985 , and 10 cents per peak watt 
in 1 990 (Table 15 above). In 1973, NSF thus believed that 50-cents - per-
peak-watt a rrays in 1 98 5 would produce power a t a bout 5-7 cents per kWh, 
104 U. S. Department of Ene rgy (1983c ), p. 29 . 
105 Taylor (1983) and EPRI (1983) , p. 2-2. 
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and that 10-cent arrays in 1990 would produce power for between 1 and 2 
cents per kWh. A revised version of this table was presente d a year l a te r 
by the Solar Energy Task Force for Project Independence (Table 16 ) . The 
Task Force used a 1995 date instead of 1990, higher system costs , hig her 
operating costs for residences, and a lifetime of 25-30 years rather than 
20 and 30 years. The Task Force saw 50-cent-per-peak-watt arrays 
producing power at 4-8 cents per kWh. 106 Because the calculations in both 
this document and the earlier NSF paper are not possible to follow, the 
reasons for the differences in energy cost are not clear. 
Despite the ambiguities of these tables, they are important in a 
number of respects. First is the explicit recognition of balance-of-
system costs, and the assessment that these might be lower in central-
station applications than in residential . Second is the implication that, 
despite these lower system costs, the costs per kilowatt hour may be 
higher in central-station applications than residential. The source of 
this difference is not clear, because if one calculates the power costs 
for the NSF table using the data indicated, one arrives at exactly the 
opposite conclusion. 
The program made several estimates in 1978-1980 of the energy costs 
resulting from 50-cent-per-peak-watt arrays . In 1978, the estimate was 
5-8 centsjkWh;l07 in 1979, from 3.9 to 9 . 2 cents/kWh. The latter range 
reflected differences in location, residential vs . intermediate load 
106 U.S . Federal Energy Administration (1974) , p. VII-15. The 
Appendix shows 50-cent arrays producing power for 6.9 to 8.1 cents per 
kilowatt hour (p. VII - B-3). The di s cre pancy between this figure and the 
4 - 8 cent figure is not explained. 
107 U.S . Department of Energy (19 78a), p . 5; (19 78b) , p. 5 . 
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center, and the price at which excess energy would be sold back to t he 
utility. 108 In 1980, the estimate became "approximately 5-9 centsjkWh"l09 
and 5.2-8 . 7 cents/kWh in residential applications and 5.5-9 . 24 cent s/kWh 
in inte rmediate l oad applications_llO 
Thus the estimate d energy cost from 50-cent-per-peak-wa tt array s 
changed from 5-7 cents in 1 973, to 4-8 cents in 1974, to 5 - 8 cents in 
1978, to 5-9 cents in 1980. In fact, however , the 1979-1980 figure s are 
lower than the earlier e stimates when one considers inflation. Because 
the methodology for the 1973, 1974, and 1978 est imates is not clear, one 
cannot say for certain, but it is reasonable to assume that these costs 
are "levelized" in constant 1975$ .111 The 1979-1980 estimates, however, 
are levelized in constant 1980$. 112 Thus the 5-9 cents/kwh is actually 
3 . 5-6.4 cents/kwh in 1975$. 
Energy cost estimates were not published by the program in 1981 and 
1982 in the annual program summaries. 113 In 1983, the program adopted the 
15 cent per kilowatt hour goal , levelized in current 1982$ dollars, o r 6 . 5 
108 Smith (198Gb) , Vol . 1, pp. 25 - 27 . Intermediate load-centers 
include all distributed systems other than low-density residential housing 
(e .g. , commercial and industrial buildings , schools, apartments). 
109 U.S. Department of Energy (1980a). 
110 U.S. Department of Energy (1980b), p. 3. 
111 As noted earlier, levelization is a computational procedure which 
divides the cost of the project so that the cost per year is the same . 
The cost can either be equal per year in constant dollars or in current 
dollars. The 1974 estimate appears to be levelized in constant 1974$ , 
based on an array cost of 50 cents per peak watt in 1974$ , which is 
equivalent to levelizing in 1975$ based on a 1975$ array cost. See U.S . 
Federal Energy Administration (1974), p . VII-B-4. 
112 See U.S . Department of Energy (1980c), p . D-3 . 
113 U.S. Department of Energy (1981), p. 2-8; (1982), p . 1-8. 
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cents per kilowatt hour, levelized in constant 1982$ (equal to 5 .1 c ents 
in constant 1980$). The Five Year Plan did not estimate what t he cent s 
per kilowatt cost of the 50-cent-per-kilowatt goal would have been , nor 
have subsequent program documents. However, JPL economists estimated in 
1985 that this would be $0.264 per kWh in 1985$, levelized in nominal 
terms. 114 This is equal to 10.5 cents per kWh levelized in constant 1 980$ 
or 7.4 cents per kWh in constant 1975$.115 
Table 17 presents the history of energy cost estimates of PV power 
resulting from attainment of the 50-cent-per-peak-watt goal, with all 
estimates converted to levelized 1980$. Because the 1973, 1974, 1978 , and 
1980 estimates are not full y documented, it is not possible to say with 
certainty what led to the decline in estimates between the early estimates 
and the 1979-1980 estimates and the later increase in the 1980s. However, 
the two most likely possibilities are the elimination of storage, and 
changes in parameter assumptions/methodology. 
Economic Value of PV 
The economic value of PV depends on the extent to which it replaces 
higher-cost substitutes , which depends not only on the cost of electricity 
from PV (examined in the previous section) but on the cost of substitutes. 
The two most important substitutes are oil and electricity. Oil prices 
114 Callaghan, Henry, and McGuire (1985), p. l. 
115 The conversion to constant 1980$ is accomplished by dividing by 
1.30 (the change in the GNP implicit price deflator) to convert to 1980$ 
levelized in nominal terms and then dividing by 1.93, which is the factor 
to convert an amount levelized in nominal dollars to an amount levelized 
in constant dollars, assuming an inflation rate of 8.5 percent, a nominal 





Energy Cost Estimates For 50-Cent-Per-Peak-Watt Arrays 
Energy Cost Estimate 
Stated Estimate Estimate in 1980$ 
Made Application (cents per kWh. level ized in constant $) 
1973 Residential 5-7 7 .2 -10.1 
1974 Residential 4 - 8 5 .8-11 .6 
1978 All 5-8 7.2-11.6 
1979 Res./Intermediate 3.9-9 . 2 3.9 -9. 2 
1980 Residential 5-9 5 - 9 
Intermediate 5 . 2-8.7 5.2 - 8.7 
1983/ 85 Central Station 10 . 5 
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are important in three respects . First, they are the major f a cto r 
affecting the cost of diesel generation, whi ch is the primary substitu te 
for PV in nongrid applications. Second, they are the major determi nant 
of the cost of oil-fired electricity generation. Third, they ( o r the 
gasoline prices resulting) are the most visible energy prices and thus 
affect public perceptions about energy prices. 
The pattern for world oil prices shown in Table 18 is well known; 
the quadrupling in 1973-1974 , followed by an increase in nominal terms but 
a decline in real terms until 1979, followed by a doubling in 1979-1980, 
followed by nominal and real declines in the 1980s. However the pattern 
of electricity prices is quite different, with (in real terms) continual 
moderate increases until 1983 and moderate declines since then (Table 19) . 
A model of PV benefits which utilized current oil prices or 
electri city prices would do so as an indicator of future prices. Cost 
comparisons between PV systems and grid alternatives must be done for 
lifet imes that span a number of years; thus future prices dominate the 
calculation, even after discounting. 116 This is the reason Table 18 uses 
imported prices; domestic prices were regulated until 1981, and therefore 
were not a good indicator of prices several years in the future when 
116 PV systems have relatively high capital costs but low operating 
costs, and therefore will onl y be less costly than alternatives if 
evaluated over lifetimes of a number of years . Similarly, the 
alternatives generally have long lifetimes. If prices of conventional 
e nergy rise and solar costs decline , PV will clearly be e conomic to 
install at some point. The key question is when . JPL in 1980-1981 
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prices would probably no longer be regulated_ll7 
The appropriate price series for electricity pri ces is l e ss clear-
cut . Average prices are relevant for the user deciding whether to r eplace 
grid electricity wi th PV; the effec t of regulation is that the user face s 
the average cost of all generat i on rather than the marginal price. For 
the utility deciding whether to install PV, t he marginal price ( the cos t 
of new generation) is the relevant price. In either case however , the 
price several years in the future is the "figure of merit". The current 
marginal price is a better predictor of either than the current average 
price since the latter reflects the cost of low-cost sources, which either 
may not exist in the future or will be a smaller proportion of overall 
generation due to growth in consumption combined with a fixed supply of 
low-cost sources. However , the current marginal price was not as widely 
available as the current average price . Chapter 4 will explore whether 
congressional voting on solar energy is e xplained better by regional 
variations in current average prices or agency estimates of future 
marginal prices . 
In addition to the price of substitutes , a number of factors played 
key roles in determining t he economic value of PV: 
-At what module price is PV competitive in a given application? 
-What level of penetration of PV is predicted for future y ears? 
- What is the economic value of PV at these l evels of penetration? 
Each of these will be discussed below. 
At What Module Price is PV Competitive? The position taken on this 
117 If the proportion of price -controlled oil is known, the n changes 
in the average price convey the same information as c hange s in the c ost 
of uncontroll e d oil (e . g., oil imports). 
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question has been, in almost every case, a function of the position taken 
on the relative economics of residential vs. central -station use 
(discussed above on pages 68-78). For example , a number of a nal yses state 
that 50 cents per peak watt would be competitive in r es idential 
applications whereas a lower price (say 10- 20 cents per peak watt ) would 
be competitive in central-station use. 118 Studies which use a figure l ower 
than 50 cents per peak watt as the permiss i ble module price generally 
focus on central-station use and dismiss residential applications.ll9 
What is the Level of Penetration Predicted for Future Years? Table 
20 shows the estimated contribution of photovoltaics made by a number of 
studies. Although the studies at the outset of the program had forec a st 
a photovoltaic contribution in the year 2000 of anywhere from .45 to 7 .0 
quads , with an average estimate of about 3 quads , the May 1979 Department 
of Energy National Energy Plan e stimated contributions in the year 2000 
of 0 . 0 3 quads in the base case, 0 . 3 in the maximum practical, and .75 in 
the tec hnical limit .120 
118 For example, Subpanel IX (1973), pp . 402 , 411 in h earings; U.S. 
Department of Energy (1979b), p. VI-11; Henry Kelly of OTA in Committee 
on Sc ience and Technology (1979 ) , p . 534, plus a numbe r of studies 
discussed i n Section III. Kelly cites a number of studies--i. e . , General 
Electric Corporation ( 1979) , p. 1-7 ; Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
( 1 977), p. 45; Aerospace Corporation (1978); Carpenter and Taylor (1978); 
and Office of Technology Assessment (1978)- - which all conclude , according 
to Kelly, that 50 cents per pea k watt would be competitive . 
119 For example , American Physical Society ( 1979), p . 4, conclude d 
that the permissible modul e price in the high-insolation Sunbelt r egion 
of the U.S. in the year 2000 would be 10-40 cent/peak watt. As shown 
earlier, the Five Year Plan , which also dismis sed residential uses, chose 
an e nergy cost target requirement that gen e rally implie s module prices 
lower than 50 cents per peak watt . 
120 U. S . Department of Energy ( 1979b) , p . Vl - 4 . Fossil energy 
displacement figures are multiplied by 0. 3 to get energy produced. 
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Table 20 
Contribution of Photovoltaics 
(1015 Btus Per Year--Quadrillion Btus o r "Quads" ) 
Study 1980 
NSF /NASA ( 1972) 0 
























































Note: This table is identical with Table 5 . 
for that year was made . 1 kWh= 3412 BTU. 
in 1974 was 72.6 quads. 
"-" means that no projection 
Total U.S. energy consumption 
Sources: NSF/NASA (1972), Table 3, multiplying by factor of 0.3 to get 
solar energy production equal to the fossil-fuel displacement figures 
given . Subpanel IX (1973), Figure 29, p. 411. MITRE (1973), pp. 178, 
180. Solar Energy Task Force from U.S. Federal Energy Administration 
(1974), pp. I-7, 9. Different figures for these studies were given in a 
table prepared by a Congressional committee . 
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Estimates of federal funding requirements went up as well. Whereas 
the original estimates ranged mostly from $300-800 million (see Table 6), 
in 1980 JPL and the Department of Energy analyzed 7 options, ranging from 
$1.4 to $5.0 billion in cost, in terms of when they would achieve the 
price goal of the Solar Photovol taic Energy Research, Development and 
Demonstration Act of 1978 (a goal which was viewed as consistent with the 
original 50-cent-per-peak-watt goal) and the 1978 Domestic Policy Review 
goal of l. 0-quad displacement by the year 2000. The least expensive 
option that attained the price goal by 1986 cost $3.0 billion , whereas the 
$1.4 billion option achieved the goal by 1993 . 121 
One might argue however that this increase in cost estimates results 
not only from a change in expectations, but also from two other sources. 
First, larger budgets became politically acceptable in the late 1970s as 
a result of the energy crisis. Second, estimates became more realistic 
over time; the earlier low estimates could not be rejected as unreasonable 
at the time due to the great uncertainty involved.122 
What is the Economic Value of PV at This Level of Penetration? 
Early economic assessments of photovoltaics were generally attempts to 
justify the program. I.n addition to producing optimistic estimates of PV 
penetration , these early analyses used methodologies which overstated the 
value of a given level of PV penetration . One source of error was the 
assumption concerning the type of fuel displaced. Both the 1974 Solar 
Energy Task Force and 1975 ERDA testimony assumed that 100 percent of the 
121 U.S. Department of Energy (1980e), Volume 1 , pp . ES-13, F-19, 20 . 
1 22 This point about the interaction of uncertainty and cost 
estimation in weapon-system cost estimates was made by Terasawa (1984). 
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fuel displaced would be oil. 123 The opposite conclusion was reached in 
the 1979 American Physical Society Study Group, which conclude d that ve ry 
little of the displaced fuel would be oil, a conclusion which was 
challenged by JPL.l24 
The issue of which t echnologies PV will replace is complex, and 
requires an accurate assessment of all other new generation options that 
could compete in an optimized generation mix. 1 2 5 If 100 percent was too 
high a percentage for oil displacement , this would have overstated PV 
value in two ways. First, energy policy measures during the 1970s were 
evaluated in large measure in terms of t heir ability to reduce U.S. 
dependence on imported petroleum. Second, the value of PV is a 
combination of fuel and capacity displacement. The value of PV was often 
measured just in terms of fuel displacement, since it was clear that PV 
use would reduce fuel use whereas the capacity displacement issue was far 
more complex. 126 Although assuming only fuel savings from 100 percent oil 
123 U.S . Federal Energy Administration (1974), p. VII-10 , and Teem 
(1975), pp . 207-208 . 
124 American Physical Society (1979), pp. 4 5-47, and Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (1980), pp. 13-14 . 
125 Taylor (1983), p. 4-25 . The complexity even extends to the 
effect of oil price increases on the competitiveness of PV. Some have 
suggested that oil price increases, and here they must be assuming that 
no other energy price changes accompany them, have an ambiguous effect on 
the economics of PV, since although they clearly make PV more economic 
relative to oil-fired units, oil price i ncreases accelerate the 
replacement of the oil-fired units. If PV is economic relative to oil at 
a later date than some other generation option, oil price increases may 
lead to installation of this other generation option. Once thi s option 
is in place, the installation of PV may be delayed since capacity costs 
for the other option will be sunk . 
126 The assessment of the economic value of PV has always been 
complicated by the fact that photovoltaics did not fit nicel y into the 
traditional categories of power generation : base l oad, inte rmediate load, 
or peaking. Photovoltaics have a relatively high capital-cost-to -
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displacement need not necessarily result in larger estimated benefits than 
a combination of fuel and capacity savings from other sources, the o il 
prices used in the analyses (based on the large increases in 1973-1974) 
would likely lead to larger es timates. 
There were at least three other sources of overstatement of the 
value of the PV program: 
1. The dollar value of oil savings was sometimes compared to the R&D 
costs of the PV program. 127 The relevant comparison is instead to the 
total cost of the PV systems, of which R&D costs are likely to be a small 
part . 
2. The benefits from PV use (e.g. , fuel savings) were sometimes not 
discounted. Although short construction times for PV systems mean that 
initial benefits occur within a year or two of the initial costs, other 
operating-cost ratio (like nuclear and coal-fired plants), so that once 
constructed, it should be used as much as possible (base load, like coal 
and nuclear). However, the output of a photovoltaic cell varies with 
location, and at any one location, varies with the time of day, time of 
year , and weather . Thus, unlike nuclear and coal-fired plants , the output 
of photovoltaics is variable and cannot be "counted on" to meet the base 
load of a system. Nor, because peak demand at a particular location does 
not necessarily coincide with peak solar energy availability at that 
location, can photovoltaics be "counted on" to meet peak demand. However, 
"counted on" is a relative notion since no generation source is 100 
percent reliable, and the presence of PV in a system can clearly displace 
some capacity. 
The problem of integrating photovoltaics, or indeed any solar energy 
source, into a power system becomes more pronounced as the percentage of 
solar within the system increases . This exacerbates the "capacity 
displacement" problem, for it is inherently a long run problem for which 
existing experience with photovoltaics in the 1970s provided little guide . 
The results of a number of studies concerning the economic value of PV in 
terms of capacity , fuel, and operations and maintenance savings are 
summarized in Smith (1980b), Vol . II, pp. 20-25. 
127 This is done implicitly in NSFjNASA (1972), Tables 3 and 4, and 
explicitly in U.S . Federal Energy Administration (1974), p. VII-10, and 
1975 ERDA Testimony (Teem (1975), pp . 207 - 208)). 
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factors (a high ratio of capital costs to operating costs, and the 20- 30 
year lifetime, i.e., stream of benefits , required to make PV economic) 
make the failure to discount serious. 
3. The benefits of the federal government's PV r esearch and 
development program were sometimes confused with the benefits of PV use. 
The benefits of a federal R&D program , by contrast, are a function of the 
benefits of PV use occurring earlier than they otherwise would.l28 
In addition, there was one error which could have led to either 
overstatement or understatement of the potential of PV relative to other 
technologies. The benefits of PV use are the cost savings, which are a 
function of the quantity of PV used and the unit cost difference. The 
benefits of various technologies, including PV, were sometimes evaluated 
by comparing the conventional energy production displaced by the 
technology with the federal funds devoted to the technology, 129 or 
sometimes by just looking at the energy production figure. 
In each aspect reviewed above, the changes over time would lead an 
observer to a lower assessment of PV value. First, oil and electricity 
prices did not increase as expected. Second, the attractiveness of 
residential systems decreased due to a recognition of difficulties. 
Third, the penetration estimates also declined from the early 1973-1975 
estimates to the DOE estimates in 1979-1980. Finally, the assessment of 
128 This point is made clear in Hamilton (1981) in which the proper 
approach is developed. The question of PV value has been virtually 
ignored since this paper . 
129 For example, the response of the Policy and Evaluation group in 
the Department of Energy to a request from Senator Bennett Johnston- -
Inside DOE, May 18, 1979, or the s uggested approach in Schmalensee (1980), 
p. 18 . 
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the economic value of a given level of PV use d ecreased as a number of 
methodological errors in the early assessments were gradually e liminated 
from analyses. 
The principal conclusion to be drawn from studying the wealth of 
analyses of the prospects for PV is that t he economic benefits of t he 
program were generally overestimated due to a combination of optimis tic 
estimates and faulty methodology. The early studies, undertaken largely 
by advocates, were the worst in this regard. As the program progressed, 
the studies became more pessimistic , primarily because of the general 
decline of forecast energy prices and demand, and the realization that 
the focus on distributed systems had been misplaced . 
BUDGETARY HISTORY 
Although the budgetary fortunes of PV and all solar energy programs 
rose and fell together, PV's share of the total solar budget has risen 
steadily, from 19 percent in fiscal year 1976 to 39 percent in 1989 . 
Table 21 shows appropriations for photovoltaics whereas Table 22 shows 
solar appropriations. 130 Table 23 shows that PV has always fared a little 
130 Whatever their importance in the Congressional funding process 
as a whole, authorizations have played a rather minor role in 
photovoltaics, especially in recent years. This is due to the fact that 
during the 1979-1985 period, for example, Congress failed to pass the 
relevant energy authorization bill for fiscal years 1979-1981 and 1985, 
and for 1983-1984 set authorizations in terms of a formula based on the 
previous year's appropriation plus 10 percent. Such a rule is not likely 
to be binding during a period of program contraction (as occurred in this 
period). Furthermore , this rule appears to apply at the level of the 
appropriation account, i . e., "operating expenses--energy supply, research 
and development activities" and photovoltaics is but a small portion of 
this account. See U.S . Senate (1980), p. 9; (1981), p . 6. Thus the 
authorization process did not seem to provide guidance to the 
appropriations committees regarding photovoltaics funding in some years 
of the program . 
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Table 21 
Photovoltaics Appropriations, 1976-1989 
(Operating Expenses, Capita l Equipment, and Construction) 
Fiscal Admin . House Senate Confer ence; 
Year Request Comm . Hous e Comm. Senate Final 
19761 10.0 12.02 29. 5 10 .7 2 na 3 21 . 62 
1977 32.8 34 .7 68 . 8 49.6 na4 64 .0 
1978 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57 .5 57.5 
Supplem. 57 . 5 57 . 5 76.5 76.5 76.5 76 . 5 
1979 76.1 125 .3 125 . 3 106.1 106 . 1 118. 8 
1980 130.0 157. 0 157.0 152.0 152.0 157 . 0 
RescissionS na na na na 150 . 0 
1981 160 .2 149.0 160.2 152.2 156.06 160 . 2 
Rescission 139. 2 139.2 139.2 139 . 2 139.2 
1982 62.9 84.0 84.0 78.0 78.0 74.07 
1983 27.0 47.0 na8 58 . 0 na8 58. 0 
1984 32.7 46 .7 46. 7 55 .7 55.7 50.49 
1985 47.5 57 . 0 57 . 0 56. 5 56 . 5 57.0 
1986 44.8 45.8 4 5.8 49.0 49.0 40.710 
1987 20.6 35.6 35 . 6 40.6 40.6 40.4 
1988 20.4 35.0 35.0 39.0 39 . 0 35 . 0 
1989 24.2 24.2 24.211 37.0 37.0 35.5 
Notes : 
The final amount for the prior year, and the Administration request and 
House committee amount for the current year are from the report fr om t he 
House Appropriations Committee accompanying the appropriation bill. The 
House amount and Senate committee amount are from the corre sponding report 
of the Senate appropriation committee . The Senate amount is difficult to 
ascertain; the Con&ressional Record often does not provide this 
information for floor amendments. The Department of Energy Budget Request 
documents were also used at various points . The revised budget request 
of the incoming President is used in fiscal years 1978 and 1 982. The 
revised budget request in 1979 of $106.1 million is not used since t here 
was no change in Administration . 
1. All 1976 appropriation figures shown represent costs (approximating 
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Table 21 (cont.) 
outlays) except for the final figure (obligations) and the House floor 
figure (unknown whe t her it is cos ts or obligations). This is why the 
final 1976 figure (21.6) is larger than the conference committee total 
(16.0) . The 1976 appropriation figure s also do not include $8.2 mill ion 
for solar research in the 1976 NSF budget. See Congressional Record , 
December 5 , 1975, p . S38926. 
2. These figures d o not include capital e quipment funds , which were not 
allocated among the solar energy accounts. Including these would probably 
increase t he PV amounts by less than $1 million . 
3. The Glenn amendment , to increase solar appropriations by $30 million, 
did not specify the increase for photovoltaics . 
4 . The Hart amendment, to increas e solar appropriations by $16.4 million, 
did not specify the i n crease for photovoltaics. 
5. Precise PV totals in the resciss i on bill are not clear from House a nd 
Senate reports. 
6. Description of the Tsongas amendment in the Congressional Record 
appears to leave PV funding unchanged, with · only the Dole a me ndment 
increasing the PV total. 
7. Although the conference total was $78 . 0 million, a general reduction 
taken by the Administration reduced this to $74. 0 million . See Department 
of Energy FY 1983 Congressional Budget Request , Vol. 2, p. 24. 
8. Neither the House nor the Senate took action on the 1983 appropriations 
bill , so funds were provided through t he 1983 continuing appropriations 
resolution , which did not specify amounts for PV . 
9 . Although the conference total was $51.2 million , a general reduction 
taken by the Administration reduced the PV total to $50.4 million. 
10 . The conference total of $49 .0 million was reduced by $6 . 5 million by 
"management initiatives" and $1.1 mill ion by Gramm - Rudman - Hollings 
reductions. See Department of Energy FY 1987 Congress ional Budget 
Request, Vol . 2, p. 25. 
11. The $ 20 million increase in solar from the Brown amendment is onl y 
listed in the Senate report as a "gen e ral increase "; it is not a llocate d 
among t he solar accounts. 
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Table 22 
Solar Appropriations , 1976- 1989 









































































125 . 8 
105 . 1 
98 . 8 
Senate 
107.1 
























552 . 7 
596 . 4 
500. 0 
268. 2 
201 . 9 
181.7 
179 . 4 
144 . 6 
123 . 5 
96 . 9 
92.2 
Note: As in Table 21 , the 1976 figures represent a mixture of costs and 
obligations . The original budget requests for 1976 and 1979 are shown, 
since no change in Administration took place. In 1978 and 1982, where 
there was a change in Administration, the request of the incoming 
President is shown . For 1986 , the conference figure of $157. 2 million was 
reduced by management initiatives of $6.5 million (solely in PV), 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings reductions of $5.9 million, and other adjustments 
of $0.2 million. 
97 
Table 23 
Percentage Increase in Appropriations for PV and Solar 
Average 81 Resc. 82 over 83 over 84 over 86 over 89 ove r 
Annual over Prev. 81 Resc. 82 83 84 86 
Increase 81 Level 
1976-80 
-------- --------- -------- ------- ------- ----- --
PV 74.4 -13.1 -46 .8 -21.6 -13 . 1 -19. 2 -1 2 .8 
Solar 56.4 -16. 2 -46.4 - 24.3 -1 0.0 -20 . 4 -3 6 .2 
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better than solar programs in general, with a significant differe nce since 
1986. 
The budgetary history of solar energy shows that the entire program 
was driven primarily by congress ional enthusiasm. In every year except 
1980 and 1986 , the solar a mount appropriated by Congress equaled or 
exceeded the President's request . For PV , the Congressional a mount was 
larger in every year except 1981 and 1986. The 1986 final figures for 
solar and PV are below the budget request due to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
reductions. The average percentage increase each year in appropriations 
over the President's proposed budget was virtually identical for PV and 
the entire solar budget--50 and 49 percent, respectively (Table 24) . 
Congress ional enthusiasm for solar energy was not confined to its 
authorizations and appropriations oversight committees. Ne ither the House 
nor the Senate ever even voted on an amendment to reduce funds below the 
a mounts proposed by their appropriations and authorizations committees. 
During the period of growth in the 1970s, proposals to increase funds 
above committee proposals were often offered and passed . Moreover , with 
few exceptions proposals to increase spending on PV were packaged with 
increases in all or most other solar e nergy activities. During the harder 
times of the 1980s, appropriations committee requests were always accepted 
without a mendment, and were always higher than the administration had 
requested, with two exceptions. First, for fiscal year 1989 , the House 
accepted an amendment to increase funding solar by $20 million . Second, 
for fiscal y ear 1986 , the House committee recommended a level $1 million 
dollars below the Administration request for PV and solar. 
If on e assumes that the program managers, executive branch budget 
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Table 24 



























-9 . 2 
97 . 1 
71.6 
46.7 












70 . 8 
36 . 1 
14 . 7 
49 . 0 
Note: Table does not show supplementals or rescissions. 
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officials, and members of the oversight commi t tees general ly posse s sed 
more expertise about the program than d i d Congre ss i n general. the 
implication of these figures is that the PV and solar prog r a ms gre w too 
fast in t he 1970 s. If so , the incre menta l dollars would have been s pent 
on activities with relatively low product i vity . Moreover, be c a use of t h e 
long-term charac t er of the program from the outset , one would e xpect that 
the program would have had a better chance for success if the boom and 
bust patte rn of the last 15 years had bee n replace d by a muc h smoothe r , 
more even path of expenditures. 
THE POLITICS OF SOLAR ENERGY 
The dramatic rise of t he budgets for solar energy during the Carter 
presidency and the equally dramatic decline during the Reagan years, 
suggest that strictly political factors --differences in support 
constituencies and ideologies--were an important factor in the life of the 
program. For purposes of analysis, the forces affecting the political 
survival of solar programs can be usefully separated into three 
categories: ideology and party; distributiv e politics; and program 
performance. Whereas it is clear that the demise of solar energy programs 
began with the election of Ronald Reagan, the question remains whether the 
Reagan Administration's opposition to the program reflected fundamental 
ideological and policy differences with the Carte r Administration , a 
simultaneous change in the long-term prospects of the solar energy 
program, or differences between Republi cans and Democrats with respect to 
the constituencies that they seek to woo with targeted federal 
expenditures . 
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Party and Ideology 
The policy differences between the two Administrations on the issue 
of solar energy were abundantly c lear. The Carter Administrat ion 
advocated a broad-based, research-oriented energy program , a nd 
specifically solar energy. In addition to the increases in budget 
requests shown in Table 21 and 22 , the November 1978 National Energy Act, 
consisting of five pieces of legislation , provided for government 
procurement, tax credits, and utility fuel-use restrictions. The Solar 
Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act (P.L. 
95-590, November 4, 1978) represents the only legislative enactment of 
photovoltaic goals during the history of t he program. The Act set forth 
a fiscal year 1988 production goal of 2 million peak kilowatts and a 1988 
price goal of $1 per peak watt for installed systems. It contemplated 
that the 10-year program to attain this goal would require a federal 
expenditure of $1.5 billion. Earlier that year, on Sun Day, May 3, 1978, 
President Carter instituted the Domestic Policy Review of Solar Energy. 
Following that review , President Carter, on June 20, 1979, proposed a 
national goal of meeting 20 percent of our energy needs with solar and 
renewable resources by the end of this century, and outlined a 
comprehensive program involving a number of government agencies to 
accelerate the use of solar energy . 131 In contrast, President Reagan soon 
after taking office, proposed shifting "the Department of Energy's solar 
activities away from costly n ear-term development, demonstration, and 
commercialization efforts and into longer-range research and development 
projects that are too risky for private firms to undertake." Accompanying 
131 U. S . House of Representatives ( 1979). 
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this redirection was a proposed reduction of DOE solar spending by more 
than 60 percent in 1982, with cumulative savings of nearl y $1 .9 billi on 
by the end of 1986.132 
Acc ompanying this shift in party and ideology of the Administrati on 
was a shift in party, and consequently ideology , l33 in the Congress, shown 
in Table 25. Thus shifts in party and ideology in the Administration and 
Congress immediately preceded major funding increases in the 70s and 
reductions in the 80s for solar and photovoltaics. 
132 U.S. House of Representatives (1981 , pp . 4-16) . 
13 3 A time series for ideology is more difficult to obtain . Although 
there is no theoretical reason why average ACA score should provide a good 
time series, the actual numbers dash any hopes that this would be the 
case. The ACA scores increased with the arrival of the " class of 74" (one 
would have expected a decrease), and the differences in ACA scores within 
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49 . 6 
48 . 6 
With respect to ADA scores, Kau and Rubin (1979b) c laim that the ADA picks 
votes so that the average rating is about . 5 and thus such ratings are not 
suitable for a time-series study . 
One procedure that has been used is to average the score for 
different years of each member, and then compute the average score of each 
Congress using these averages for each member . This procedure assumes 
that the liberal-conservative positions of each member are constant over 
time and the variation ove r time in the liberal-conservative nature of the 
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Table 25 
Party in the U.S. Congress 
Senate 
% Democratic 








54 . 0 
Note: Percentages are calculated as Dem. /( Dem. +Rep.) and thus 
independents are ignored. 
Source : U.S. Department of Commerce (1986, p. 235) for 1971-1985. U.S . 
Government Printing Office (1987) for 1987. 
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Distributive Polit ic s 
The importance of distributive politics arises fro m the nature of 
representation of the citizenry in Congress. One can expect legislators 
to evaluate programs based in part on the effe cts of the program on their 
constituents. In the solar energy program , these effec ts are t h e 
stimulative effec t of federal expenditures and the benefits of solar 
energy. 
Several distribut ive aspects of the solar energy program are like l y 
to have had similar eff ects on all or most solar technologies . Sunlight, 
for example , is important to both solar thermal and PV technologies, 
although less important for wind. Another common factor is the price of 
conventional and other energy sourc es , whi ch also varies geographically. 
All solar technologies will be more attracti ve in areas where , all else 
being equal, conventional a nd other energy sources are more expensive. 134 
Still another factor is overlapping technology. For example, solar 
thermal and PV both use concentrators, s o that advances in concentrator 
technology would benefit both. Moreover , the presence of technical 
commonalities could lead to geographic concentration of solar R&D across 
a spec trum of technologies. In fact, many firms and government labs 
worked simultaneously on several solar technologies . 
These factors al l suggest that the appropriate focus of a political 
analysis is the entire solar energy program, not one of its components 
such as PV. Moreover, because solar energy apparently did constitute a 
1 34 Although different solar technologies may substitute for 
different fuels, there is enough commonality in fuel t ype as well as 
correlation between the prices of these substitutes, to lead to common 
distributive effects. 
lOS 
politically relevant ideological category of policies, even in t he a bse nce 
of technical and economic commonalities it would still be an ide al basis 
on which to build a political coalition or to orchestrate a logroll . 
Hence , separating the distributive effects of each solar e n e rgy progr a m 
is likely to be very difficult and pe rhaps impossible . 
Some distributiv e factor s are useful only for explaining di ff e r ences 
among politicians in their support for a program, rather than changes in 
the fortunes of a program over time . For example , the geographic 
distribution of sunlight does not vary over time, and so cannot explain 
the rise and fall in the fortunes of the solar energy prog ram. In the 
case of PV, changes in the distributive politics of solar energy could 
affect its long-term fortunes in the f ollowing way s. First, if any one 
of the solar energy t e chnologies appeared to be losing the competition 
with PV, the entire solar energy coalition could fall apart. Second , a 
group of firms in the PV industry might develop that was not receiv ing 
f ederal support. Continuation of the program would be seen by them as 
unfair, and their representatives could come to regard the distributive 
aspects of the program as undesirable. Third, changes in the political 
composition of the government could reflect important changes in the 
relevant political constituencies in assessing distributive effects. 
Specifically, groups threatened by solar energy (such as the nuclear power 
industry or, with r e spect to distributed s y stems , electric utilities) 
might become better represented as time progressed, while solar interes t s 
simultaneously enjoyed fewer supporters in Congress. This e ffect, of 
course, is all but impossible to disentangle from the e ffects of party and 
ideology . 
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The distributive benefits of PV were quite uncertain along t hree 
dimensions: when PV would work, who it would work for, a nd who would 
receive federal money. The first uncertainty arose out of uncertainti e s 
internal ( supply -side ) and external to the program (demand-side). The 
uncertainty about who PV would work for arose because of the complicated 
nature of PV economi cs, in which the competitiveness of PV in a r egion 
would depend on a number of factors such as latitude, weather, load 
pattern , environmental constraints, the need for new capacity, and the 
cost of alternative sources. Whether the primary market for PV was 
dispersed residential use or central-station utility generators was also 
uncertain for the first 10 years of the program. 
Who would receive federal money was uncertain for a number of 
reasons. The program was not targeted from the beginning, such as a dam 
or harbor would be. Also, there was uncertainty about program direction : 
an R&D program implied a different set of beneficiaries than a program of 
demand stimulus achieved through a combination of government procurement, 
tax credits , and forced utility purchases. Within the context of an R&D 
program, there were additional sources of uncertainty. First, the 
contract award process was d ecentralized and thus l e ss subject to 
political influence. Second, who got the larger contracts that 
characterize the later stages of R&D would depend on technical success in 
earlier stages, and this was highly uncertain . Finally, the approach to 
demonstrations was to not fund a single project, unlike the solar the rmal 
project at Barstow , Cal i fornia , or the Clinch River breeder reac t or. 
Demonstration projects were funded, but they were of a smaller scale, and 
hence l e ss predictable . 
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The next two chapters will examine the distributive bene f its of PV 
in more detail. Chapter 3 develops a model o f the benefi ts of PV 
technology. Chapter 4 uses this model in an econometric anal ysis of PV 
roll call voting . 
EVALUATION OF PROGRAM 
There are a varie ty of ways to evaluate the photovoltai cs prog ram. 
Among these are the following: 
-Did the program achieve its goals? 
-Were the goals of the program sensible? 
-Did the program make the right strategic decisions? 
-Were the budgetary levels appropriate? 
-Was the form of government inv olvement the right one? 
-Was the management structure appropriate? 
These issues will be addressed in this section. 
Did the Pro~ram Achieve Its Goals ? 
Evaluating the PV program in terms of its outcome has t hree major 
deficiencies . First, both cost reductions in PV and the ext ernal 
environment in which the product must compete are subjec t to substantial 
uncertainty. One should not confuse a bad outcome with a bad dec i sion . 
Perhaps the program was likely to produce commercial adoption but a bad 
draw from nature resulted in an uneconomic outcome . Second, even if 
adoption of t he technology is unlikely , proceeding with the technology may 
be wise, particularly if on e is risk-averse , to provide ins uranc e a gainst 
future even ts that may not transpire, but t hat would be very costly if 
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they did and no plans had been made to cope with them . Third , t he 
existence of a new energy technology , even if never adopted, can const rain 
the cost of other energy sources with which it could c ompete. 
These three considerations suggest that evaluating the desirability 
of the PV program in terms of whether it accomplished its or iginal price 
goal is unduly harsh. Lack of adoption of the technology could be a 
result of "unlucky outcomes" (e.g., some foreseen technology cost 
reductions that did not happen, or the decline in world oil price s 
beginning in 1981). Similarly, solar technology could be valuable 
insurance against the possibility that nuclear or fossil fuel alternatives 
do not work out. 135 Also , the demonstration of a "backstop" technology 
such as solar, even if not available for many years, could significantly 
depress current oil prices due to the fact that energy producers, as a 
result of the demonstration of the technology, will produce more oil and 
sell it at lower prices until the backstop technology becomes available . 
Neither the Administration nor the Congress justified the program 
as either insurance or as a backstop technology . The justification for 
the program was that achievement of the program's goals, which were 
considered feasible, would result in commercial adoption of the 
technology. 
Were the Goals of the Pro~ram Sensible? 
Primary emphasis on a cent-per-watt cost goal for modules for most 
of the program's history (1973-1983) raises the possibility of 
mismanagement of program resources. A major argument in favor of this 
135 Landsberg (1979), p. 468. 
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goal is that a stable goal, even if not ideal, is preferable to a shi fting 
target based on changes in energy prices, financial parameters , etc . A 
second advantage was its orientation toward costs rather than technical 
accomplishment. The disadvantages were the neglect of balance-of-system 
costs in the module goal and the lack of a direct tie to economi c 
viability. 
Did the Program Make the Right Strategic Choices? 
Several key strategic choices were made during the life of the 
program. Probably the most important was the balance between research and 
development and government procurement. Although the 12 percent of 
program funds spent on d emonstration programs was too large , it means t hat 
the program remained throughout primarily a research and development 
program . 136 Furthe rmore, 1 2 percent compares favorably with other energy 
programs , such as the solar thermal or breeder reactor programs. Both of 
the latter included a single major demonstration project which consumed 
a large portion of the program budget . By contrast, the PV demonstration 
projects remained relatively small , entirely in keeping with the notion 
that PV was a modular technology and hence that there were not risks in 
extrapolating resul t s t o large units . l37 
The program underwent several shifts in its thinking rega rding 
s ystem configuration, specifically the role of storage and the role of 
distributed vs. central - station PV systems. Analytical issues that are 
136 As noted earl ier, the solar tax c redits are similar to governme nt 
procurement a nd a re not included in the 12 percent figure . 
137 This characteristic of PV is noted in Maycock (1985), p. 140 . 
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clear in hindsight are often muddled at the time, and it is reasonable to 
regard some program e x penditures as necessary for learning. The inclusion 
of storage costs appears to be a simple analy tical mista k e that did n o t 
have major long-term consequences (inclusion made batterie s seem mo r e 
important than their obvious use in remote applications). The emphasis 
on distributed systems in the late 1970s reflected political and social 
factors. On the analytical side , the resolution of the issue depended on 
the appropriate balancing of financial and tax considerations favoring 
residential use vs. cost factors that favored central-station use. The 
cost differences between distributed and central-station systems were not 
accurately assessed in the late 1970s. Some errors were obvious--e.g . , 
the view that residential maintenance costs were zero (since they do it 
themselves) . Another error which could have been avoided without any 
detailed research was the failure to perceive the large marketing and 
distribution costs of distributed systems, and complications such as 
utility interconnection and PV installer training that are exacerbated in 
distributed applications . l38 
This misplaced emphasis on distributed systems could have had a 
number of effects that could have retarded progress in central-station 
applications. The specific problem areas might have been the following : 
too little emphasis on concentrators and sun-tracking systems; too much 
emphasis on residential institutional issues such as building codes and 
engineering, legal, and economic issues relating to the interconnection 
138 There may also be a safety issue. I was told by a former lawyer 
for the nuclear industry of an estimate that extrapolated from the 
accident experience of homeowners with rooftop antennas to conclude that 
accidents from rooftop PV could be sizable . 
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of dispersed PV systems to the grid , primarily relating to the sell-back 
of electricity to the grid; and, among demonstration proje cts, too muc h 
emphasis on residential and not enough on utility applications. However. 
this distributed bias would have had little effect on much of the research 
effort, since much of the technology would be the same under either focus. 
Another potential difficulty was distortions introduced by t he 
difference in PV tax credits for residential and business use , and the 
exclusion of utilities from the credit. The actual effect of these 
provisions is difficult to determine given the lack of data on utilization 
of the PV credits . 
Were the Budgetary Levels Appropriate? 
The program grew rapidly in the 1970s and shrank dramatically in the 
1980s. Whether this growth and subsequent cuts were justified is a 
complicated question. One place to begin is with the shape of the budget 
path, given that the program was designed to payoff 10-25 years after its 
inception. Growth of a program from $2 million in 1974 to $76 . 5 and $150 
million four and six years later incurs some waste. This must be balanced 
against the perceived urgency in the 1970s concerning the development of 
energy alternatives. Similarly, rapid reductions incur inefficiencies as 
research and demonstration programs are terminated prior to fruition. 
This in turn must be balanced against the decreasing need for alternative 
energy sources with falling oil prices. The decline of world oil prices 
beginning in 1981 reduced the expected benefits of PV, so an optimal 
program would have been cut back. But this does not answer the question 
of whether the pre-1981 levels were too high or low, or whether the 
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magnitude of the cutback was correct. The growth a ppears to have been too 
rapid and the subsequent cuts too severe, given the steady progress of the 
program, but this judgment is difficult if not impossibl e to prove. 
Was the Form of Government Involvement the Right One ? 
There are at least t wo alternatives to the form of governme nt 
involvement utili zed in PV. One is to let the private sector ma ke the R&D 
decisions . This is the approach recommended by Nelson (1982 ) and Gates 
( 1988) except for special cases, such as where there is a well-defined 
government procurement intere st. To ensure that the private sector 
undertakes the R&D , there are "carro t" and "stick" approaches. The 
"carrot" approach is tax credits, either on the supply side supporting 
research a nd development, or on the demand side supporting purchases , 
which indirectly spurs R&D. The "stick" approach is regulatory. For 
example, little government R&D money has gone into pollution abatement or 
increased gasoline mileage, two issues that the government has deemed ( via 
the regulatory process) to be of national importance. In both of these 
cases, the strategy has been to mandate performance goals or the adoption 
of c ertain technologies. The analogy in photovoltaics might have been to 
mandate that electric utilities ut i lize photovoltaics . 
The approach the government followed was different. On the supply 
side, the policy was more specific than a tax or regulatory approach 
because the government made specific choices on the supply side among 
competing technologies, whereas these other a pproac h e s would have only 
required that the research be in a category , such as PV, solar, or energy, 
and thus would not discriminate among PV approaches . On the demand side, 
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it supported adoption of these tec hnologies by government procurement, tax 
credits , and fuel-use restrictions as in the "carrot" a nd "stick" 
approaches . The fuel-use restrictions, however, only required that 
utilities meet environmental standards and restrictions on oil and gas 
use, and that they buy solar power at their avoided costs . Thus if the 
environmental/fuel-use res trictions could be met in other ways, and the 
solar resulting from the government program was more costly than other 
sources, they had no need to adopt solar energy. 
This is not to suggest that legislative andjor regulatory mandates 
for photovoltaic use by electric utilities would have been a wise policy . 
These provisions prejudge highly uncertain economic outcomes and may 
result in substantial inefficiency. However they have the advantage that 
potential users guide the application of applied and research and 
development funds.l3 9 
Given that "technology-forcing" approaches have been used elsewhere, 
it is worth considering why this approach was not used in photovoltaics . 
One reason may have been that homeowners were foreseen at the outset as 
the initial users. Thus failure to perceive that the utility market would 
dominate (as shown in Table 3) may have precluded the use of alternate 
strategies for photovoltaics development. 
One difficulty in either the PV a pproach to R&D management or 
leaving it up to the private sector is that the resulting R&D is not 
coordinated. In government - managed R&D, it is difficult for the 
government to know what private R&D is occurring and thus how to integrate 
1 39 See the final chapter of Nelson (1982) fo r a d iscussion of this 
point. 
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its R&D with that occurring in the private sector. The photovol taic 
program did not appear to deve lop special mechanisms to deal with this 
problem. 140 
An alternative is centralized control, which was recommended by 
Ouchi (1984) in his criticism of the PV program. In his view, excessive 
program fragmentation caused contract awards to unqualified organizations 
and poor coordination of the research. The former point , if true , is a lso 
consistent with the view that the program simply grew too fast or made 
awards for political reasons. The latter is not by itself a conclusive 
argument, for less coordination is a necessary cost of decentralization 
and competition that may or may not provide offsetting benefits. That 
there were offsetting benefits appears plausible. 
The program throughout was characterized by a great deal of 
uncertainty for reasons internal (supply-side ) and external (demand-side ) 
to the program. To cope with the technical uncertainties, multiple 
approaches were supported in a competitive environment. On the demand 
side, the program devoted a great deal of analytical effort to 
understanding how PV might become competitive in different uses. 
Government procurement, tax credits, and utility restrictions were used 
to assure at least some market for PV. 
Conclusion 
The fortunes of the photovoltaic program rose and fell with the 
energy crisis, and with the changes in party and ideology in the Congress 
140 This problem has been raised regarding R&D in general by Nelson 
(1982), p. 5, and with respect to energy R&D by Landsberg (1979), p. 550, 
and Gates (1988). 
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and the Administration, first in 1975/77 and then in 1981. One reason for 
this may have been that , with the exception of a f ew d e monstrat ion 
programs, the PV program imposed on itself, through the decentralized 
award of contracts to technical "winners , " an inability to r e ward 
Congressmen for previous political support. In addition to sustaining a 
preeminent role for party and ideology in determining program support , 
this may have had an effect on the economic performance of the program. 
The allocation of resources within the program was less subject to 
Congressional control , either directly or indirectly through attempts of 
program administrators to maintain political support for the program by 
awarding contracts to particular districts _141 This freedom from "pork 
barrel" aspects may have improved program performance. 
It is instructive to compare the photovoltaics program with the 
breeder program. 142 Both were long-term electricity supply options, with 
essentially infinite energy supplies , but that were too costly for current 
use. Proponents of both programs argued that the programs were valuable 
as insurance, even if too costly now or in the immediate future. Solar 
advocates often argued for more funds for solar based on the funds 
received by the breeder.143 
141 Arnold (1979) documents Congressional influence through the 
actions of program administrators designed to affect Congressional 
support. 
142 Chapter 9 , Cohen and Noll, forthcoming. 
143 "If only a part of the $2 billion of federal funds slated for 
the Clinch River breeder reactor were directed instead to photovoltaic 
purchases, the $1000 per-peak-kilowatt could be achieved very 
soon- -compared to a $5000 per-peak-kilowatt estimated cost at Clinch 
River . " Maidique (1979), p. 210, cited in Maycock and Stirewalt (1985), 
p. 17f. 
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The conclusion in Cohen and Noll with respect to the breeder that 
results from the R&D program itself play virtually no role in 
the overall assessment of the program, in part because the 
program proceeded slowly, but mainly because the external 
shifts were far more dramatic in their i mplicat ions than the 
technical progress of the program 
overstates the case for PV, but is basically correct. Changes in the 
overall energy situation affected both programs, although t he decline i n 
electricity demand growth rates impacted the breeder program more 
severely, through its dependence on the demand for light-water reactors . 
For photovoltaics, the shifts in external economic conditions were 
important , but the shifts in the attitude of the federal government toward 
solar energy were far more important. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL VOTING 
This chapter briefly surveys statistical analyses of congressional 
roll call voting that were published in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Beginning the survey in 1970 means that the historical context for the 
early studies is undeveloped, but one has to begin somewhere. Issues 
addressed below include general statistical methodology and the use of 
explanatory variables concerning party and ideology, constituency, and 
campaign contributions. 
STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
The approach in all these statistical studies has been to examine 
the relationship between voting behavior and other variables. Where 
regression analysis has been used, votes on bills have been the dependent 
variable, and variables representing party, ideology, constituent 
interests, contributions, etc. have been "right-hand-side" independent 
variables. 
Early studies used correlations and ordinary least squares, often 
in conjunction. Correlations were used by Markus (1974), Bernstein and 
Anthony (1974), Dunlap and Allen (1976), Kenski and Kenski (1980), 
Bernstein and Horn (1981), and Wayman (1985) . Ordinary least squares was 
used by Jackson (1971), Markus (1974), Bernstein and Horn (1981), Chappell 
(1981a), Riddlesperger and King (1982), Peltzman (1985), Wayman (1985), 
and Wayman and Kutler (1985). Since the mid-1970s, because of the 0-1 
nature of the dependent variable (yes-no vote on a bill), most studies 
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have employed either probit or logit, mostly in single -equation form, but 
in a few instances employed simultaneous models. Probit was used by Dav is 
and Jackson (1974), Silberman and Durden (1976), Abrams (197 7 ), Danielsen 
and Rubin ( 1977) , Kau and Rubin (1978) , Kau and Rubin (1979a), Chappell 
(198la), Chappell (1982) , Welch (1982), and Coughlin ( 1985). Logit was 
used by Kau and Rubin ( 1979b), Chappell (198lb), Kalt (1981 , 1982), Kau , 
Keenan, and Rubin (1982), Crandall (1983), Weingast and Moran (1983) , 
Navarro (1984), Feldstein and Melnick (1984) , Peltzman (1984), Kalt and 
Zupan (1984), Pashigian (1985), Wright (1985), Nivola (1986) , Fowler and 
Shaiko ( 1987), and Krehbiel and Rivers (1988a). Probit appeared to be 
more popular in the earlier studies and logit more recently, but these 
studies in general do not address the rationale for choosing one over the 
other . 
The studies have attempted to explain samples ranging from a few 
votes to large numbers of votes. One of two approaches has generally been 
taken. The first is to estimate one equation for each vote. The second 
is to estimate one equation, where the dependent variable is a voting 
index constructed from the individual votes. In either case, the number 
of observations is the number of members voting (when indices are 
constructed, these studies generally use members who have voted on all the 
bills or compute a score for a member assuming his or her votes on the 
other bills would f ollow the same pattern as the available votes). 
Estimation of separate equations for each vote was done by Kau and Rubin 
(1979a) , Chappell ( 198lb), Wright (1985), and Nivola (1986), among others. 
Scales were used in Jackson (19 71) , Markus (1974), Bernstein and Anthony 
(1974) , Davis and Jackson (1974), Dunlap and All e n (1976), Silberman and 
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Durden (1976), Lopreato and Smoller (1978), Bernstein and Horn, Kal t 
(1981 , 1982), Crandall (1983), and Kalt and Zupan (1984). A third 
approach is to combine votes by pooling the data. 
Weingast and Moran (1983) and Pashigian ( 1985 ). 
PARTY AND IDEOLOGY 
This was done in 
Party and ideology have been used as explanatory variables in many 
studies. Although no objection has been raised to the use of party, the 
ideology issue is unquestionably the most controversial issue in roll call 
analyses . A wide variety of ideology measures have been used. The most 
commonly used have been the ratings of the Americans for Constitutional 
Action (ACA) and the Americans For Democratic Action (ADA). Every year 
each organization selects a set of votes in each House in that year and 
computes an index (from 0 to 100) for each member, based on those votes. 
For the years 1975 -77 and 1980 (the years utilized in Chapter 4), ACA 
selected 24-28 votes in each House and ADA selected 18-20 . The ACA score 
for a member is based only on votes that member actually casts, whereas 
ADA scores treat failures to vote as a vote contrary to the ADA position. 
Kalt (1981) used a special ADA index which avoided this problem. 
Ratings by interest groups are highly correlated and thus the choice 
of the rating is unlikely to affect the results. ADA scores were used in 
Mitchell (1977, 1979), Bernstein and Horn (1981), Carson and Oppenheimer 
(1984), Kau and Rubin (1978, 1979b), Peltzman (1984, 1985), Weingast and 
Moran (1983), Coughlin ( 1985) , Wright ( 1985) , and Wayman (1985). ACA 
scores were used by Lopreato and Smoller ( 1978), Chappell ( 198la, b), 
Welch (1982), and the studies in The Technolo&y Pork Barrel (forthcoming). 
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Other indices, such as COPE or the League of Conservation Vo ters , have 
occasionally been used. 
The problem with the use of ideology as an RHS variabl e i n a rol l 
call regression is that if one believes that other variables influence t h e 
vote in question (e.g., one includes variables such a s party and 
constituency interest as RHS variables), then it is reasonabl e to believe 
that these same variables, or similar ones, influence some of the votes 
used to create the ideology index (Fiorina (1979)). The coefficients in 
the roll call regression therefore become difficult to interpret. To 
confront this difficulty, a number of studies regress the ideology 
variable on the other variables, and then include the residual ideology 
variable in the main equation to eliminate multicollinearity between the 
ideology variable and other variables (Kau and Rubin (1979b) , Carson and 
Oppenheimer (1984) , Kalt and Zupan (1984)). This approach has been 
criticized by Bernstein (1985), Morgan (1985) , Sanders (1985), and Poole 
(1988) on several grounds . First, because the economic interests of the 
constituents, the member's party, and the member's ideology are highly 
correlated, it is misleading to define the residuals as "personal" 
ideology . Second, the Carson and Oppenheimer results using this procedure 
do not correspond with our normal concepts of who is liberal and who is 
conservative in the Senate . 
Another approach is to utilize ideology measures unrelated to the 
issue at hand--e.g., Kalt (1981), in examining votes on oil-price control, 
uses an ADA score on nonenergy issues , and Kal t and Zupan ( 1984), to 
examine coal strip-mining voting, use four different substitutes for 
ideology : a Social Issue Index based on 12 non-Panama Canal issues, a 
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Panama Canal Index based on 25 votes on the Panama Canal, a single vote 
on communist immigration, and a single vote on the death penal ty . In the 
latter study, these measures do not do as well as the League o f 
Conservation Voters index, but still result in a considerable increase i n 
explanatory power over the model without ideology. 
Another approach is to "explain away " ideology by the inclusion of 
sufficient numbers of economic var iables so that the addition of the 
ideology variable d oe s not add anything (Peltzman ( 1984), Coughlin 
(1985)). Although there has been some success in such an effort1 , it has 
not been shown that the set of variables from one "success" can be applied 
to other votes, which of course is one of the strengths of ideology 
scores, or that Peltzman's results can be extended to the House or to 
voting on a single issue. 2 More importantly, in comparing votes on one 
issue to those on others, it is essential that the list of economic 
variables be relatively compact to facilitate comparison--another strength 
of ideology scores. Finally, the Peltzman (1984) results suggest that the 
constituency variables must include those relating to supporters, not just 
the district or statewide averages, and this significantly adds to the 
effort involved. 
Virtually all studies have found ideology to be significant in roll 
call regressions, and in some it is the most significant variable, even 
1 Peltzman (1984) studied 331 Senate votes in 1979 - 1980 and found 
that the inclusion of better voter and contributor interest variables 
would decrease the explanatory power of the ideology variable . Of course 
one could take the approach of beginning with ideology, and seeing how 
much economic variables would add--Poole (1988) believes it would be 
little . 
2 I strongly disagree with the interpretation of the ideology 
findings in Coughlin's study of House voting on one issue . 
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when other constituency variables are included. The significance of an 
ideology variable in a regression containing economic interest variables 
could be due to a number of factors. First , as suggested by the Peltzman 
(1984) results , it may be due to faulty choice of e conomic interest 
variables--certainly a number of studies have made odd choices f o r 
variables . Second, as suggested by Kalt and Zupan (1984), it may indicate 
"shirking" by legislators; instead of representing their constituents o r 
supporters, 3 they are voting their own preferences. Third, they are 
directly representing constituent or supporter ideology, as opposed to 
economic interest . A few studies have attempted to include measures of 
constituency ideology, e.g., Kalt (1981, 1982) used the percentage of the 
state vote going to McGovern in 1972, Kau, Keenan , and Rubin (1982) used 
percent voting for Ford in 1976, Kalt and Zupan used state membership in 
environmental organizations, Wright (1985) used percent voting for Reagan 
in 1980, and Wayman and Kutler (1985) use a public opinion measure of the 
liberal/ conservative nature of the district. Votes for President appear 
to be problematic as representing voter ideology, since they presumably 
are a function of judgments about the character of indiv idual candidates 
and economic interests, as well as voter ideology. 
3 The supporter qualification is important in two respects. First, 
campaign contributions and other support come, to some extent, from 
outside the House member's district , or the senator's state, and thus 
variables that refer only to the district and state may not explain votes. 
Second, members may be influenced more by their supporters within the 
district/state (which has been termed their "reelection constituency") 
than those in the district/state not supporting them, and thus 
constituency variables which refer to the districtjstate as a whole may 
not be the whole story . Markus (1974) found that the electoral coalition 
had a higher explanatory variable than state characteristics. 
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CONSTITUENCY VARIABLES 
Constituency variables included in these studies have been of three 
types--general, Census-type demographic variables; variables relating 
specifically to the economics of the issue being voted on ; and program 
expenditure variables. Not surprisingly, studies examining votes on a 
wide variety of issues use demographic variables almost exclusively , e.g. , 
percent urban , percent nonwhite, percent in agriculture , percent in 
manufacturing, etc . , whereas those in particular areas tend to use 
variables relating to the issue at hand, either by themsel ve s or in 
conjunction with demographic variables. The interesting issue in this 
area is therefore whether the studies addressing votes in particular areas 
use demographic variables. Those using general demographic variables 
include Davis and Jackson ( 1974 ) in votes on negative income tax, Dunlap 
and Allen (1976) on environmental issues , Silberman and Durden (1976) and 
Krehbiel and Rivers (1988b) on minimum wage, Abrams (1977) on NOW 
accounts , Mitchell (1977, 1979) on natural gas deregulation, Lopreato and 
Smaller on energy ( 1978 ), Kau and Rubin (1978) on minimum wage, Kau and 
Rubin (1979a) on gas guzzlers and the SST, Kau and Rubin (1979b) on a wide 
variety of issues, Chappell (198lb) on mortgage disclosure for lenders , 
air pollution control requirements, and tax rebates for oil companies , 
Kalt (1981, 1982) on oil price control , and Wright (1985) on an FTC used-
car rule, a highway bill, the Gramm-Latta budget proposal, the exemption 
of professionals from FTC regulation, and the withholding of interest from 
bank accounts. Those using only specific economic variabl es inc lude 
Danielsen and Rubin (1977) on energy, Bernstein and Horn (1981) on energy, 
Chappell (198la) on maritime legislation, Riddlesperger and King (1982) 
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on energy, Welch (1982) on milk price supports, Kalt and Zupan ( 1984 ) on 
strip mining , Feldstein and Melnick ( 1984) on hospital cost containme nt . 
Wayman (1985) on defense, Wayman and Kutler (1985) on oil decontrol , a nd 
Nivola (1986) on energy conservation . 4 
Thus practic e with regard to the inclusion of demographic variables 
in the analysis has been mixed . Recent studies , or those dealing with 
energy, tend not to use general demographic variables, although not 
universally . Kalt (1981, 1982) is included in the list including 
demographic variables, but the focus there was to d etermine whether the 
ideology variable could be explained by the use of demographic variables . 
A more surprising pattern is evident in the third type of 
constituency variable, that relating to government spending. Until 
recently, the few studies in this area used either a government-wide 
spendjtax variable (Peltzman (1985)) or spending by the largest of 
agencies ( DOD or HEW--Kau and Rubin ( 1979b), Kau, Keenan , and Rubin 
(1982), Navarro (1984), and Wayman (1985)). The lack of significant 
positive results in these studies is surprising. More recently, a number 
of draft studies (logit regression studies of the Space Shuttle , Clinch 
River, and SST in The Technology Pork Barrel and Krehbiel and Rivers 
(1988a) on federal school spending) have examined spending at the program 
level, and the results here have been more encouraging. The only 
published studies using program spending (Bernstein and Anthony ( 1974) and 
Arnold (1979b)) have been correlation analyses. 




The post-Watergate campaign financing reforms probably led to the 
use of campaign contributions as RHS explanatory variables in roll call 
analyses in two different ways. Fi rst , the reforms made the data more 
available. Second , t hey are generally credited with increasing the 
importance of Political Action Committees (PACs). PAC con tributions are 
far better to use as an RHS variabie than contributions from individuals , 
since the issues associated with a PAC contri bution are more clearly 
identified than those associated with an individual's contribution. 
Studies employing campaign contributions have included Silberman and 
Durden (1976); Chappell (198la); Chappell (1982); Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 
(1982); Welch (1982) ; Feldstein and Melnick (1984); Wright (1985); Wayman 
and Kutler (1985); and Schroedel (1986). 
These studies suggest that the use of contributions in the analysis 
of solar energy voting is inadvisable. First, these studies have 
generally either found insignificant effects or, where significant, 
effects which were the least significant of the variables examined . 
Second, these studies examined issues such as the minimum wage , milk price 
supports, the exemption of professionals from FTC regulation, and others 
which affected PACs which were generally viewed as the most powerful. 
There is certainly no solar energy PAC in this league . Finally, the 
inclusion of contributions generally has complicated the analysis, through 




BENEFITS OF PV 
There are three difficulties in assessing PV benefits. In order of 
increasing difficulty, they are as follows . First, there are different 
types of benefits, different markets, all of which must be considered. 
Second, the nature of the proposals being voted on, to increase spending 
on PV over the level recommended by the authorization or appropriation 
committee, means that the benefits of a PV proposal may be different from 
the benefits of PV. Third, determination of benefits in grid-connected 
markets is complicated for any generation source, but is made more so by 
the intermittent nature of PV generation. 
addressed in the next three sections . 
These difficulties are 
Following the discussion of these three difficulties, two issues of 
how this benefit information should be used in a roll call analysis are 
discussed. These issues apply to virtually all roll call analyses. 
First, what is the appropriate base case and the role of costs? Second, 
should benefits be represented by a single benefits variable corresponding 
to consumer surplus or by several "indicator" variables that are in some 
way related to the benefit variable? 
Finally, based on the above, several options for PV roll call 
analysis are described in detail and a preferred option chosen. 
TYPES OF BENEFITS 
As discussed in Arnold (198la, b), public policies in general offer 
(and Congressmen evaluate) three classes of benefits. General benefits 
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of a policy accrue to everyone, ~ benefits accrue to particular 
segments or groups in society, and local benefits flow to spec if i c 
geographic areas. As he states, "When general benefits are substantial 
and the support for them is . widespread, programs survive and pros per 
without having to allocate local benefits carefully to maintain a 
congressional coalition . "l 
I will also classify benefits along another dimension into two o r 
three categories. Expenditure benefits will refer to the stimulus effect 
of federal program expenditures, whereas I term all other benefits 
nonexpenditure. In many government programs such as those relating to 
technology development, nonexpenditure benefits can be further subdivided 
into production benefits (e.g., stimulus resulting from production of PV 
systems) and consumption benefits (e . g . , cost savings from using these 
systems to produce electricity). The relative importance of these 
categories in a cross-sectional context will vary depending on the 
program . In defense, expenditure and production benefits will dominate 
because defense is a "public good" and therefore the consumption benefits 
do not differ across districts. 2 Because defense is entirely federally 
procured, expenditure and production benefits are identical. By contrast, 
nonexpenditure effects will dominate in regulatory programs . Solar energy 
programs are interesting because all three types of benefits (expenditure, 
1 Arnold (198la), p. 528. 
2 Throughout this chapter, references to "district" should always be 
interpreted as references to districts or states to account for the 
different unit of repr esentation in the House and Senate and the fact that 
even though data are desired on a district basis for analysis of House 
votes, they are sometimes only available on a state basis. Reference s to 
Representatives likewise include Senators. 
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production, and consumption) are distinguishable and could be important. 
Nonexpenditure effects might dominate if federal expenditures were l ow 
relative to classic "pork barrel" projects. On the other h a nd , if PV were 
seen as a "loser" which would not become economic, then expenditure 
benefits might dominate. 
These two dimens ions (generaljgroupjlocal and expenditure; 
production/consumption) produce a 3x3 matrix classification of benefits. 
However, not all cells of this matrix will be important for our analysis 
of PV. 
General Benefits of PV 
PV provides three types of general benefits : reduced dependence on 
foreign oil , a backstop technology which constrains price increases in 
other energy sources3 , and reduced pollution. 4 Oil savings received far 
more attention than the other two types of general benefits in PV 
analyses . In fact, it was viewed as a major benefit of the program. 
Because general benefits do not vary by district, it is not possible in 
a cross-sectional analysis to determine whether one type of general 
benefit was more important than others. In a time series analysis, the 
relative importance of different types of general benefits can be 
3 PV as a backstop technology benefits 
alternatives to PV, not just those who end up 





4 Reduced pollution from PV replacing use of fossil fuels has both 
local and general benefits . Local effects of fossil fuel generation are 
important, both at the site of generation and in some more distant areas 
as a result of acid rain. The primary general effects are global warming 
as well as lowered "opt ion" value (lowering the utility one receives from 
knowing that other areas, even if one will not live there , have low 
pollution) . 
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determined if the levels of these change over time. Unfortunately , as 
explained in Chapter 4, a time series analysis of roll call votes is not 
feasible for photovoltaics because of the lack of comparable vo t e s which 
could be pooled. Hence the subsequent discussion will be limited t o 
cross-sectional analysis and will ignore general benefits. 5 
Group Benefits of PV 
Group benefits of PV would go to various classes of users (e.g ., 
homeowners, utility companies and their customers, the DOD, etc . ) and PV 
system producers and installers . As with group benefits in any program, 
group benefits of PV are similar to local benefits. The difference lies 
in the fact that benefits going outside the d i strict of a member of 
Congress matter to the member if they flow to members of an identifiable 
group which may be the source of campaign contributions or may increase 
the support given to the member from group members inside the distric t. 
Neither of these conditions for the salience of group benefits 
applies to PV . As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no reason to believe 
that campaign contributions were important for PV. With respect to the 
second condition, one should examine the three groups that might 
especially benefit from PV: electric utilities, PV manufacturers , and PV 
5 General benefits could be added in to all districts if one were 
concerned about whether members voted for PV even when total net benefits 
for their district were negative, or vice versa. However, determination 
of the sign of total net benefits for each district is very difficult 
given the uncertainty regarding future PV and conventional electricity 
prices, the need to assess insurance benefits at PV and conventional 
electricity prices different from the expected values, and other 
complications (explained later in this chapter) in assessment of PV 
benefits. For these reasons, I will not be interested in whether benefits 
in a district are positive or negative, but only how they compare to 
benefits in other districts. 
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research firms. During the period of the votes (1975-1980), el e ctric 
utilities were very lukewarm toward PV and were not lobby ing f or i t s 
support . PV manufacturers, which did strongly support the federal PV 
program, were competitors. A member with a PV manufacturer in his 
district would not want PV manufacturers in other districts to prosper. 
PV research firms were competing for federal dollars and t hus their 
situation was similar to PV manufacturers. These considerations suggest 
that group benefits for PV should not be analyzed separately from local 
benefits. 
With general and group benefits excluded, the analysis reduces to 
the analysis of the expenditure , production, and consumption aspects of 
local PV benefits. Expenditure aspects are measured by PV funding going 
to individual districts , and are addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Production benefits in PV occur both where the PV module is produced and 
also where it is used, since some local labor and materials will generally 
be used for the latter (e.g., installation, operations and maintenance, 
etc.). Production benefits depend on the "flow" of PV module production 
and installation, whereas consumption benefits depend on the "stock" of 
PV installed (as well as on other factors). Because of these differences, 
the regional pattern of production benefits at the point of use may be 
somewhat different than the pattern of consumption benefits . However, 
they are obviously correlated . Furthermore , the district pattern of 
production benefits at the point of use of PV is obviously correlated with 
the corresponding pattern of benefits at the point of use of whatever PV 
replaces. For these reasons, production benefits of PV at the point of 
use will be ignored. 
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The production benefits at the point of PV module manufacture will 
be represented by a dummy variable which indicates whether the district 
contained a PV manufacturer . Further details on this measure a re 
contained in Chapter 4. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to local 
consumption benefits, with the exception of generic issues relating to 
roll call analyses. 
PV Markets and Resultin~ Consumption Benefits 
Assessment of the local nonexpenditure benefits of PV requires an 
assessment of several markets and the types of benefits in each market . 
The PV market can be divided into five markets: foreign, U.S. specialty 
(calculators, watches , etc . ), U.S. government, U.S . nongrid, and U.S . 
grid-connected applications. Upper-bound estimates made in the late 1970s 
of the size of these markets are shown in Table 26. 
The analysis of nonexpenditure benefits will differ by market . All 
markets result in U. S . "production" and "consumption" benefits except the 
foreign market, which only confers production b enefits to the U.S. The 
local consumption benefits of PV are cost savings and reduced pollution 
as a result of installation of t he technology, and insurance against price 
increases in other electricity sources. Insurance benefits result from 
potential cost savings from utilization of PV and therefore are local in 
nature in contrast to the backstop nature of PV, which provides benefits 
to those who do not utilize PV. Because insurance benefits are potential 
cost savings (that would be realized if the conventional price, PV price, 
or other factors are different than expected) , they are perfectly 
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Table 26 
Initial Breakeven Prices (1977) and Market Potential 
Market 














Deep Well Cathodic 
Remote Power 
Notes: 
















Market Si z e 
( MW ) 
2.5-2. 7 













These estimates are based on a panel review of existing studies. Market 
size is the upper bound on potential sales and reflects the size of the 
market for which photovol taics could compete. The consumer category 
includes watches, toys, calculators, etc. 
Source: Solar Energy Research Institute (1978), Vol. I, p. 51. 
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correlated with cost savings and thus need not be anal y zed separately . 6 
The analysis below will therefore focus only on cost s a v ings . Pollution 
benefits will be ignored here because the program n ever attempted to ma k e 
much of the pollution be ne fits of PV on e ither a national or l ocal bas i s. 
The consumption benefits of various PV markets are outline d bel ow: 
l) U. S . specialty use can be ignored in a cross-sectional anal ysis; 
regional variations in consumption are likely to be small. Furthermore, 
this market was never the focus of the Administration o r the Congress . 
2) U.S. government use could result in cost sav ings to the nation 
as a whole (which are translated into benefits of other programs, t a x 
reductions, or reduced deficits) as well as conceivably permitting 
applications which would not be practicable without PV . For DOD uses, 
which dominate U.S. government uses, the latter would generally re s ult in 
benefits to the nation as a whole, rather than to residents at the 
location of use . 
3) Non-grid-connected and grid-connecte d benefits clearly vary by 
district . 
Thus, in a cross-sectional analysis of nonexpenditure benefits, non-grid-
connected and grid - connected consumption b enefits deserve the most 
attention . 
Non~rid Consumption Benefits . As is c lear from the s y stem break-
even prices and siz es in Table 26, the r e lative importance of U.S . n on-
grid and grid markets was s ubject to some uncertainty during the pe riod 
of the v otes. The grid- connected market was seen as much larger but 
6 Again the fact tha t only r elative ma gnitude s among di s tricts i s of 
interest , means that insurance benef its do not have to be added in. 
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economic only at lower PV prices. As long as PV prices remaine d high, the 
nongrid market would constitute the PV market. When price s dropped , t he 
grid-connected market would dwarf the nongrid market. Th e r e f o re the 
benefi t s from each market would depend on the rate of price d ec rease and 
the discount rate . 
The evaluation by the program of the relativ e importance of these 
two markets can partially be inferred through examination of the price 
goals set by the program. The 1973 Cherry Hill goals of 50 and 10 cents 
per peak watt, discussed in Chapter 1, were grid-connected goals. Not 
until 1978 was a higher intermediate goal of $2 per peak watt set . The 
influential American Physical Society report , issued in 1979, focused on 
grid-connected applications, dismissing nongrid applications based on the 
small siz e of the market relativ e to grid applications. 7 Thus , in program 
planning, the benefits of grid-connected applications we r e the primary 
focus. 
Be cause of the program's evaluation that the longe r-term grid-
connected market was the appropriate framework for evaluation , a nd because 
the non-grid-connected market dominated in the near term, PV provides a 
test of the Cohen and Noll (1984) hypothesis that the implicit discount 
rate in the legislative process is higher tha n in the private sec tor. 
The importance of nongrid applications in PV roll call v otes would support 
this hypothesis since analyses tended to dismiss the nongrid market. 
However , the Tsongas amendment must be treated s e parately. It was aimed 
primarily at increase d f ederal purchases of PV s y stems. In the y ear after 
7 Ame rican Phy sical Soc i e t y (1979) , p. 23 . The conclusions we r e 
based on the SERI r eport , which is the basis for Table 26 . 
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the Tsongas vote, an elaborate, market- by-market analysis of the net 
economic benefit of such a federal procurement initiative showed that ( l ) 
the proposal would result in a negative net economic benefit and ( 2 ) 
virtually all of the benefits would occur in the non-grid-connected market 
because the price reduction effects are sufficient to increase benefits 
in the nongrid market but not enough to materially alter b enefits in the 
grid-connected market.8 This has two implications. First, if the nongrid 
variable is significant in the Tsongas vote, one cannot use this as 
evidence to support the Cohen-Noll hypothesis, since the agency analysis 
saw the bulk of the benefits going to the nongrid sector. Second, if the 
Congressional evaluations were similar to the agency analysis, then one 
would expect that nongrid applications would be more important in the 
Tsongas vote than in other votes. 
These considerations concerning discount rate and the difference 
between an R&D program and a procurement program suggest that the role of 
nongrid applications is an important one to test empirically. 
Grid-Connected Consumption Benefits. The special problems involved 
in assessing PV benefits in this market are described later. 
BENEFITS OF A PV FUNDING AMENDMENT 
The nature of the proposals being voted on, to increase federal 
funding for PV by a certain amount, presents two difficulties for 
evaluation of the benefits of these proposals. First, the benefits of the 
proposals reflect the benefits of the federal program, not the benefits 
of the PV technology. Second, the proposals are to increase federal 
8 Solar Energy Research Institute (1978). 
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funding, not up-or-down votes on the entire federal program. These two 
issues are examined below. 
The Benefits of a Federal PV Program 
Since the available roll call votes concern funding increases for 
the PV program, it is important to examine whether the consumption 
b enefits of the federal PV program are different than the consumption 
benefits of PV. These are identical only if the federal program is 
necessary for PV, i.e., without a federal program , PV would never be 
economic. Otherwise, the consumption benefits of the federal program are 
to accelerate the point at which PV is economic in various applications. 9 
To make this more precise, we will develop expressions for the consumption 
benefits of PV and of the federal PV program. 
We shall assume that PV is installed at the optimum time (as defined 
below) and instantaneously replaces all grid electricity of "ty pe" i. 
"Type" would refer to different fuel sources (coal, nuclear, oil, gas, 
etc.) as well as differences in base load, intermediate , and peaking 
capacity. To relax the assumption of instantaneous replacement of a 
category, "type" could also refer to parts of each category so that the 
entire category could be replaced over time. For simplicity, we shall 
also assume that the installation of PV does not affect the quantity of 
9 Only Hamilton (1981) seems to correctly formulate the possibility 
that the benefit of the program is to accelerate the adoption of the 
technology rather than be an essential prerequisite for the adoption of 
the technology. The benefit analysis in Solar Energy Research Institute 
(1978) considers the change in price and quantity resulting from a federal 
procurement initiative . Because this initiative is only part of the 
federal program, the question of whether a market may exist without a 
federal program is never addressed. 
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electricity consumed (thus we are neglecting the "welfare triangle" fr o m 
increased consumption of electricity at lower prices of electricity 
brought about by PV) 10 and that all cost savings a re passed along t o t he 
consumer. Let 
Ui(t) total costll of grid electricity of type i at time t 
C(t , si) cost of PV (cash flow) at time t given installation at time 
s to replace grid electricity of type i 
The optimum time , Ti , to install PV to replace grid electricity type i, 
is found by minimizing the following expression:l2 
NPV(T) IT . Jco ~ -kt -kt U.(t) e dt + C(t,T .) e dt 0 ~ T. ~ 
~ 
(1) 
where k is the discount rate. Since PV would probably replace different 




where R is the set of electricity types that are replaced by PV. This 
reduces to 
10 In accounting for increased consumption, the supply curve that 
shifts is the curve for all electricity (not just PV electricity) due to 
the fact that the cost of PV is "averaged in" with other cost sources to 
produce an electricity price. 
11 The cost of energy could include environmental pollution , 
occupational accidents, and dependence on foreign oil . 
12 This is a generalization to account for multiple conventional 
sources of the formulation in Orren and Chamberlain (1981) of the optimal 
time to install PV (the "PV wait" problem). 
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\ 
L ( 3 ) 
iER 
These expressions assume that the benefits are under certainty ( no 
insurance benefits) and that the cost of grid-electricity is not affected 
by PV (no price-constraining effect). 
Assuming that PV is installed optimally according to (l) both in t he 
case of a program and the case of no program, the consumption benefits of 
the program, if they exist, occur in one of two cases: 
(l) Without the program, PV would be adopted ~Ti years later, or 
(2) Without the program, PV would never be adopted (Case l with an 
Only for case two are the consumption benefits of the program equal to the 
consumption benefits of PV (derived above). The consumption benefits of 
the program, B, for case one (assuming that PV is installed at time Ti 
with the program and ~Ti years later without the program) are as follows 
(neglecting benefits such as reduced dependence on foreign oil, reduced 
pollution, price-constraining effects, or insurance): 




cost of PV with a federal PV program 
cost of PV without a federal PV program 
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For case two, this expression reduces to our previous expression (equation 
3) for the benefits of PV. This expression reduce s to 
B ( 5) 
The two integrals represent the two potential consumption benefits of the 
PV program . The first term repre sents the reduction in electricity costs 
from r e placing conventional sources by PV from the time of replacement of 
grid source i by PV with the program (time Ti) to the replacement of grid 
source i by PV without the program (time Ti+flTi) . The second term 
represents the reduction due to the PV program of the costs of PV for the 
years beyond when grid type i would be replaced by PV without t he 
program . 13 
The Benefits of a PV Funding Amendment 
All the roll call votes examined in Chapter 4 are votes on funding 
amendments rather than y es-no votes on the total program . The analysis 
of the consumption benefits of the entire program however is applicable 
as long as one assumes that the consumption benefits of the amendment are 
perfectly correlated with the benefits of the program . This is a 
reasonable assumption i n general since the precise targeting of funds was 
either not specified in the amendments or was generally in accord with the 
baseline distribution of funds . However, as note d above, in at least one 
13 Hamilton implicitly assumes, as I have done explicitly, that the 
quantity consumed is unaffected by the introduction of PV . He also 
assumes only one electricity generation type and that PV costs are 
constant over time . 
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case, the Tsongas amendment, the distribution of consumption benefits 
would be different since the federal procure ment program provided f o r in 
this amendment would result in a larger percentage of consumption bene fits 
going to nongrid applications than would be the case under the research 
and development emphasis of the program without the amendment. 
CONSUMPTION BENEFITS IN GRID-CONNECTED MARKETS 
The expressions in the previous section require assessment of the 
cost difference between conventional power and the PV which replaces it . 
This is in accord with our intuition that the cost-reduction benefit of 
PV in grid-connected applications would be to replace more expensive 
electricity . The difficulty lies in the fact that even though power is 
a homogeneous good, when one replaces power from one generation source 
with power from another type of generation, one cannot simply compare the 
costs per kilowatt or kilowatt hour of each generation source. The good 
supplied by each generation source is not homogeneous, but instead power 
with a certain probability, that depends on the lead time, the need for 
repair, and other factors (such as weather, in the case of PV) . 
This difficulty does not invalidate any of the mathematics presented 
in this chapter. An optimal planning process would determine the cost, 
and quantity, of PV that would replace a given amount of conventional 
electricity, and this is implied by defining C(t,s) in terms of what would 
replace U(t) . Because of the modular nature of PV, PV can be sized to 
replace prespecified amounts of capacity (e .g., an entire generating 
unit). However, in other contexts, one will specify the PV capacity and 
calculate the conventional capacity replaced . Regardless of which 
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variable is fixed, the assessment process is t he same. 
The cost savings from the alternative technology are assessed by 
comparing the difference in costs between two cases: ( 1) the cost o f 
conventional generation assuming that no alternative technology is 
considered, and (2) the cost of conventional generation a ssuming that the 
alternative generation is considered . 14 This requires modelling of the 
utility load curve and the characteristics of the generation source s 
involved. 
To apply this methodology to PV, one recognizes that because the 
costs of PV are almost entirely capital costs, PV will always be used when 
available. Therefore the output of the PV device is subtracted from 
demand; PV is a negative load. The simplest assumption is that the output 
of the PV device is known in advance with certainty. To determine the 
cost of conventional generation with PV, a level of PV capacity is assumed 
and the output of this capacity is simulated on an hourly basis and 
subtracted from demand, and then the resulting demand is served by 
conventional generation. The costs of conventional generation with and 
without PV present are calculated assuming the utility is optimizing, 
holding variables like reliability constant . Cost changes are computed 
for capital, fuel, and operations and maintenance categories. Cost 
savings are calculated by subtracting the cost of PV from the difference 
in conventional generation costs. 
The assumption of known PV output becomes somewhat unrealistic in 
the context of short-term load-following by the utility, i.e ., the process 
14 This methodology is described in Jeffrey L . Smith (1980b), pp . 7-
8, and Flaim ( 1985). The former reviews a number of studies of the 
savings in conventional energy costs from the use of PV . 
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of managing demand and supply by putting various types of generation 
capacity on or off line as require d and increasing or decreasing t he l oad 
on the on-line uni ts. As Flaim (1985) notes, a utility might have to 
commit additional spinning reserve capacity (capacity that c an be brought 
on-line quickly) to cover the sudden loss of some of the intermitt ent 
generation (e.g., PV). At small penetrations of intermittent generation, 
this is unlikely to matter much. At larger penetrations, this effect 
would be more important and thus the level of cost savings per unit of PV 
is likely to decline as the level of PV capacity is increased, although 
the additional sites from larger penetration would result in greater 
spatial diversity and thus reduce the correlation in output across sites 
and thus reduce the impact of intermittent generation on load-following 
requirements. 15 
Because of the complexities involved in the substitution of any 
power source for another, and the particular difficulties resulting from 
the intermittent nature of PV generation, assessment of cost savings from 
PV in grid-connected applications will be difficult. 
GENERIC ISSUES IN USE OF BENEFIT INFORMATION IN ROLL CALL ANALYSES 
The two issues discussed in this section are the relevance of other 
alternatives and costs, and how benefit information is represented . 
15 As Flaim notes, the studies she describes showing that larger 
penetrations of intermittent capacity lead to decreases in percentage of 
capacity displaced as a percent of PV capacity are based on single-site 
resource data and thus do not capture the effects of spatial diversity. 
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The Relevance of Other Alternatives and Costs 
Roll call studies have generally not assessed the benefits of the 
program relative to other proposals. 16 On the cost side, in the few roll 
call studies which assess expenditure benefits, the practice with regard 
to whether expenditures are gross or net (of tax) is mixed. Kau and Rubin 
(1979b), Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982), and the other studies in The 
Technolo~y Pork Barrel use gross expenditures. Peltzman (1985) and 
Krehbiel and Rivers (l988a) include the tax side as well.l7 Only Wayman 
(1985) considers both gross and net-of-tax specifications. Net 
expenditures performed better in a bivariate sense, but there was no 
noticeable difference in a multivariate setting. 
To determine the correct course for PV, one begins with general 
principles of policy evaluation. Policy evaluation should always consider 
net benefits, benefits minus costs, and benefits and costs should always 
be evaluated relative to some base case. There are three polar cases with 
respect to the base case for policy proposals before Congress. The first 
is that overall government expenditures and revenues are fixed, and thus 
16 Although many roll call studies assess nonexpenditure benefits , 
they do so by what I will term "indicator" variables rather than "benefit" 
variables (see next section). The indicators chosen do not attempt to 
represents benefits relative to another proposal. With respect to 
expenditure benefits, Krehbiel and Rivers (l988a) examine voting on 
several alternative school funding proposals. Whether expenditure 
benefits are assessed relative to other proposals is not clear in the 
paper. 
17 The latter compute a benefit-cost ratio, which is odd given that 
benefits minus costs rather than the B/C ratio is the appropriate decision 
criterion for a decision maker choosing among mutually exclusive projects. 
Even though the three alternative funding schemes being analyzed there 
have different aggregate spending levels (and thus preferences over the 
total level of funding would be relevant as well as the benefit-cost 
relationship), the use of ratios is questionable. 
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the program is being funded at the expense of something else. In this 
event, the tax cost is the same under both proposals and thus can be 
ignored whereas the benefit measure is the difference in benefits be tween 
the two proposals. The second possibility is that total government 
expenditures and revenue collections are increased by the amount of the 
proposal. In this case, one looks only at the benefits minus costs of the 
proposal. The third possibility is deficit financing: tax revenues are 
fixed, but government expenditures increase by the amount of the proposal. 
The benefit measure is the benefit of the proposal minus the cost of the 
deficit financing. 
A number of facts are relevant in deciding among these 
interpretations. First, most spending proposals, including all the solar 
energy amendments we are considering, are not self-financing; they do not 
raise taxes. Taxes are raised in separate proposals. Second, during the 
period of the votes, general revenue tax increases occurred through 
"bracket creep" without any explicit action of the Congress. Third, 
Congress is required to set overall spending and revenue levels in budget 
resolutions. Subsequent authorization and appropriation actions to fund 
specific programs are supposed to fit within these levels. Fourth, the 
solar energy funding amendments proposed changes in funding that are 
minuscule compared to overall federal budget levels. Fifth, the 
differences among the states in taxes paid per capita are not huge (in 
1976 they ranged from a high of $1995 in Connecticut to a low of $945 per 
capita in Mississippi).l8 
Based on these considerations, inclusion of tax costs in a roll call 
18 U. S. Department of Commerce (1978) , p. 267. 
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a nalys is seems merited onl y if special c ircumstances exist. The most 
important of these is if the proposal explicitly raises taxes. Other 
cri teria would be if the geographic a llocation of f unds is determined by 
formula o r if the p r ogram were particularly l arge. Allocation of f o r mula 
invites a comparison to geographic tax share. Furthermore, allocation by 
formula often resul ts in a more even d is tribu tion of funds than i n an 
award proce ss (such as utilized by PV ). Subtraction of taxes paid thus 
is likely to have a greate r effect on the relative ranking of geographic 
areas for programs funded by allocation rather than awards. In a large 
program, there is a greater payoff f rom the i nclusion of factors (such as 
tax share) which may no t be wor th the bo t her in smaller progra ms.l 9 
Of course tax costs can be i gnor ed where the program is b e ing funded 
at the expense of somet h i ng else. In some c ases , the proposal does this 
explicitly (of the solar rol l call votes discussed in Chapter 4, only the 
Brown amendment did this--solar electric at the expense of solar heating 
and cool i ng). In c as e s where the alternat ive is not explicit, one could 
implement t his interpretation by using t he pattern of benefits of 
government programs as a whole or in the particular budget area. This 
approach is practical for expenditure b e n e fits (informat ion on total and 
budge t category per capita government expenditures by state is published 
in Statistical Abstract of the United States), but not for nonexpenditure 
benef its since it would be impossible to e stimate nonex penditure benef its 
for all government programs take n as a whole . Th e interstate expenditure 
19 One or another of these two latter special fac tors were p resent 
in each case in the literature where tax costs were considered . Krehbiel 
and Rivers (1988a) examined school funding ( allocation f o rmula) whereas 
Wayman (1985) examined defense programs as a who l e and Peltzman (1985) 
focused on the entire federal government as a whole. 
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pattern is considerably different than the geographic pattern f o r t a x 
share. 20 
Finally, under the interpretation of d e f i cit fina n cing one woul d 
determine the geographic incidence of the costs of defi c i t financing, 
which of course is quite unclear. 
Based on the a bove, e xcept for the special case s whi c h have been 
described , inclusion of benefits of alternative programs or the costs of 
tax and deficit financing costs does not appear warranted. Given t he 
uncertainty as to which formulation is best (e.g., does one use the tax 
or the expenditure pattern for a ll programs), assuming that Congressmen 
would ignore these corrections is attractive. Furthermore, t he 
expenditures from the program are v isible, the tax share less so and the 
benefits from other programs uncertain . Howev e r , one could test whether 
other specifications outperform this simple form in the case of PV 
expenditures. One would want to test the two alternative specifications: 
gross expenditures minus tax burden and gross expenditures minus 
expenditure share in other programs. One could also test specifications 
using ratios as in Krehbiel and Rivers (1988a) . 
The Repre sentation of Benefits in Roll Call Studies 
The proposition that the degree to which Representativ es support a 
program is influenced by the benefits of t he program (to the nation as a 
whole or their dis t ric t) can be t e sted in roll call studie s in which on e 
or more RHS variables represent benefits . But what do we mean by 
represent? The approach used in the rol l call literature has b een 
20 U.S . Depar tment of Commerce (1978 ) , p. 267 . 
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somewhat different for expenditure and nonexpendi ture benefits. For 
expenditure benefits, roll call studies have always used a variable 
representing the dollar amount going to the district from the agency or 
program, with the exception of some of the studies done for The Technology 
Pork Barre l which used dummy variables, 21 and Krehbiel and Rivers (1988a), 
which used a dollar funding/tax ratio. For nonexpenditure benefits, every 
roll call study (of which I am aware) has used variabl es which are 
indicators of benefits, rather than variables that directly measure 
benefits in the s ense of consumer s urplus or net present value. 
The approach for nonexpenditure benefits has 'been to use demographic 
variables, nonpopulation variables , or both. Examples of nonpopulation 
variables include electricity price, per capita oil production or 
consumption , percent increase in medical prices, etc. Although the use 
of demographic variables is generally as indicators of nonexpendi ture 
benefits, such use is subject to alternative interpretations. For 
example, demographic variables may be correlated with constituent 
ideology, and thus the significance of a demographic variable in an 
analysis could mean that a representative was voting constituent 
ideological, as opposed to economic, interest . As noted in Chapter 2, 
recent studies tend to use nonpopulation variables that relate 
specifically to the issue at hand, rather than demographic variables. The 
specialized nonpopulation variables may avoid this interpretation problem 
21 Banks in his space shuttle study used a dummy variabl e to indicate 
whether the district contained a large shuttle contractor or one of the 
principal NASA Centers for the shuttle. Edelman on the SST and Cohen on 
Clinch River use a dummy variable because a continuous representation was 
viewed as too fine a measure for mirroring Congressional behavior and 
because they believed the responsiveness to funding would be nonlinear . 
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because they are more uniquely related to constituent economic interest. 
Benefit Variables. The potential for the use of benefit var iabl e s 
can be illustrated by examining the issue most studied in roll call 
analyses: energy deregulation. Instead of using several indica tor 
variables such as oil production and the cost of crude oil in the state , 
one could calculate a benefits variable and use this instead of the 
indicator variables in the analysis. Two energy studies by Kalt are the 
only roll call studies on any topic that even make an attempt in this 
direction. Kalt (1981 , 1982) uses a variable to represent producer 
interest equal to the product of state crude oil production and the 
difference between the price of foreign oil and the state ' s average price 
of crude oil. Kalt and Zupan (1984) uses a variable which apparently 
measures the agriculture/timber revenue yield of acres affected by strip 
mining. These studies use indicator variables to represent other 
interests . 
Use of a benefits variable in roll call analyses has a number of 
appealing features. First, it provides a straightforward t e st of the 
proposition that the degree to which Representatives support a program is 
influenced by the benefits of the program to their district . Second , 
estimates of nonexpenditure benefits are often available at the time of 
the vote, generated by agency analysts, by economic groups with 
substantial stakes in the outcome , and other groups. These results would 
be communicated, in a variety of ways, to Congressmen. Third, use of a 
benefits variable permits the roll call analyst to test a variety of 
precise ways of integrating the effect of the relevant variables . For 
example , do the votes suggest that Congressmen are voting the benefits of 
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PV or the benefits of the program (see above ), what escalation or disc ount 
rates are being assumed, etc. 
Advanta~es of Indicator Variables. On t he other hand , there are 
several reasons why the use of indicator variables may be more 
appropr iate, and thus why studies to date have used the indicator approach 
rather than attempt to calculate benefits. The most important of these 
is that, while it is true that estimates of nonexpend i ture "benefits" are 
often available at the time of votes , this information is not of the form 
implied by a benefits approach to roll call voting. First, most policy 
analyses generate impacts on price and quantity variables of interest 
rather than calculating economic benefit measures such as net present 
values or consumer surplus. For example, energy deregulation studie s 
featured impacts on gasoline prices or inflation, or oil imports and 
production, rather than net economic benefit. Second, where studie s 
generate both pricej quantity impact and benefit information, the former 
receives more attention. Third , legislative proposals, in contrast to 
agency decisions, are often at a level of generality which makes precise 
determination of nonexpenditure benefits difficult. This is in contrast 
to the district expenditure benefits of legislation which are sometimes 
clear either from the legislation itself or from studies produced by the 
relevant agency indicating funding totals by district . Fourth , most 
analyses are national in nature, with far f ewer addressing regional 
impacts, and fewer still impacts on a district basis. Pe rhaps as a result 
of all these reasons, no study of which I am aware, on a ny subject , 
calculates net economic benefit (as an economis t would d efine it) on a 
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district basis.22 
The other principal argument against a benefits approac h is the 
nature of Congressmen, the decisions facing them, and the voting public. 
Congressmen are not economist s or analyt i cal l y minded, they must make 
decisions on a wide variety of topics , a nd they have limited staff support 
and limited time for decisi ons. Reliance on benefits analysis produced 
by agencies makes the Congressmeh more s usce ptible to manipulation by 
agency analysts. 23 I ndicators represent easily available and 
noncontrov ersial data whereas a benefits formula may require data or 
estimates that are not readily available or which are controversial. 
Finally , although intere st groups may respond to detailed benefits 
calculations, voters at large would more likely judge n onexpendi ture 
benefits in terms of indicators. Another (but weaker) argument for an 
indicator approach is that it is obviousl y easie r for the analyst of roll 
call voting to i mpl e ment and report. Precisely because the way the 
indicators combine into a single benefits measure is not spelled out , the 
roll call analyst can avoid issues that are irrelevant for the purpose at 
hand. 
Conclusion. Although the issue of multiple indicators vs . a single 
benefits variable may be resolved fo r some by these gener a l arguments , for 
others it will depe nd on the issue at hand . Two key issues are the 
22 The statements in this paragraph are based on t he author's eight 
years of work experience in both the executive and l egislative branches 
of the federal government in the areas of t he environment , energy, 
aerospace, and agriculture , as well as famil iarity with analyses conducted 
in PV. However s uch a study proba bly exists or agencies might have 
prepar e d s pecial computer runs with suc h information at t he requ est of 
Congressme n . 
23 Roger Noll to author, June 10, 1987. 
151 
following : (1) Were estimates of a benefit variable produced, as were , f o r 
example, the estimates of agriculture/ timber revenue y i e ld of acre s 
affected by strip mining in Kal t and Zupan ( 19 84) , and ( 2 ) Do t he 
indicators which relate to benefits and fo r which there are data or 
estimates combine in a natural way, as did oil production and the 
difference in the costs of imported and domestic oil in Kalt (198 1 , 1 982)? 
These questions are addressed in the next section. 
In cases where use of a single benefits variable appears desirable, 
the best research strategy may be to use an indicator approach first 
before using a single benefits variable because the risk of 
misspecification leading to insignificant results would be greater wi th 
the benefits variable. 
LOCAL CONSUMPTION BENEFITS OF PV: ANALYSES EXISTING AT TIME OF VOTE 
The preceding sections have suggested t hat a complete analy s i s of 
the benefits of a PV funding increase proposal would be quite complicated . 
The program or other groups never produced estimates on a regional or 
local basis of the benefits of a PV funding amendment , of the PV program, 
or of PV itsel f . A complete analysis of suc h is bey ond the capabilities 
of this pape r . Even if it were feasible to conduc t one now, there is a 
philosophical question as to whether such an analysis would provide a good 
understanding of how Congress voted, since the results were not available 
to those voting. It is therefore worthwhile to consider what analy ses 
were conducted at the time . 
The early studies of PV focus on the national potential of PV and 
do not carefully examine how the potential of PV differs by reg ion . The 
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first published quantitative regional assessment I found was a 1977 
Aerospace Corporation report for the Department of Energy which compute d 
PV energy costs for utilities in five cities. In order of ascending PV 
costs, they were (1) Inyokern, California, ( 2 ) Miami, Florida, ( 3) 
Sterling, Virginia, (4) Cleveland, Ohio, and (5) Seattle, Washington.24 
Of course a ranking based on PV energy cost alone does not consider many 
factors that might determine the potential of PV in different regions. 
Beginning in 19 78 , a number of studies broadened the analysis by 
calculating PV module break-even prices in grid-connected applications for 
a small number (often 3-6) of representative sites around the country. 
The rationale for using PV module or system break-even prices was that PV 
module and system prices were corning down as the technology progressed . 
The break-even price indicated how far they had to decline before being 
competitive and thus was a good way to set cost targets. Areas with the 
highest PV module break- even price would be the first in which PV was 
competitive. PV module break-even prices included both PV energy costs 
and the costs of alternatives. The break-even prices were generally 
computed for small, but significant PV penetration levels--e.g . , 4-16 
percent. 25 
Areas with higher break-even prices would tend to have larger 
benefits from PV for two reasons. First, higher break-even prices mean 
earlier use and thus earlier cost-reduction benefits. Earlier benefits 
translate to larger benefits because discount rates are generally assumed 
24 Aerospace Corporation (1977), p. 43. 
25 This is the range of the studies summarized in Jeffrey L. Smith 
(1980b), p . 23. 
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to be positiv e. Second, as PV module price s decl ine past the break-even 
point, benefits are l a rger in a reas with higher break- even points. The 
same result holds even if PV prices never reach t he break- even point--the 
higher the break-even point , the greater the insuranc e value of PV because 
it provide s cost-reduction benefits over a bigger range of PV modul e 
prices. 
However , these statements i gnore the quantity of PV used, whi ch 
affects PV benefits. The quantity used is equal to the PV penetrat ion 
percentage times the electricity usage in the r egion . Two pathologies 
exist regarding PV penetration percentage. First, if one is comparing 
break-even prices for two areas, and the higher break-even price is 
calculated based on a lower PV penetration percentage , then one cannot 
tell in which of the t wo areas PV penetration l evel (and benefits) will 
be highest for any given module price. Second , if the actual PV module 
price is below the two break-even prices, one cannot be sure about which 
area will have the larger PV penetration percentage (a break-even price 
tells us about the conventional electricity supply curve at one point 
only). 
The degree of electricity usage in the region is independent of the 
attractive ness of PV, and thus may result in a different pattern of 
regional benefits of PV than indicated by break-even prices a lone . The 
degree of electricity usage is a r e levant issue for a determination of 
regional benefits, but not to set technology goals or determine where PV 
will first be used , and therefore was not highlighted in these studies. 
The studies showing PV break-even prices for different areas are 
reviewed below. Most, if not all, of these were sponsored by the solar 
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program in DOE. Although quantitative estimates of break- even prices for 
each site were produced in each case, I have only shown t he relati ve 
ordering of sites/regions by break-even price. 
-The MIT Energy Laboratory in 1978 examined break- even prices in 
three different settings: (1) single family residences; ( 2) institutional 
buildings (such as a school) , and ( 3) utili ties. The residential and 
institutional analysis chose 5 cities to represent 5 different regions: 
Miami (South), Omaha (Northcentral), Boston (Northeast), Southwest 
(Phoenix), and Fort Worth (Texas). The utility analysis was conducted for 
four synthetic utilities developed by the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) . The ordering of regions (Table 2 7) depends on the 
application considered and the assumptions concerning penetration level 
and type of capacity displaced. 
-General Electric in 1978 computed break-even prices for three 
utilities. Break-even prices were highest for Arizona Public Service 
(Salt River Project), followed by New England Electric System, and then 
Florida Power and Light.26 
-Stone and Webster in 1979-80 examined three utilities in the 
Southwest and two in the Southeast. Combining the results of these 





Southern California Edison, Florida Power and Light, Baltimore 
"Requirements Assessment of Photovoltaic Power Plants in Electric 
Systems," General Electric Company, Volume 2, ER-685, June 1978 , 
H, as reported in J effrey L. Smith (1980b), pp. 22-25. 
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Table 27 
MIT Results on Attractiveness of PV in Different Regions and Applications 







In utility applications, the credit for use of PV was calculated for 
different regions. No break-even price or other complete measure of PV 
attractiveness was computed. The credit for use of PV of course does not 
consider the cost of PV in that region, and thus this ranking is a less 
comprehensive ranking than the others. The credit was computed based on 
different levels of PV penetration and types of capacity displaced. The 
relative ranking depends on these assumptions, and no preferred assumption 
is indicated in this analysis . 
Source: "SERI Photovol taic Venture Analysis: Long Term Demand Estimation," 
Richard D. Tabors, Susan Finger with Allen Burns, Paul Carpenter, Thomas 
Dinwoodie, and Gerald Taylor , MIT Energy Laboratory, June 27, 1978, 
Appendix I in Solar Energy Research Institute (1978), pp. I-7, 12, 17-20. 
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Gas and Electric , and then Arizona Public Service.27 
-General Electric in 1 979 computed bre ak-even pr ice s fo r res idences 
in five cities. From highest to lowe st, the ranking was Phoenix, Bos ton , 
Mia mi, Omaha , and Fort Worth. 28 Thus, the orde ring was essen t ially t he 
same as in the MIT study of residence s. 
-The draft Department of Energy Multiyear Program Plan' s 1980 
ordering for residential , intermediate l oad centers , and utilities was 
Phoenix, Boston , and then Miami , with more pronounc ed differences fo r 
residential and intermediate load centers than for utilities. 29 
-A JPL study in 1983 computed residential break- even prices for nine 
cities. In declining order, they were (1 ) Honolulu, Hawaii, (2 ) Barstow , 
California, (3) Alhambra, California, (4) Miami, Florida, ( 5) Boston, 
Massachusetts, (6) Denver, Colorado, (7) Midland/ Odessa, Texas , ( 8) 
Phoenix, Arizona, and (9) Lincoln , Nebraska.30 
-A 1985 JPL study of utiliti es in 4 cities c omputed break-ev en 
costs. In declining order, they were Phoenix, Fresno, Miami, and 
27 Southwest Project: Resource/Institutional Requirements Analysis. 
Volume III--System Inte~ration Studies, Stone and Webster Engineering 
Corporation, December 1979, and Southeast Re~ional Assessment Study--An 
Assessment of the Opportunities for Solar Electric Power Generation in the 
Southeastern United States, July 1980, as reported in Jeffrey L. Smith 
(1980b), pp. 21-25. Since I rely on Smith's account, it is not clear why 
Arizona Public Service is least attractive . Although I first suspected 
that different PV penetration levels were the reason, I then linearly 
interpolated break-even prices calculated for two different PV penetration 
levels for two of these utilities. Based on this, the penetration lev els 
do not appear to be the key factor. 
28 General Electric Co. ( 1979) as reported in Jeffrey L . Smith 
(1980b), pp. 21-25. 
29 U.S. Department of Energy (1980c) , pp . D-2 , 5 . 
30 Borden (1983) , p. 24. 
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Boston. 31 
The possibilities for use of these break-even estimates will be 
dis cussed in the next section, with problems in this approach discussed 
at the end of the chapter. 
OPTIONS FOR ROLL CALL ANALYSIS OF CONSUMPTION BENEFITS OF PV 
The preceding discussion has developed several important points with 
regard to estimates of local consumption benefits of PV. First, analysis 
of these benefits is quite complicated. Second, estimates of module 
break-even prices, which vary by region, correlate with these benefits if 
electricity consumption does not vary across regions and if actual PV 
penetration levels are higher in higher break-even regions. (These are 
jointly sufficient, but not necessary.) Third, the cost reduction 
benefits of PV in grid-connected applications depend on a whole host of 
factors: what type of generation is displaced, the extent of capacity 
displacement per kW of PV, the fuel savings, the price of PV electricity 
(which depends primarily on insolation and technology), and the extent of 
PV use. Estimates for most of these variables on a district or regional 
basis are not available . 
There are several options for how to proceed. 
Option 1 : Use A Re~ional Variable Reflectin~ Break-even Prices 
The advantages of this option are that these measures were issued 
by the program, that they represent the most sophisticated analysis of 
31 Crosetti, Jackson, and Aster (1985), Tables 7-9. 
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regional attractiveness available, and that break-even prices are probably 
closely related to consumption benefits. Under this option, there are two 
major issues. The first is which ranking to use, since different numbers 
of cities are evaluated and the rankings vary by study. One possibility 
is only to score the mos t promising regions with all else as "o ther" 
because most of the studies attempted to evaluate the relative 
attractiveness of PV among only the most promising regions for PV--the 
Southwest, the Northeast, and the Southeast. The second issue is what 
variable should be used--should one use the break-even price, an integer 
ranking of regions, or dummy variables to indicate the region? There are 
two reasons why a generalized measure such as a dummy variable for region, 
might be preferred . First, although benefits and break-even prices are 
almost certainly correlated, the exact relationship depends on PV 
penetration levels and the level of electricity use. Second, the 
discrepancies in the results of the studies suggests that a general 
measure representing the consensus of studies might be preferred. 
Option 2: Use Indicator Variables 
The studies discussed above generally concluded that competing 
energy costs and insolation are the most important factors in determining 
the break-even price in grid-connected applications, with some studies 
including state tax treatment as well. 32 The equations developed earlier 
suggest that benefits in grid- connected applications are a func tion of 
competing energy costs, PV costs, and PV quantity consumed . The first 
32 Two sources which cite state taxes are Tabors (1982) and Borden 
( 1983). 
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part of this section will show that the results from these two a pproaches 
are totally consistent , and suggest a common set of variables to indicate 
district benefits . These variables a re pe r capita e lectrici t y 
consumption , conventional electricity price , and insolation. The section 
will then consider what modifications a re appropriate fo r nongrid 
applications, and will discuss the specific variables that should be used 
for each . 
l) Per capita electricity consumption is used because of the 
dependence of benefits on PV quantity consumed. The l atter is equal to 
the product of per capita electricity c onsumption and percentage PV 
penetration level . Per capita electricity consumption is used rather than 
total electricity consumption because all economic variables should be 
normalized by population. The percentage PV penetration level will depend 
on the cost relationship between conventional and PV power, and possibly 
other factors such as state regulatory policy. The difference in costs 
between conventional and PV power of course affects benefits directly, as 
well as indirectly through the percentage PV penetration level. 
2) The price of conventional e lectr icity is a n important , although 
imperfect element, of the cost relationship between conventional and PV 
power . It is imperfect for two reasons. First, because the conventional 
generation is being replaced by an alternative type of gene ration, the 
price of conventional power may refer to a different quantity of power 
than the corresponding alternative power figure . Determination of the 
differences in quantities and costs is made more difficult when the types 
have very different patterns of availability , as when conventional power 
is replaced by intermittent generation. Second, the price of conventional 
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electricity represents an average of the costs of different types of 
conventional generation , and PV is unlikely to displace capac ity in the 
same average pattern . Both of these inadequacies of an electricity price 
measure may be important in a cross-sectional context since t he exten t of 
capacity replacement and the t ype of capacity replaced is likely to vary 
by region due to differing load and PV output patterns. 
I have not included these factors here because there were no well-
known projections at the time of the votes as to the differences in 
capacity displacement on a regional, much less district , basis. One 
reason for this was that the situation was dynamic; the extent of oil 
displacement at the time might be very different than at the time when PV 
would actually be used . 
Instead of using conventional electricity price as an indicator of 
the benefits of replacing conventional generation, one could also use the 
percent of generation from oil. The rationale for this latter measure is 
that several studies have shown that the percent of capacity displacement 
that is oil is correlated with avoided cost. However , a number of 
problems exist with the use of this measure . First, the studies indicate 
that the percent of capacity replaced that is oil is correlated with 
a voided cost . This percent can only be determined by analysis of the role 
of PV i n the particular system, and cannot be determined solely from the 
percent of generation that is oil (one still needs to know how much 
capacity is displaced , and how much of this is oil). Second, the l evel 
of oil generation capacity is likely to be very different a t the time when 
PV is competitive in grid-connected applications , due to the displacement 
of oil by coal and nuclear in the meantime. Third, when oil use is 
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reduced, avoided capacity costs, not the value of displaced oil, will be 
more important in determining avoided costs.33 For these reasons , I have 
not pursued the use of this measure . 
( 3) Insolation can be used to indicate PV costs. This will be 
demonstrated by examination of the factors t hat determine PV costs. The 





















[ FCR (1 + ID)(MD + AB + PB/A) + AO&M) ] / AEP 
annualized (leveli ~cd) energy cost in $/kWh 
levelized fixed cha~ge rate 
( 6) 
indirect cost factor to account for the indirect costs 
associated with the installation of systems 
module cost in $;m2 
area-related balance-of-sy stem cost in $; m2 
power-related balance-of-system cost in $/kW 
1 I [(IN x ASE)] where 
average peak insolation in kWhjm2 , and 
annual system efficiency, which 
BOSE x TC x ME , where 
balance-of-system efficiency 
temperature correction to module efficiency at 25 ° C, which 
depends on average annual module operating temperature 
module efficiency at 25 °C 
G x CRF x OM, where 
present worth factor 
capital recovery factor (G x CRF = 1.0) 
yearly operation and maintenance cost in $;m2-yr. 
annual energy production 
S x ASE, where 
annual solar availability in kWhjm2 -yr 
The principal issue in determining regional PV costs is which PV 
cost factors vary by region. I will assume that only average peak 
insolation (IN) and annual solar availability (S) varies by part of the 
33 See Flaim (1985), pp. 278-280, for discussion of these points. 
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country. The rationale for viewing the others as constant is described 
for each variable below:34 
-The fixed charge rate (FCR) depends on the lifetime, the discount 
rate, and taxes. The most pronounced regional variation in these factors 
would result from state taxes, particularly PV provisions. These are 
ignored because they do not affect the cost of PV in the region, only who 
in the region bears the cost. 
-The module cost (MD) and power-related balance of system cost (PB) 
depend on the state of PV technology and would not vary by region . 
-The area-related balance-of-system cost (AB) for utility 
applications depends on the price of land, which varies by part of the 
country . However, there are three reasons to ignore this in our analysis . 
First, the votes under study range from 1975 to 1980, and, as described 
in Chapter 1, during much of this period it was thought that the first 
application of PV might be in residences, where there is no cost due to 
land since the arrays are mounted on the residence roof. Second, several 
studies of the economics of utility PV indicate that land would constitute 
only 1-2 percent of the area-related balance of system costs .35 Third, 
34 One must make a number of simplifying assumptions so that the 
number of variables used in the analysis (either entered directly in the 
regression equation or used to calculate the benefits variable to be 
entered in the regression equation) is a manageable number . The PV cost 
formula given in (6) describes 13 variables which affect PV cost. The 
assumptions as to which factors do not vary by part of the country and 
hence are irrelevant in determining differences in benefits of PV by 
district, defines the list of variables which could potentially affect 
roll call voting in a cross-sectional analysis. 
35 Aerospace Corporation (1977, p. 39) and Tay lor (1983b, p . 3-2) . 
In addition to these point estimates, the latter also provides a range 
from less than 1 percent to 6 percent . Of course it would be easy to find 
sites where the land cost would b e much greater. However, with some 
transmission losses , these sites can be avoided. 
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and probably for similar reasons, the analyses of the attractiveness of 
PV in different parts of the country (the 1977 Aerospace study a nd those 
cited beginning at footnote 26) do not examine land as a variable of 
interest ; those studies performe d prior to v otes could be presumed to have 
had some effect on the evaluation of these factors in the voting decision. 
-Annual system efficiency (ASE) depends on balance- of- system 
efficiency (BOSE), temperature correction ( TC) , and module efficiency at 
25°. The last depends on PV technology and would not vary by region_ 36 
BOSE efficiency could var y due to differences in dirt accumulation and 
array shadowing.37 TC would vary as well, since modules in warmer areas 
of the country and in higher insolation areas would operate at h igher 
temperatures and thus the downward correction to module efficiency a t 25° 
would be different . However , data on regional differences in t hese 
factors do not readily exist and the differences are likely to be small. 
-Operations and maintenance costs "are annually recurring expenses 
for module replacement, salaries of operating personnel, module washing, 
and the upkeep of the grounds, structure , and electrical systems. " 38 
These costs could differ by part of the country, due to differences in the 
number of cleanings required or perhaps other factors. This factor is 
ignored due to the lack of data and because the analyses of the 
36 As with other parameters such as MD and AB that depend on PV 
technology, the values observed in different parts of the country may 
vary , because the preferred technology in different parts of the country 
may vary due to differences in insolation and other fac tors. It greatly 
simplifies the analysis however to regard these as constant across the 
country, rather than using the optimum at each point. 
37 Crosetti, Jackson, and Aster ( 1985), pp. 29-33. 
38 Crosetti, Jackson, and Aster (1985), p. 42. 
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attractiveness of PV in different locations did not examine operations and 
maintenance costs as a factor . 
-Differences in labor rates in different parts of t he count r y would 
lead to regional differences in the costs of PV power. To translate l ocal 
labor cost differentials into PV power cost differentials, would require 
an estimate of the percent of the cost of PV power that arise s from the 
use of local labor. To construct such an estimate, one could examine the 
places where labor costs appear and whether these labor costs reflec t 
local conditions. The two most important areas are probably indirect 
costs and operations and maintenance. Indirect costs (ID) include 
engineering fees, construction contingency, owner's costs and interest 
during construction, with engineering fees estimated at 12-28 percent of 
indirect costs . 39 Operations and maintenance costs (O&M) would reflect 
local labor rates. For residential PV, whether differences in local wages 
lead to differences in O&M costs depends on whether homeowner labor for 
residential PV is regarded as free.40 For utility PV, using the energy 
cost equation and parameter assumptions from the Five Year Plan (using the 
ranges for module costs and efficiency) produces estimates of operations 
and maintenance costs of 5-7 percent of total PV cost . What percentage 
of this 5-7 percent operations and maintenance cost is labor depends 
heavily on the assumed module replacement rate, with the baseline scenario 
39 Crose tti , Jackson, and Aster (1985), p. 38, Taylor ( l983b), p. 3-
10. 
40 As noted in Chapter 1, 
residential PV was often regarded 




1970s, homeowner labor for 
This is still done in s ome 
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showing slightly less than half of the 5-7 percent figure to be labor.41 
Parameter Values. With the rationale established for regarding 
these variables as constant across regions, it is necessary to make some 
assumption regarding the values for these variables i n order to determine 
values of PV cost by region using equation (6). For simplicity, I have 
used the values in the 1987 plan (I use the midpoints of the module cost 
and efficiency ranges) . The use of these values may be appropriate 
because, as noted in Chapter 1, the Five Year Plan values lead to energy 
costs that are intermediate between what would be produced by the initial 
50-cent-per-peak-watt goal and the longer-term 10-cent-per-peak-watt goal . 
Substituting these values, one obtains 
EC [ ( . 0961)(1.5)[62 . 5+50+150*IN* . 85*.9*.175)) + 1.1 J /(S*.85*.9*.175) 
or 
EC = 121.1/S + 21.6 (IN/S) + 8.22/S 
The ratio IN/S or average peak insolation/annual solar availability, is 
nearly a constant. 42 If we treat it so, then we get 
EC 129.3/S + .0099 
41 Crosetti, Jackson, and Aster (1985), p . 44 . 
42 This is implied by Taylor (1983b), p. 4-6. 
confirms that this is a reasonable assumption; the 
from Crosetti, Jackson, and Aster (1985), p. 23. 
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5 . 00 
(7) 
The following table 
first two columns are 
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This demonstrates that insolation alone can be us e d to predict PV costs 
in our context. 
Note that u s ing a constant term to represent power- rel a t e d costs 
reflects two assumptions . First, that IN/ S is c onstant across regions; 
as a v erage sunlight goes up, so too does peak insolation. Second , one 
builds the power-conditioning system to fully utilize this peak. 4 3 The 
sensitivity of our results to the first assumption44 can b e examined. 
Using a 1987 baseline value of S of 2400 kWh/ m2-yr (high-insolation 
location such as the desert Southwest), one obtains 
EC .054 + . 0099 $0 . 064/kWh ( 8) 
Thus, the small-percentage variations in the IN/S ratio that do exist 
translate into equally small-percentage effects on the second term in (8), 
which translates into a smaller-percentage effect on the overall energy 
cost. The effect would be even smaller in lower-insolation regions where 
the first term would be larger. 
Thus the use of three variables--per capita electricity consumption, 
conventional electricity price, and insolation--as indicators of benefits 
of PV in grid-connected markets is consistent with the studies of break-
even prices and my earlier derivation of PV benefit formulas. Of course , 
other factors affect PV break-even prices , but it is not practical to 
43 Whether this will in fact be done depends to a great extent on 
whether the peak output of the PV system coincides, in terms of time of 
year and time of day, with the peak demand on the electricity grid . This 
depends on the region of the country. 
44 The sensitivity to the assumption regarding building the power 
system to meet the peak is more difficult to examine. 
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include these in the analysis, as discussed earlier . 
State Solar Tax Treatment. Note that I have not included state 
solar tax treatment, even though this was mentioned as a key factor 
affecting break-even prices. State solar tax treatment refers to those 
provisions that vary from state to state and apply specifically to solar 
energy ; one can infer from Borden (1983) that these are solar tax credits 
and exemptions of solar property from property taxes . For simplicity I 
will refer to all these provisions as "credits." The rationale for their 
inclusion is that if one assumes a f ixed state revenue requirement, the 
effect of a state solar credit is to redistribute state tax liabilities 
to state tax payers as a whole from a c oncentrated group (those receiving 
the credit) . 45 The standard analysis of such redistribution, due to 
Mancur Olson, is that this will have a political benefit because of the 
concentrated nature of the beneficiaries and the diffuse nature of the 
losers (one could add conditions such as "the concentrated group is seen 
as deserving"). This suggests that the size of the state credit would be 
correlated with state congressional political support for PV. The larger 
the credit, the larger the transfer. The group that would receive the 
credit perceives the Congressman's support as increasing the likelihood 
that PV will be economic (with the favorable tax treatment) and thus that 
this transfer would actually take place. Even though the federal 
legislator is one step removed from the granting of the credit, he would 
be rewarded for his support. 
There are several reasons for exclusion. First, these tax credits 
45 Due to the deductibility of state income taxes, the effect on 
federal tax liabilities is in the opposite direction. Of course the state 
effect dominates. 
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may not exist at the time when PV is used in a significant way.46 Second, 
the state tax treatment is likely to be a function of variables which 
affect the Congressman's evaluation of PV. Solar tax credits may b e more 
like l y to be adopted in states where PV would be most attractive without 
the credit. Constituent ideology could also play a role in affec t ing both 
Congressional support of PV and the exi stence of state solar c redits. 
Thus the second reason for exclusion of state solar tax treatment is very 
similar to the argument made against the inclusion of ideology indices 
determined from other votes in roll call analyses (see Chapter 2): the 
state solar tax treatment or the ideology index is itself a function of 
the other explanatory variables. 
Interpretation of results with state solar tax credits included 
would be difficult. Does significance of state solar credits indicate 
that (1) Congressmen have a high discount rate and therefore are valuing 
credits which may be gone before PV use is large , (2) Congressmen believe 
these credits will continue , or (3) the district would support solar for 
economic or ideological reasons that are not captured by the economic and 
ideology variables included? Due to the difficulty in interpretation, 
solar tax credits will not be included. 
Non-Grid-Connected Market. With respect to the non-grid-connected 
market, sunlight and population density are good indicators. Sunlight is 
again a good measure of the cost per unit output of the PV system. 
Electricity is clearly not a good measure of the cost of alternatives. 
Some measure of the extent of grid-connectedness would be best , but such 
46 For example, Borden (1983) excludes solar tax credits from his 
baseline case . 
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measures do not appear to be available. 4 7 Because of this lack of data , 
I use population per square mile of land area as a variable which is 
probably highly correlated with grid-connectedness. 
However, there may be problems with this variable. My proposed 
approach is to use insolation, electricity price, per capita electri city 
consumption, and population density as the variables related to 
consumption benefits. With thes~ variables, the importance o f nongrid 
applications is measured only by whether population density i s 
significant. Aside from the fact that population density is an imperfect 
measure of grid-connectedness, it is also correlated with land prices 
which affect the cost of central-station PV . Thus less densely populated 
regions may be more attractive for central-station PV. However, as argued 
above, land prices are only a small portion of PV central-station costs 
and do not affect residential grid-connected applications, which were 
viewed as important at the time of the votes. Thus the significance of 
population density might still be interpreted as indicating the importance 
of nongrid applications in particular. If the variable is not 
significant, this supports the argument that nongrid applications were 
unimportant. 
Specific Variable Choices. With the rationale for selection of 
variables hopefully clear, we now turn to specific choices regarding 
d efinition of variables. The insolation measure is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4 and the Data Appendix. Three reasons were 
instrumental in the selection of this particular data set. First, 
47 This question is not asked in Census, Energy Information 
Administration, or Edison Electric Institute surveys, nor is this data 
submitted in regional reliability council reports. 
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insolation values a re provi ded for a large number (235) of sites. Thi s 
simplifies the extrapolation to 435 distr icts . Second , a l though oth e r 
solar data sets are available, this set was publishe d by the photovolta i c 
program a t JPL. Third, I had been previously acquainted wi t h the aut ho r 
o f the s t udy. 
With respect to conventional electricity prices, there are a vari e t y 
of options with regard to which con ventional e l e ctric ity price should b e 
employed. The first cho ice is between past or current price, and 
projections of future p r ices . The second choice is whether to use average 
price or marginal (the cost of new generation) . The third is be tween 
average price for a ll customers or average residential price. In al l 
cases, the grid- connected market is the relevant marke t since the nongrid 
market does not depend on t he level of electricity prices (except in the 
cases where connecting to t he grid is an option). 
Past/Current Price v s . Future Price. The b enefit of PV in grid-
applications depends on the quantity of electricit y generated by PV as 
well as the cost difference between PV and conventional electricity. At 
t h e time of the votes, the level of PV generation was so small that the 
resulting l evel of benefits was infinitesimal compared to the future 
promise of PV in grid-connected applications. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume that Congressmen were voting based on future benefits, not 
current benefits . To test this, one would like to use two different 
specifications of electricity price--the cu rren t price to represent 
current b enefits and agency estimat e s of future price , to r epresent future 
benefits. 
Un fortunately , such an approach would not work for a number of 
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reasons. First, voters and Congressmen might use past and current prices 
to project future prices, rather t han using age ncy projections , even 
though one would expect that agency projections would be more accurate . 
Second, voters and Congress might be responding to today's problems rather 
than attempting to predict the future. Thus significance of past or 
current price variables in a PV roll call analys is does not have a unique 
interpretation, nor can one test the relative importance of current vs. 
f uture benefits by using current vs. future electricity prices. 
Average vs. Marginal Price. Due to average cost pricing by 
utilities, decisions made by nonutilities to replace utility power by PV 
are made based on the average price . However, sell-back of power to the 
utility will be based on avoided costs (marginal price). The decision by 
the utility as to whether new power should be PV or some other source is 
based on the marginal price of each. 48 
Average vs. Residential Price. The cost of electricity is allocated 
by state regulatory policies to customer classes, with the result that 
different classes have different power prices. Some analysts (e . g . , 
Nivola (1986)) have used residential prices in roll call analyses, because 
they believe these prices are more politically salient than the overall 
average. The relationship of these customer class prices to the overall 
state average will vary by state depending on the regulatory policies in 
each state. It is difficult to predict how the relationship of various 
48 The decision as to whether and when to replace existing capacity 
with new capacity is based on the cost of power replaced, as well as t he 
marginal price of the new source. 
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customer class prices will change over time . 49 
Data Availability . Past and current prices are a vailabl e by state. 
whereas projections of future prices were only made by r egion. 
Past/curre nt data are for customer c lass (e.g ., re sidential ) a nd a verage . 
Agency projections are average and marginal pric es. 
Based on these conside rations as we l l as the a vail ability of da ta , 
I will test the following alternative specifications for electric ity 
price. 
-Av erage price year of vote 
-Average price year of vote and percent change from 2 years earlier 
-Average residential price year of vote 
-Average residential price year of vote and percent change fr om 2 
years earlier 
-Projected 1985 marginal price for region50 
-Projected 1985 average price for region 
Option 3: Calculate District-Unique Variable Based on Indicator Variables 
The benefit framework developed in the equations above can be used 
to develop a simplified local benefits model which can then be used to 
generate a benefit variable for grid-connected uses . Nongrid applications 
49 Jeffrey L . Smith (1980b), Vol . II, p . 16 , describes this as an 
impossible task. 
50 Projections are for 1985 made by the Energy Information 
Administration in 1977. EIA projected prices for 1985 and 1990 in that 
document. Although either could be used, I have used 1985 since the 50 
cents per peak watt by 1985 was a more prominent goal than the 1990 goal. 
The regional estimates are more aggregated than the state est i mates used 
for past and present prices since there are only ten regions. 
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will be evaluated as before. 
Simplifying the Model. Recall that our expression fo r the benefit 
of a PV program (repeated below) involves the discount ed differenc e in 
energy cos ts r e sulting from the accelerated adoption of PV due to the 
program, plus the reduction in PV costs after the time whe n PV would be 
adopted anyway. 





Even if the PV program only serves to accelerate the adopt i on of PV , 
a similar simplification results once one realizes that the second 
integral in (9) will be small relative to the first and will not differ 
much by region . The second integral will be small compared to the first 
integral for two reasons. First, the second integral compares the cost 
differences in PV with and without a program, after the point that PV 
becomes economic without the program. Because this will be a long time 
in the future, the differences will be heavily discounted. Second, once 
PV becomes economic without the program, the d iffer ence s in PV costs with 
and without the program are likely to be relatively small. Large cost 
reductions are required to make PV economic; once these are achieved, 
further reductions are limited due to limits on conversion efficiency and 
other factors. The second integral is also unlikely to differ much 
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between regions because the PV cost reductions due to the PV program will 
be similar in all regions of the country. 51 Thus the second term will not 
lead to significant differences in regional benefits and thus can be 
ignored. The remaining first integral is the same as in t he c as e where 
PV would not be adopted without a program , except that the upper limi t of 
integration is different. 
Focusing now only on the first integral , to calculate benefi ts by 
region using this procedure , one would determine , using price projections 
for conventional and PV power, when PV would become economic in each 
region, and discount the differences in the cost of conventional and PV 
power from then on, or until PV would become economic without the progra m. 
These price projections will be on a price per kilowatt hour basis, and 
therefore will ignore the complicat ions associated with dete rmining the 
savings in conventional power costs described above. 
Because this approach requires PV and conventional price projections 
over time by locale , and these are not available, alternatives to this 
approach that rely on less information are desirable. In part i cular, one 
could examine cost differences at a single point in time for all locales, 
rather than examining cost difference s over time, with the beg inning point 
for each locale being when PV becomes e c onomic in the l ocale (and the 
ending point being when PV would be economic without the prog ram for that 
locale). Whether these two approaches produce the same ranking depends 
on whether the ordering of regions by PV cost and conventional e lectricity 
51 Although the federal PV program might place a different emphasis 
among different technologies than a private program, these would not 
translate ex ante i nto different e ffects on r egional benefits such as 
would be the case if one program emphasized concentrators a nd the o the r 
flat plate technologie s . 
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cost changes ove r time. The ordering of regions by PV cost is unl ike l y 
to change; such changes could however occur if technological developments 
favored one region over another (e.g., technological devel opments of 
concentrator technology would favor areas in whic h a higher proportion of 
the total insolation is direct insolation). Changes in r egi onal order ing 
of conventional electricity costs may be somewhat more likely. 
As in the indicator approach, although it i s difficul t to estimate 
t he quantity of PV that will be used in each district which , along with 
cost differences, will determine tota l benefits, the quantity of PV t ha t 
will be used in each district is almost certainly highly posit ively 
correlated with the cost advantage that PV has over conventional power in 
that district . Thus the ordering of districts would not change much 
whether one includes the PV quantity of not, and thus we can focus merely 
on the cost difference. 
PV Power Costs . In the "indicator" approach (opt ion two), 
quantitative estimates were not made for PV costs (sunlight i tself was 
shown to be an adequate indicator). Since quantitative estimates of PV 
costs are required to calculate benefits in option three , the issue arises 
whether one should utilize t he cost equation devel oped for PV or use 
approaches similar to that used for conventional powe r . Price 
expectations could be based solely on past and current prices, or price 
expectati ons could be based on estimates of future prices that were made 
by federal agencie s and others at the time. Neither of these two 
alternatives is however appropriate for PV. With respect to the first, 
price data for PV has n ever been published by regi on as it has for other 
generation sources . More importantly, what price data existed in t he 
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1970s would be a poor basis for projection of future prices because the 
limited data were heavily influenced by factors such as t he size of the 
buy and because of the large price d eclines expected. With respect to the 
second alternative, PV prices were not pro jected by region.52 
To use the cost e quation to calculate PV c osts , it is necessary to 
calculate the S values from the insolation data set. I assume t he highest 
value in the data set corresponds to an S value of 2400. 
Conventional Power Costs. In utilizing the alternatives for 
conventional power described for option two, one must realize that, unlike 
the indicator approach, the ordering of districts in terms of net PV 
benefits may vary if e ither variable , conventional energy cost or PV power 
cost, is transformed by a scalar. This is because one variable is being 
subtracted from the other. This means that ordering of districts by net 
benefits depends on the year chosen to compare prices53 as well as 
assumptions underpinning the conventional and PV price projections. This 
is one reason why the indicator approach should precede use of a benefits 
variable. 
The marginal and average price projections discussed earlier are 
available for 1985 and 1990. It is unclear which is the better year for 
comparison to PV costs, as derived by the PV formula, since the parameter 
values I have chosen reflect PV costs intermediate between those achieved 
52 The projections discussed earlier for a few representative cities 
were the break-even PV module prices required , not the PV electricity 
prices resulting from use of a single PV module price. Aerospace 
Corporation (1977), p. 43, showing prices for five cities is a rare 
exception. 
53 The same problem exists in the earlier formulation , where one is 
integrating the difference over a number of years . 
177 
by the 1985 cost goal of 50 cents per peak watt and the 1990 goal of 10 
cents per peak watt. Because of the greater prominence of t he 1985 goa l . 
I will use that year as the comparison year. Current year pric es need to 
be "scaled up" to the comparison y ear; I do this by multiply ing t h e se 
prices times the ratio of the projected 1985 ave rage price to the a verage 
price in the year of the vote. 
PREFERRED OPTION 
Option l, use of a variable reflecting break-even prices , is not 
chosen due to four problems with using these estimates in roll call 
analysis of PV voting. In order of declining importance , they are as 
follows. First, the estimates only exist for a few cities . There is no 
good way to make estimates for fifty states and 435 congressional 
districts. Second, all of the break-even estimates were published after 
eight of the nine votes had occurred (with seven of the nine votes 
occurring two years before the first estimate), and thus these estimates 
were not available at the time of the vote. Third, the ranking varies 
across the studies to some degree. Changes over time in ranking would be 
a valuable addition to a roll call analysis if the ranking were changing 
in a consistent manner across votes, and if the votes could be compared 
by pooling or in other ways. With neither t h e case, the changes in 
ranking suggest that ( l ) the choice of a ranking by the roll call analyst 
is somewhat arbitrary and (2) the rationale that Congressmen were relying 
on these rankings is weakened because the rankings presen t a confused 
picture . Fourth, in addition to confusion resul ting from differences in 
rankings between studies, the picture that emerges i s a lso a complicated 
178 
one. The MIT study found that the ordering of regions depends on the 
whether the market is utility or intermediate load/residential and on 
assumptions regarding penetration level and t y pe of capacity dis placed. 
As noted in Chapter 1 , the issue of whether the residential o r util ity 
market would be economic first was the most hotly contested issue duri ng 
this period. Similarly, the extent of oil displacement was a lso highl y 
controversial. 
The third option, which estimates the cost difference between PV and 
conventional power in 1985, to r e flect the benefits of g rid-connected 
uses , and which utilizes population density as an indicator that nongrid 
uses were valued, may produce insignificant results if the scale factors 
for PV and conventional power are incorrectly chosen. This could result 
from choosing the "wrong" y ear for comparison, the wrong escalation factor 
for conventional power, or the wrong rate of cost decline for PV. 
Thus, the second option , which uses conventional electricity price, 
insolation, per capita electricity consumption , and population density as 
indicators of benefits in grid-connected and non-grid- connected 
applications, is the preferred option . The third option will also be 
performed, although I am not optimistic as to the results. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF ROLL CALL VOTING ON PHOTOVOLTAICS 
To test the hypotheses concerning the role of party , ideology, a nd 
distributive politics d evel oped in Chapters 1 and 3, congressional roll 
call votes concerning photovoltaics were analyzed using an econometric 
model . 1 The votes analyzed (Table 28) are the s e t of all roll cal l votes 
pertaining to photovoltaics funding since 1974 with the exception of the 
following. 2 
First, votes on final passage of energy authorization or energy and 
water development appropriation bills are not included. Photovoltaics or 
solar represented less than 10 percent of the energy or energy and water 
development budget and thus votes on final passage cannot be used as 
proxies for solar or photovoltaics votes . 3 
Second, extremely lopsided votes were ignored for two reasons . The 
estimations are likely to fail and the reasons why a few voted differently 
from the vast majority are likely to be different than the determinants 
of voting behavior in more contested votes. The two lopsided votes were 
the Solar Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1974, 
adopted 383-3, and the Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, 
1 Regressions models to explain congressional voting have been used 
extensively in the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter 2 surveys these. 
2 The universe of votes was generated from descriptions of floor 
action on energy programs found in the annual Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac. I believe this to be a complete list. 
3 Banks used votes on final passage of NASA authorization bills in 
his study of the space shuttle. However , the space shuttle represented 
approximately 30 percent of the funds in the NASA budget, and was the 
largest item in the budget. Appropriation bills were not used by Banks 





Selected Roll Call Votes 
-Gravel (D Alaska) amendment to increase FY 1976 and transi tion quarter 
authorization for solar energy research and development by $63 million and 
$18 million respectively. Rejected 34-59, July 31, 1975. CQ 366 . 
-Glenn (D Ohio) amendment to increase appropriation for solar energy 
research and development in fiscal year 1 976 and the transition quarter 
by $46 million. Adopted 52-31, December 5, 1975. CQ 554. 
-Hart (D Colo) amendment to increase FY 1 977 appropriations for solar 
energy programs by $16.4 million . Adopted 54-41, June 23, 1976. CQ 312. 
House votes: 
- Richmond (D N. Y.) amendment, to the McCormack (D Wash) amendment, to 
increase FY 1976 and transition quarter appropriation for solar energy 
research by $54.1 million and $9.9 million, r espectively . Rejected 
190-219, June 24, 1975. CQ 255 . The McCormack amendment to increase FY 
1976 and transition quarter appropriations for solar energy by $13 million 
and $9.5 million was subsequently passed by voice vote. 
-Anderson ( R Ill) amendment to the Brown ( D Calif) substitute amendment, 
to eliminate the $58 million increase for solar h eating and cooling 
programs, thus cutting the increase for solar e lectric and other programs 
from $116 million to $58 million. Rejected 188-207, May 19, 1976. CQ 
204. 
-Brown (D Calif) substitute amendment to the Jeffords (R Vt) amendment to 
redistribute the $116 million increase for solar electric, ocean thermal, 
wind energy , biomass, and related programs to $58 million for these 
programs and $58 million for solar heating and cooling . Also deleted line 
item authorization for specific technologies and provisions to increase 
ERDA staffing. Adopted 265-127, May 19, 1976 . CQ 205. 
-Jeffords (R Vt) amendment to increase FY 1977 authorization by $116 
million for solar electric, ocean thermal, wind energy, biomass, and 
related items. Adopted 321-68 as amended by Brown amendment, May 19, 
1976 . CQ 206 . 
-Tsongas (D Mass) amendment to increase FY 1978 authorization by $28 
million for federal purchase of solar photovoltaic systems and $10 mill ion 
for technology deve lopment. Adopted 227 - 179, September 21, 1977 . CQ 535 . 
- Fuqua (D Fla) amendment to increase 1981 appropriations for energy 
supply, research, a nd development by $107 million, of which $49 million 
was for solar programs and the rest for fusion. Adopted 254-151, June 24 , 
1980. CQ 327. 
Source: CO Almanac . Con~ressional Record , May 19 , 1976, pp. Hl4410 - 14427 ; 
September 21 , 1977 , p. H9765 ; June 24, 1980, pp . H16604-16 614 . 
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and Demonstration Act of 1978, adopted 38 5 -14. The votes in t he Senate 
on these two bills were voice votes. 
Third, non-roll -call votes were excluded because one knows onl y 
whether the measure passed, in the case of a vo ice vote , or the vote 
total, in the case of a standing vote, and not the vo tes of indi v idual 
members. Explanations of v oting behavior in voice and standing votes 
depends on the existence of a large number of vot es sinc e each vote is 
only one data point. There were onl y e ight non-roll-cal l votes on 
photovoltaics during this period, a nd thus these are ignored .4 
The nine votes selected for analysis, along with the eight non-roll-
call votes and the two lopside d votes that were excluded, are interesting 
in a number of respects . Only one floor vote has been taken during t he 
decline of the program. This was the Brown amendment to transfer $20 
million from space nuclear research to solar energy in the FY 1989 
appropriation . The amendment did not specify how much of this was to go 
4 The non-roll-call votes were the following . House : (1) Richmond 
(D N.Y.) amendment to increase the FY 1976 authorization for solar energy 
to $194.8 million from the $140 . 7 million provided i n t h e committee 
vers ion , with a comparable increase for the trans i tion quarter. Approved 
43-31 , standing vote, June 20, 1975; ( 2 ) McCormack (D Wash) amendment t o 
increase 1976 solar appropriations by $13 mill ion. Adopted after 
rejection of Richmond amendment (see list of roll call amendments in table 
below) , June 24, 1975; (3) Conte-Koch amendment to increase 1977 solar 
appropriations by $95 mill ion, adopted June 15, 19 76 ; (4) Tsongas (D 
Mass) amendment to increase 1978 ERDA appropriation by $24 million 
(including $19 million for photovoltaics), agreed to October 19, 1977 ; 
(5) Brown (D Calif) amendment to transfer $20 million from space nuclear 
research to solar energy in 1989 appropriation, adopted May 17, 1988 . 
Senate: (1) Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 
1 974. Approved, voice vote , Sept . 17, 1974; (2) Solar Photovol taic 
Energy Research, Development, and De monstration Act of 1978, adopted by 
voice vote , October 10 , 1978 ; (3) Dole (R Kansas) ~mendment, to 
appropriate $3 . 75 million f or a photov oltaic demonstrat ion project. 
Approved, September 9, 1980 . (Kansas was one of 5 states that were 
possible locations for t his project). 
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to photovoltaics. 5 Prior to this vote, the last vote was in September 
1980, on the FY 1981 budget, which was the peak year of appropriations fo r 
photovoltaics. In addition, there has never been a floor vo te o n a 
proposal to decrease the budget below the committee -approved level , o r to 
cancel the program entirely. Most have been to increase the budget over 
the committee level, and many of these were successful. All of the nine 
votes selected for analysis provided for increases over the committee 
level . 
The nine votes selected for analysis incl ude eight that affect sola r 
authorizations or appropriations and one (Tsongas amendment) which affects 
only PV authorizations. This limitation of the data has important 
implications for the selection of the explanatory variables for en e rgy 
price, federal expenditures, and manufacturers, as well as for the 
interpretation of results. 
The Senate econometric model is specified in Table 29 ( the Data 
Appendix provides additional information regarding these variables). 6 
The model for the House is the same (replacing Member for Senator) except 
for the following. First , there is no variable for terms since all House 
5 Con~ressional Record, May 17, 1988, pp . H3314-3318 and Report from 
Senate Appropriations Committee accompanying energy and water development 
appropriation bill, Senate Report 100 - 381, June 9, 1988, pp . 90 -93. The 
Senate report, which is always the best source of information concerning 
the effect of an approved House amendment since the effect of that 
amendment is incorporated into the tables under "House allowance," carrie s 
the $20 million separately as a "general increase . " 
6 This is the model specification that , along with a model 
specification to be presented at the end of the chapter, outperforms all 
others that were tested. The other specifications that were tested are 
discussed later in this chapter . Once this "best specification" was 
developed, all the regressions that are described in this chapter were run 
against this specification for comparison and these are the results that 
are described in this Chapter. 
183 
Table 29 
Econometric Model of Senate Roll Call Voting on Photovoltaics 
where F(.) is logistically distributed; 
Vi = vote by senator (0 = antiphotovoltaic vote; 1 
vote); 
a = constant; 
Pi party affiliation of senator at time of vote 
(0 Rep., 1 = Dem .) ; 
Ti year term of senator ends (either 77, 79, or 81); 
proph o tovoltaic 
ACAi = ACA score of senator fo r year of vote , divided by 100; 
APi =Membership of senator on Appropriations committee, year of vote; 
(0 =nonmember, 1 = member); 
APSi = Membership of senator on Appropriations subcommittee overseeing PV 
budget, year of vote (0 = nonmember, 1 = member); 
AUi =Membership of senator on committee overseeing PV authorization, year 
of vote (0 =nonmember, 1 =member); 
AUSi = Membership of senator on subcommittee overseeing PV authorization, 
year of vote (0 =nonmember, 1 =member); 
ELPi = State average electricity price, year of vote (1975 dollars per 
million BTU); 
DENi = Natural log of population density in state in year of vote 
(thousands of persons/square mile); 
Ii = Estimated average annual insolation (sunlight) in state (MWHj sq. 
meter); and 
Fi = Estimated real per capita PV expenditures to state in fiscal year 
being voted on, discounted at 10% (FY 1976 dollars per capita) 
MANi = PV manufacturer in state in 1980 (0 = no , 1 - yes); 
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terms end at the same time. Second, insolation . population density , 
photovoltaic spending, and photovoltaic manufacturer es tima tes pertai n to 
t he district of the member. 7 The House model uses total photovol taic 
spending in the district (in millions of dollars) in contrast to the per 
capita figures used in t h e Senate model since there i s little variat i on 
in the population of Congressional districts. 
The predicted signs of the coeff icients on a vote will be as 
follows: 
Democrats are more likely to vote pro-PV . 
The more liberal , the more likely a pro vote. 
Appropriations committee members are likely to vote no . 
B3 > 0 The higher the electricity price, the more likely a 
pro vote. 
B9 < 0 The less dense the population, the more likely a pro vote . 
The sunnier, the more likely a pro vote. 
The more PV funds, the more likely a pro vote . 
7 Population density in the House model refers to 1970 population per 
square mile in the district, from U. S. Department of Commerce (1973, 
1974a, 1974b, 1974c). The Senate model used state population estimates 
for intercensus years (year of the vote). Since these estimates are not 
available for Congressional districts, a census year (1970) is used. 1970 
data probably give a better picture (than 1980 data) of population density 
in the years of the House votes (1975-1980) since the number of districts 
in a state for the votes in question was determined by 1970 population 
data. For example , where population growth has been rapid, use of 1 980 
data would overstate population density per district because the 1980 
population figures would yield more districts for that state. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to find 1980 population data per district 
(with the districts defined prior to the redistricting resulting from the 
1980 census). District population density is expressed in persons/ square 
mile. 
185 
B12 > 0 ... If a PV manufacturer is present , the more likely a pro vote. 8 
The predicted sign for the c oefficient of t e rm d epends on the 
relative strength of the three classes of factors we have hy pothesized 
affect PV voting: party and ideol ogy fact ors , consumpt i on f actors , a nd 
federal PV expenditure and manufacturer factors. The importance of each 
of these factors is predicted to depend on how close or far off one' s 
elect ion is. Party and ideology are predicted to be most import ant for 
those whose election is near. Voting in accord with one's party is most 
important the closer the election. Simil arl y with ideology--representing 
constituent ideology is most important for this same group of Senators.9 
Consumption factors work exactly the opposite- - the further off the 
election , the more likely a yes vote, for photovoltaics in particular ( and 
solar programs in general ) were viewed as having a medium to long - term 
payoff. Those with short time horizons for these benefits would favor 
other programs. Finally, federal expenditure and manufacturer factors are 
most important for those with elections upcoming. 
The predicted signs for the committee membership variables are 
8 Roessner (1982) cites the results of Assessment of Solar 
Photovoltaic Industry. Markets and Technolo~ies , Booz, Allen, and 
Hamil ton, September 30, 1978, which conducted a survey of industry 
executives regarding the federal program. A third found the program a 
positive influence on their business, on e half found it negativ e , with the 
remainder believing it had little effect . However, I still believe the 
sign should be positive. Most of the negative responses (pp. IV - 40 - 43) 
discuss the possibility of dropping out of the pro~ram. This presumably 
means no longer receiving government research funds or produc ing modules 
for government purchases--this is different than call ing for its 
termination. 
9 This is in contrast to the idea, noted briefly in Chapt er 2 , that 
ideological voting is "shirking," i. e ., voting one's own ideology rather 
than constituent interests . Under that interpre tation, i deology would be 
less important for those with e lections the closest . 
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derived from hypotheses concerning committee norms a nd committee 
membership. 10 These hypotheses suggest that appropriation subcommit tee , 
authorization committee, and authorization subcommittee members are often 
cross-pressured on floor vo tes to increase funding above the committee 
level. Committee norms are to support the committee level a nd hence vote 
against funding increases . However, the committee ass i gnment process 
works so that program supporters grav itate to those committees exercising 
jurisdiction over programs benefiting their districts . This would tend 
to lead committee members to support funding increases . 
The strength of the "support the committee" effect depends on 
several factors. The effect is presumably stronger on bills of the same 
type (authorization bills for authorization full and subcommittee member s, 
appropriation bills for appropriation subcommittee members). On bills of 
the opposite type, one might support one's own committee's position or 
support the other committee's position with the expectation that such 
deference would be reciprocated. 
The predicted sign for the appropriation subcommittee, authorization 
committee and authorization subcommittee dummy variables depends on the 
relative strengths of the committee norm and assignment effects. For 
these reasons, no prediction will be made for these three variables. 
Since the appropriations committee oversees all appropriations , the 
committee assignment process would not result in this committee being 
dominated by energy interests. Thus members of the appropriations 
committee should vote against funding increases in accord with the norm 
10 For appropriations committee norms, see Fenno (1966, 19 73) . For 
committee membership , see Shepsle (1978). 
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of supporting one's bill on the floor. Thus B4 is predicted to be 
negative. 
I NTERPRETATION AND CODING OF VOTES 
As indicated earlier, a vote by a Repre s entative or Senator that is 
considere d prophotovoltaic is coded as 1, whereas antiphotovoltaic votes 
are coded as 0. Pairs are coded as votes , whereas a bstentions and 
unpaired absences are treated as missing data.ll A ~ yes~ vote on the 
Anderson amendment or Brown amendment is considered ~antiphotovoltaic, ~ 
whereas yes votes on the rest of the votes are considered prophotovoltaic . 
Coding in this fashion is designed to produce the same pattern of signs 
of coefficients across all votes. 
The Anderson and Brown amendments were not isolated votes, but 
instead were part of the Anderson, Brown , and Jeffords series of votes on 
the solar portion of the FY 1977 authorization . The Jeffords amendment 
proposed to increase the authorization for solar electric, ocean thermal, 
and biomass technologies by a total of $116 million . The Brown amendment, 
a substitute amendment to the Jeffords amendment, redistribute d this $116 
million by giving half ($56 million)l2 to solar heating a nd cooling and 
half to those technologies that got the entire $116 million under t h e 
Jeffords amendment. The Anderson amendment to the Brown amendme nt 
11 In the analysis of Clinch River v oting , Cohen e mploy s a t wo-stage 
procedure in which one is interes t e d in why members abstain . Since the 
number a bstaining in the photovoltaic votes i s relatively small, I simply 
code abstentions as missing data, and only analyze those voting. 
1 2 Con~ressional Quarterly describes this as $58 mill ion to heating 
and cooling and $58 million for the other technologies. The tex t of the 
amendments a nd the ensuing discussion make clear t hat t he numbers are $56 
mill ion, with the other $4.2 million to go to program ma nage ment . 
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allocated money to the same technologies as the Jeffords amendment . but 
the total increase was only $58 million.l3 The sequence of votes was 
Anderson (rejected 188-207) , then Brown (adopted 265- 1 27) , a nd t hen 
J e ffords, as substituted for by Brown (adopted 321-68) . 
The effect of various combinations of vote outcome s is s hown i n 
Table 30 . If Jeffords is rejected , there is no increase for "solar 
electricity" (for simplicity in discussion of the se amendments , I wil l us e 
this term to refer to PV , solar thermal , ocean thermal, wind , and biomass) 
or heating and cooling, regardless of what happened earlier. Assuming 
Jeffords is accepted, the following outcomes result. The rejection of 
Brown would lead to a $112 million increase for solar electric and none 
for heating and cooling, regardless of whether Anderson was approved or 
rejected. If Brown is adopted, the decision on Anderson makes no 
difference in the solar electric increase ($56 million) but determines 
whether heating and c ooling gets a $56 million or zero increase. Thus 
Anderson is basically a vote on whether to eliminate the solar heating and 
cooling increase by reducing total funding; Brown is a vote on whether to 
provide a solar heating and cooling increase by redistributing the solar 
13 The conclusion that the $58 million goes entirely to non heating 
and cooling technologies is supported by three pieces of evidence. First, 
the 1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac description of the vote (p. 62-
H). Second , the text of the Anderson and Brown amendments (Congressional 
Record, May 19, 1976, pp. Hl4416 and 14420). The key section in the 
Anderson amendment is "Strike lines 5 and 6" which, by a process of 
elimination, one can deduce refers to in the Brown amendment "Page 3, line 
20, strike out '$78,900,000' and insert in lieu thereof '$314,900,000' . " 
This is a typo in the Congressional Record; the latter number should be 
$134,900,000 and represents the $56 million increase over the $78.9 
million provided for heating and cooling in the committee bill . Finally, 
the statement of the bill's sponsor in introducing the amendment, as well 
as the comment of Mr. Jeffords later in the debate, implies that funding 
is directed to the Jeffords technologies . CR, pp. Hl4420 and 14423. 
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Table 30 
Effects of Various Combinations of Anderson and Brown Adoption/Rejection 
Anderson Outcome Brown Outcome Funding Outcome 
Adopte d 56 Solar electri c 
0 Heating and cooling 
Adopted 
Rejected 112 Solar electric 
0 Heating and Cool ing 
Adopted 56 Solar electric 
56 Heating and cooling 
Rejected 
Rejected 112 Solar electric 
0 Heating and cooling 
Note: Table can be read as a vote tree from left to right. Funding 
outcomes are the increase over the committee level, in millions of 
dollars . "Solar electric" are the technologies provided for in the 
Anderson and Jeffords amendments , i.e., PV, solar thermal, ocean thermal , 
biomass, and wind. All outcomes shown assume Jeffords is adopted. If 
Jeffords is rejected, there is no increase for solar electric or heating 
and cooling above the committee level, no matter what the Anderson or 
Brown outcome is . 
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increase. 
How various groups would vote under straightforward and 
sophisticated voting is described in Table 31 for Anderson and Tabl e 32 
for Brown. Straightforward v oting in Anderson suggests that a "no" vote 
be coded the same as "yes " votes for the non-Anderson/Brown votes. 
(Although PV supporters per se have no preference, the other variabl e s 
affecting solar voting support this coding) . Similarly, straightforwa rd 
voting in Brown suggests that "no" votes be coded as prophotovoltaic. 
The rationale for sophisticated voting on Anderson or Brown is that 
the probability of adoption o f a proposal is affected by the adoption or 
rejection of amendments to that proposal. Thus the preceding analysis , 
which analyzed the effect of an amendment assuming that the proposal to 
which it was an amendment would be adopted, may not be a good guide as to 
whether voting for or against the amendment was pro- or antiphotovoltaic. 
The analysis is simplest for the Brown vote. Once Anderson is defeated , 
the choice in Brown is between a wider or narrower allocation of a 
constant amount of funds . Those who would prefer the narrow allocation 
(e.g., PV supporters) might vote for the broader allocation (a "logroll") 
if they t hought this increased the chances of approval of some increase, 
and v ice versa . The Anderson case is more c omplicated. Anderson narrows 
the coalition (thus endangering the increase) but provides for a smaller 
total increase (thus e nhancing the c hance of passage). To determine how 
to vote, one would have to determine the net effect of these two factors. 
Although sophisticated voting may, as a general rule , be rare due to 
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Table 31 
Straightforward and Sophisticated Vot ing on Ande rson Amendment 
Solar Supporters 
(as a group ) , 
High El ec tricity 
Price or Sunlight, 
Low ACA Score, or 
Low Density 
PV Supporte rs 






( eliminate s heating 




( smaller increase) 
Sophisticated 
Ye s ( if maintaining opt i on 
of $56 mill ion s olar 
increase enhances 
likelihood of passage 
of s o me solar i ncrea s e 
more than losses due to 
r esul t ing $0 increase 
for heating and cooling) 
o r 
No (if v ice versa) 
II 
(thereby increasing the 
likelihood of support for 
heating and cooling in 
future) 
Exact opposite of 
analy sis for solar 
supporters, et al. 
Note: Opponents in each category have exactly the oppos i te preferences as 
do supporters. "PV supporters" is meant to include solar electric, ocean 
thermal, wind energy, and biomass, but exclude solar heating and cooling. 
Analysis of sophisticated voting in table assumes smaller increases are 
more likely to pass than larger ones if both increases are directed toward 
the same group . 
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Table 32 
Straightforward and Sophisticated Voting on Brown Amendment 
(once Anderson is defeate d) 
Sola r Supporters 
(as a group) 
PV Supporters 
















Yes (provides a 
more balanced 
increase than Jeffords) 




Yes (preserves solar 
coaliti on) 
Ye s (preserves coal it i on ) 
No (redistribution 
amendments should be 
opposed) 
Yes (general solar 
increase more likely to 
pass than targeted one) 
No (increases likelihood 
of passage of Jeffords and 
thus of increase) 
Yes (increases likelihood 
of passage of Jeffords) 
Yes (increases likelihood 
of passage of Jeffords) 
Note : Opponents and PV supporters as in previous table. Analysis of 
sophisticated voting in table assumes increases for a ll solar technologies 
are more likely to pass than those which benefit only non heating and 
cooling technologies. Since the focus of this study is on PV, the 
straightforward assumption that sunlight, density, and liberalism do not 
distinguish among solar technologies is a working assumption which might 
be rejected by more complete analysis of PV r e lative to other solar 
technologies. 
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the difficulty of explaining the vote, 14 actual vote outcomes, if one 
assumes that members' preferences are reasonably well-known t o each o the r . 
may provide more specific evidence as to its likelihood in particular 
cases. Large majorities of passage or rejection of proposals later i n t he 
vote tree argue against sophisticated voting, since the alteration 
provided in the amendment is less l ikely to have de termined the outcome 
of the subsequent proposal. Thus adoption of Brown 265- 127 and Jeffords 
321-68 argues against sophisticated voting on Anderson and Brown. The 
case for Brown is more clear-- it seems unlikely that the heating and 
cooling portion of the coalition was so large that the 321-68 outcome 
would be reversed. Anderson was defeated, so its passage was clearly not 
necessary for the passage of Brown and Jeffords. If Anderson is adopted, 
then the question is whether the increase for solar electric to be voted 
on ultimately will be $56 million or $112 million (vote on Brown), and 
then whether this increase or none at all will be approved (Jeffords). 
We have just argued that the $112 million increase would have passed , so 
clearly the $56 million increase would have passed. So the only question 
is whether the increase would have been 56 or 112 had Anderson passed . 
Disgruntled heating and cooling supporters, combined with those that 
believed a $112 million i ncrease for solar electric was too large , might 
have limited the increase to $56 million. 
Two additional vote patterns also suggest straightforward voting on 
Anderson. Of the 68 who voted against Jeffords and who voted on Anderson 
14 Inferences about what a member supports are incorrect unless 
explained . Explanation is costly and perhaps not convincing, since the 
plausibility for the sophisticated vote depends on probabilities of 
acceptance of proposals which may be difficult for the target of the 
explanation to know . 
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a nd Brown, 65 voted for Anderson. This suggests either that they we re 
strongly opposed to money going to heating and cooling, or, mo re likel y . 
they voted yes on Anderson as a way to limit the solar increase to $56 
million (they then would have voted yes on Brown). Under ei ther 
interpretation, the Jeffords opponents are voting strai ghtforwardly on 
Anderson . Of the 131 voting against Brown and who voted on Anderson, 97 
(or 74 percent) voted against Anderson . Those who vote sincerely against 
Brown are solar electric advocates. Solar electric advocates Qer se have 
no preference on Anderson , and thus other factors , such as their general 
support for solar energy , should affect their voting. 
against figure is consistent with this interpretation. 
The 74 -percent-
Ignoring the previous arguments based on actual numerical vote 
outcomes, some of the sophisticated voting in the table is more likely 
than others. Heating and cooling supporters face a $56 million increase 
for heating and cooling with Brown and $0 with Jeffords. The only reason 
for a sophisticated vote against Brown would be on the principle that such 
redistributionist proposals endangered the future health of the coalition, 
since unamended Jeffords provides for $0 increase for heating and cooling. 
By contrast, a sophisticated vote of PV supporters in favor of Brown 
offers more immediate rewards by maintaining the coalition that would 
provide a $56 million increase for these technologies if Brown wins. 
Strategic voting to assure passage of a lower authorization is more 
plausible in the case of the Gravel amendment . Gravel proposed the 
largest percentage increase in authorizations that was ever offered as an 
amendment to a committee recommendation for solar energy. Proponents of 
the program would well have believ ed that such an amendment would defeat 
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the entire program , especially in its infancy ( 197 5). Or, proponents 
argued (and could have believed) that this amount was simply too large for 
the nascent program to digest, creating the prospect that the funds would 
be wasted and hence the political climate for the program in subsequent 
years would be undermined. At the very beginning of the rapidly growing 
program, the beneficiaries of a still further increase are likely to be 
unidentified as yet, so that little or no political costs associated with 
distributive losses are likely to be suffered from vot ing against such a 
large increase. For these reasons , the distributive effects of the Gravel 
amendment should be less than for the other votes. 
The Tsongas amendment is also unique. It proposed an increase in 
only the photovoltaics program, whereas the other votes dealt with a broad 
array of renewables programs. Also, most of the increase in the Tsongas 
amendment was for the purchase of PV systems , whereas other amendments 
primarily increased R&D money. Advocates of PV could well be conflicted 
on this vote as well . If votes are taken on each program separately, the 
solar coalition could unravel . Some PV proponents would have disliked the 
emphasis on procurement in the Tsongas amendment . At the same time, 
members with extensive photovoltaic expenditures or PV manufacturers in 
their constituencies (or in constituencies where non-grid-connected 
opportunities were important--see Chapter 3), may have been subjected to 
considerable pressure to enhance the PV program . 
Finally, the Fuqua amendment differs from the others in that it 
includes an appropriation for fusion research as well as solar . Hence, 
it would have a broader support constituency than proposals to support 
only solar , including conservatives who support nuclear power . In 
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addition, the fact that Fuqua was the Chairman of the Science and 
Technology Committee (the authorizing committee) , a sought- after 
committee,l5 would also broaden support for the amendment. 
REGRESSION RESULTS16 
The sign of all coefficients has the same interpretation across 
votes. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that increasing that 
variable increases (decreases) the probability of a prophotovoltaic vote . 
All of the equations are significant at the .0001 confidence level , 
using the likelihood ratio test . The test is defined by 
LRT 2 * [Log of Unconstrained maximum likelihood estimator 
minus Log of constrained maximum likelihood estimator] 
which is distributed chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of restrictions . The null-hypothesis (i.e . , that all coefficients 
are equal to zero) is rejected if the statistic exceeds a prescribed 
critical value_l7 This critical value increases with the number of 
variables and is approximately equal to 40.9 for 13 variables (the Senate 
equations). 
The regression results are reported in Table 33. Recall that no 
predictions were made regarding three committee membership variables--
15 Barone and Ujifusa (1982), pp. 215-216 , and Barone , Ujifusa , and 
Matthews (1979), p . 177 . 
16 All nume rical results were obtained with the Statistical Software 
Tools (SST) program developed by Jeffrey A. Dubin a nd R. Douglas Rivers. 
17 Amemiya (1981), p. 1498. 
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Table 33 
Regression Results with All Variables, Best Specification of Each 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Independent Vote 
Variable Calendar Year of Vote 
SENATE HOUSE 
Gravel Glenn Hart Rich . And . Brown Jeffords Tsongas Fuqua 
1975 1975 1976 1975 1976 1976 1976 1977 1980 
AUTH APP APP APP AUTH AUTH AUTH AUTH APP 
constant -11.6 -7 . 81 -33.5 - . 09 -.6 2 - 2 .39 1.15 2 .47 5.43 
(. 79) ( . 48) (2 . 38) ( . 07) ( . 47)(1.89) ( . 61) (2 . 06) (4 . 09) 
party .86 -1.50 - . 13 -1.81 -.72 .85 .32 -. 72 - 1. 38 
( 1. 02) (1.84) (. 19) (4.48) (1.88)(2.52) ( . 81) ( 1. 94) (3 . 03) 
term .12 .04 .40 ---------------------------------------
( . 67) ( . 19) (2 . 28) 
aca -4.01 -6.39 -4.61 - 5 .12 -5.46 -1. 23 -5.23 -3 . 91 -5. 26 
score (2.49) (3.87) (3.68) (7. 46) (7.99)(2.26) (6.21) (6.14) (5.91) 
app - . 50 - 3 . 11 - . 68 -1.10 -.36 - .42 -.12 -.89 -1.98 
dummy (.57) (2 . 56) (. 67) (2 . 77) ( . 89)(1.11) (.22) (2.36) (4.74) 
app sub -.69 1. 85 -.67 -8.02 - . 28 -.65 -. 02 - . 11 -.61 
dum (.57) (1.33) (.54) (.16) ( . 26) ( . 56) (.02) ( .13) (.51) 
auth .86 .99 -.81 .61 .29 - .94 -. 47 -.98 11.0 
dummy ( . 38) ( . 62) ( . 39) ( . 83) ( . 39)(1.17) ( . 60) ( 1. 55) (.14) 
auth sub -3.30 . 15 1.13 . 04 -.99 .10 -.37 .43 -8 . 25 
dummy (1. 32) (. 08) (.51) ( . 05) ( 1. 13) ( .10) ( . 36) ( . 56) ( . 11) 
elect. . 24 .17 .02 .12 . 21 .23 .17 . 16 . 10 
price (1. 51) ( 1. 18) (.15) (2 . 29) (3.50)(4.04) (1.88) (2 . 81) (1. 78) 
log of - . 60 -.32 - . 28 - . 09 . 14 -. 10 . 01 - . 11 - . 01 
pop . den. ( 1. 90) (1.18) ( 1.14) ( 1. 42) (1.95)(1.56) (. 06) (1.67) (. 20) 
insolation -. 72 4.12 1.77 1. 79 1.45 .70 1.13 - .47 -1.46 
(.51) (2.47) (1.39) (3. 26) (2 . 37)(1.27) (1.32) (. 87) (2 . 49) 
PV 4.37 - 2 .53 3 . 51 -. 24 -51.8 . 22 - .18 . 42 .25 
spending (1.11) ( 1. 12) ( 1. 83) ( . 42) ( . 26) (.73) ( . 78) (1.53) ( . 99) 
PV manuf. - 1 . 14 2 . 43 -. 77 .49 . 18 .66 -. 24 . 68 .64 
dummy ( 1. 26) (2.04) (.90) (.84) ( . 30)(1.30) ( . 24) ( 1.10) (. 88) 
LRT 52 . 0 45.8 47.0 130.4 175 . 0 89.4 297.8 114 . 4 179 .2 
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appropriation subcommittee, authorization, and authorizat i on 
subcommittee--due to the conflicting pressures of n orms to uphold the 
committee recommendation vs. the effects of program supporters being 
assigned to these committe es . Because subcommittee membership i mplie s 
full committee membership , the effect of being on the subcommittee, 
relative to not being on the full committee at all, is given by the sum 
of the coefficients on the full and subcommittee variables. 18 The effe ct 
of being on the subcommittee , relative to being on the full committee , i s 
given by the coefficient of the subcommittee variable alone . 
The results are clearest for the appropriation committee . In a l l 
nine votes, the effect of membership on this committee is to oppose 
funding increases over the committee level, and this effect is significant 
in four of the nine votes . 1 9 The effect of being on the appropriations 
subcommittee, in all cases except the Glenn amendment, is to increase t he 
likelihood of a no v ote over that resulting f rom membership on the full 
committee. However the t-statistic in each of the 8 instances is below 
1. 
The effect of membership on the authorization committee is mixed. 
18 The significance of this sum of coefficients can be tested by t he 
t-statistic for subcommittee membership in the following model: 
v = .. . + bl* (comm-subcomm) + (bl+b2 )*subcomm + . .. 
19 Appropriations committee members support Anderson and Brown. Both 
are consistent with straightforward voting. The former cuts the amount 
of the funding increase whereas the latter provides that the increase in 
Jeffords will be more consistent with the original committee balance among 
solar technologies than provided for in Jeffords. Sophisticated voting 
would oppose the Brown amendment because it increases the likelihood of 
passage of a funding increase. The s a me is true for Ande r s on if loss of 
heating and cooling support is more important than votes g ained by 
maintaining a $56 million increase option. 
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In 5 out of 9 cases, it is to increase funding, yet the only significant 
result, or nearly so, is the opposition to the Tsongas increase. The 
effect of authorization subcommittee membership is mixed and never 
significant. 
Because no theoretical prediction was made for three committee 
variables (appropriation subcommittee , authorization committee , and 
authorization subcommittee) due to the conflicting pressures on these 
committees, because of the weak results for these three variables, and 
because committee behavior is not the focus of this study, the remaining 
regressions in this chapter will be estimated without these three 
variables . 
The reestimated model results are shown in Table 34. The coding 
assumption of "no" votes on Anderson and Brown as prophotovol taic is 
supported by the fact that this assumption produces signs of the 
coefficients on ACA score , appropriations committee membership, 
electricity price, log of population density , and sunlight that are the 
same as for the other votes. The conclusion reached above that 
sophisticated voting is unlikely is supported by the fact that 
straightforward voting correctly predicts the sign of the coefficients on 
these five variables for both votes, except for the cases of liberals and 
members from low-density or high-sunlight areas , voting on Brown. 20 My 
analysis of straightforward considerations was that these three groups 
would have no preference based on the assumption that solar programs do 
not differ along these dimensions. Since the focus of this effort has 
20 It is true that the sophisticated prediction for Anderson for 
these variables is ambiguous. 
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Table 34 
Roll Call Regression Resul ts without I nsignificant Committee Variable s 
(t stat i stics in par entheses) 
Independent Vote 
Variable Calendar Year of Vote 
SENATE HOUSE 
Gravel Glenn Hart Rich. And. Brown Jeffords Tsongas Fuqua 
1975 1 975 1976 1975 1976 1976 1976 1977 1980 
AUTH APP APP APP AUTH AUTH AUTH AUTH APP 
constant -7 . 73 - 7.68 -33.5 -.19 - .52 -2.36 l. 24 2 .60 5 .05 
(.57) (.50) (2 . 40) ( .16) (. 40) ( 1. 89) (. 66) (2 . 18) (3. 99) 
party . 81 -1 . 60 .08 - 1.83 -. 73 -.84 .32 -.74 -1. 38 
(. 98) (2.00) ( . 11 ) (4.55)(1.92) (2.53) ( . 82) (2.01 ) (3.16) 
term .07 .OS . 40 ------ -- ------ ---- - -- -- - ----------- ---
(.39) ( . 26) (2 . 29) 
aca -3.43 -6. 20 -4.59 -5 . 14 -5.41 -1 .20 -5.11 -3.94 -5 .31 
score (2.23) (3.96) (3 . 67) (7.52)(7 . 98) (2.22) (6.17) (6 . 22) (6.17) 
app -.65 -1.93 -1.09 -1. 28 - .35 -. 41 -.04 -.83 -2. 24 
dummy ( 1. 02) (2 . 70) ( 1. 68) (3.33) (. 94) (1.13) (.09) (2 . 41) (5 . 66) 
elect. .30 .09 .04 .12 .20 .23 .17 .15 .12 
price (2 .12) (. 68) ( . 30) (2.36)(3 . 43) (3. 99) ( 1. 82) (2.67) (2.13) 
log of -.6 5 -.19 - . 31 -.09 - . 14 - . 09 . 01 -.11 -. 03 
pop . dens . ( 2 . 16 ) ( . 80) (1.31) ( 1. 44) ( 1. 90) ( 1. 44) (. 08) ( 1. 70) ( . 42) 
insolation - 1. 17 4. 20 1. 67 1. 89 1. 37 .63 1.01 -.52 -1 . 15 
( . 85) (2.62) (1.31) (3.47)(2.27) ( 1. 14) (1.21) (. 97) (2 . 06) 
PV 3 . 83 -2 . 18 3 . 33 -. 21 - . 05 - .20 - .17 .39 .27 
spending ( 1. 06) (1.13) ( 1. 82) (. 3 7) ( . 25) (. 69) ( . 76) (1.53) ( 1. 02) 
PV manuf. -.82 1. 87 - . 69 . 46 .21 . 70 -.28 . 66 .89 
dummy (1. 00) (1.75) ( . 81) ( . 79) (. 35) ( 1. 40) ( . 29) ( 1.10) (1.21) 
LRT 45.8 42 . 2 46 . 4 125 . 8 173 . 0 85.0 296 . 2 110 . 6 152.4 
nobs 93 83 95 419 402 399 388 406 405 
% Pro-PV 36.6 62 . 7 56.8 46.5 47 . 8 67 . 2 82.5 55.9 62.7 
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been on PV, a more thorough analysis of this assumption is beyond the 
scope of this study . In any event, the opposition of these three groups 
to Brown is exactly opposite of the support predicted by sophis ticated 
considerations (increases likelihood of passage of solar i ncrease). Thus, 
these cases too support the assumption of straightforward voting. 
Party and Ideology 
The regression results s upport the hy pothesis that ideology has a 
significant influence on photovoltaic support . 21 The predicted 
relationship for ideology ( conservatives vote anti-PV) is highly 
significant in all equations. It is least significant i n the Brown vote, 
which is consistent with the thesis a dvanc ed above t hat this amendment 
would split the solar coalition, and in the Gravel vote, which i s 
consistent with the idea t hat solar proponents would be divided on this 
vote due to the large inc r ease proposed. 
The results for party are contrary to t h e predict i on t hat Democrats 
are likely to vote pro-PV . In the Senate, party has no clear effect . I n 
the House , Republicans are more l ikely to support solar energy t han 
De mocrats, once one has controlled for ideology . One possible explanation 
for this is that t he votes which constitute t he ACA i ndex may be, on 
a verage, votes for which s upporting one's party position (or one 's 
President , if of the same party) may be more importan t t han t he solar 
votes under consideration. If this were the case, consider the e ffect on 
two Congressmen, on e of each party and of the same ideology ( s omehow 
21 Or, to paraphra se the Republican pres idential campaign s l ogan of 
1988, PV voting is "about ideology." 
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objectively measured). Suppose there is a conservative , Republ ican 
president (the argument is the same if there is a liberal. De moc r atic 
president). The Republican Congressman votes wi th his party on the 
important votes in the ACA index ; his resulting ACA score is higher than 
the Democratic congressman of equal ideological persuasion. When the 
Republican votes on an ideological issue like solar e nergy where party 
loyalty is less important, his biased ACA score lumps him with more 
conservative congressmen who are, based on ideology, more like ly to oppose 
solar energy. Controlling for ACA score (not ideology), the Republican 
is more likely to vote for solar energy. 
This hypothesis about the effects of including both ideology and 
party in roll call analyses should be tested in other roll call studies . 
This issue has often not arisen in studies to date because they have not 
included both variables. Of course the proper specification of ideology 
in a congressional vote equation is a controversial issue in the recent 
literature on congressional voting.22 
22 This issue is discussed in Chapter 2. One objection is that the 
significance of the ideology variable may only indicate the importance of 
variables not included in the voting regressions. Suppose that what 
really determined congressional voting behavior were the economic 
characteristics of districts and how bills affect these. Then the 
ideology measure constructed from voting behavior on a group of bills 
would reflect the economic characteristics of districts. Regressing solar 
energy votes on ACA scores and obtaining significance on the coefficient 
of ACA scores thus would not imply that solar energy votes were 
"ideological," in the usual sense of the term. 
The controversy is discussed in detail in Carson and Oppenheimer 
(1984), Kalt and Zupan (1984), and Peltzman (1984) . One approach is to 
attempt to remove the influence of these economic variables, either by 
regression analysis to yield a noneconomic residual ideology or by 
selection of votes which appear to be basically "ideological" and not 
economically determined . Another approach i s to try to include the 
relevant economic variables in the regression. If the i ncluded economic 
variables also influence the included ideology i ndex, the significance 
l evel of the economic variables may be understated and the hypothe ses 
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The results concerning ideology and party suggest that ideology, not 
party, was the basis of the reduction in t he program after the 1980 
election. 
Distributive Politics 
The regression r esults generally confirm the hy pothesis that 
photovol taic support is influenced by distributive politics , but t he 
results are more equivocal than for ideology . Furthermore, while both t he 
consumption and expenditure/ production components are positively related 
to support for photovoltaics, the consumption benefits seem to be more 
important. The c onsumption benefits of the program are represented in t he 
regressions by electricity price, sunlight, and population density . 
The electricity relationship is of the right sign in all votes, with 
significant coefficients in all but the Glenn and Hart votes . Sunl i ght , 
on the other hand , is about equally significant in the House and Senate 
votes. It has the wrong sign in three votes but only significantly so in 
the vote on the Fuqua amendment. Since half of the spending increase in 
this amendment was for nuclear power (the other votes pertain only to 
solar items), the wrong sign is not surprising. The Gravel and Tsongas 
votes (the other votes with incorrect signs) are also somewhat special , 
as discussed above . The lack of significance for sunlight in the Tsongas 
vote indicates that its explicit reward to PV may have split the 
"sunlight" coalition. The opposition of high sunlight areas to the Brown 
amendment (a vote to reallocate an increase for solar electric to all 
regarding the role of these economic variables are therefore tested in a 
conservative manner . 
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solar), suggests that the "sunlight coalition" preferred inc reases 
targeted to PV or solar electric over increases in a ll solar programs . 
The fact that the electricity and sunlight resul t s are gene r ally of 
the correct sign and significant suppo rts the hypothesis that PV was seen 
as a potential benefit. Because of the high c ost of PV at t he time, PV 
could have been viewed not as a potentia l benefit, but as a potential 
curse in which use of PV would be mandated despite the existence of lowe r 
cost alternative s and these costs would be borne by the areas forced to 
use PV. Such mandated use of uneconomic PV never became a s ubject f or 
serious debate within the program (the PURPA requirement that utilities 
buy power from alternative sources at avoided cost is not PV-specific a nd 
"avoided cost" might not be burdensome to utilities). In the absence of 
concrete proposals, it is difficult to predict the criteria for mandated 
use and thus what r egression coeffic ients might have different predictions 
t han previously argued . However, areas with high electricity price and 
sunlight might have been candidate s , and therefore it is significant that 
these areas supported, rather than opposed, PV. 
It is also important to note that since all but one of the votes 
pertain to all solar energy programs and not just PV, and solar programs 
such as heating and cooling substitute for other t ype s of energy as well 
as for electricity, other energy prices are potential explanatory 
variables. Energy prices are highly correlated, and when both electricity 
and residential natural-gas prices are included in a regression , the 
coefficients for electricity are far more significant . Only t he 
regressions with electricity prices only are reported here. 
The natural log of population density was included in the 
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regressions as an imperfect proxy for the extent of grid-connectedness. 
PV would be economic in non-grid- connected appl icati ons long before i t 
would be economic in grid-connected applications. Although the grid 
market was expected to eventually dominate, n ongrid applications could be 
judged as important by those who were less optimistic about the 
competitiveness of PV , who had high discount rates, or who were from areas 
that offered relatively more opportunities for nongrid applications. 
Variables to represent the first two of course are not available, but the 
extent of grid-connectedness would be negatively correlated with nongrid 
opportunities. Thus the predicted sign for the natural log of population 
density is negative.23 The results are of the right sign in all but the 
Jeffords amendment, where the significance level is very low (.08) , and 
have t-statistics in excess of 1.4 in six of the other eight. The almost-
significant result in the Tsongas vote is significant since a government 
procurement program , which was the essence of t he Tsongas vote, would have 
benefits primarily in nongrid applications, as explained in Chapter 3. 
The interpretation of the results for population density is clouded, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, by the fact that population density is also 
correlated with land prices. Thus the negative sign on population density 
could mean nothing about greater potential for nongrid applications in 
particular, but simply reflect greater potential for all types of PV due 
to lower land prices and h ence lower PV generation costs. However, as 
23 I initially used simply population density, with poor results. 
Upon further reflection, the log transformation made much better sense. 
In the House data, the population density varies from approximately .5 
persons per square mile to over 75,000 . Increases i n population density 
at low densities would be likely to have far more effect on grid-
connectedness than at high de nsities . 
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also discussed in Chapter 3, the low proportion of PV costs represent e d 
by land costs for central-station PV with no effect of land costs on 
residential rooftop PV, suggests the grid-connected interpretation may b e 
better. 
The importance of the distributive effects of PV expenditures and 
production receives weak support in the regressions . These expenditure 
benefits are represented by federal PV expenditures whereas the production 
benefit i s represented by a PV manufacture dummy variable. The 
correlation between these two is .41 for Gravel and Glenn, . 59 for Hart, 
.35 for Richmond, . 13 for AndersonjBrownj Jeffords, . 29 for Tsongas , and 
. 21 for Fuqua. 24 The spending variable has the incorrect sign (negativ e) 
in 5 of the 9 votes and PV manufacture the wrong sign (negative) in t h ree 
votes. However, the positive signs are more significant than the negative 
signs for both variables, particularly PV manufacturer , with t-statistics 
often exceeding unity. 
The results for the Tsongas and Fuqua votes are especially 
interesting. These are the only two votes with correct signs for both 
variables. Furthermore, all four t-statistics exceed unity . Tsongas, 
the single vote that most clearly dealt exclusively with PV interests , has 
the second highest t-value for PV spending of any vote . Tsongas and Fuqua 
24 A comparison of the annual program summaries with the list of PV 
manufacturers suggests that the portion of federal PV expenditures that 
went to PV manufacturers is small. This is corroborated by the complaints 
of PV manufacturers that they were not receiving more of the funding. The 
correlation between PV expenditures and manufacture is therefore probably 
partially due to collocation . Due to the infant state of the industry, 
PV manufacturers were similar to research firms and thus would need 
somewhat similar skills. Collocation would also facilitate access to 
technology -specific human capital (e .g., hiring of employees of the other 
firms) . The correlation is of course higher when FY76-83 spending is used 
instead of the yearly figures. 
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are also the last two votes , and t hus the geographical pat te rn of PV 
expenditures and PV manufacture might have been clearer at thi s point t han 
in earlier votes_ 25 On the o t her h a nd, t he sign ificance l evels f or PV 
manufacture are lower in Tsongas t han in Gl e nn , Brown , a nd Fuqua. 
Although the greater significance of the Fuqua result may be a r e sul t o f 
when PV manufacture is measured , the greate r s i gnifican ce l evels i n t he 
Glenn and Brown vote is surprising , since a fede ral procurement progr a m 
(the distinctive aspect of the Tsonga s vote ) provides much larger bene fits 
per dollar of expenditure to current manuf acture rs than a research and 
development program does. 
There are two reasons why the results on expenditures and production 
are perhaps the most that could b e expected . First , the program is 
relatively small , and thus othe r effects might be more important . Second, 
the data used had several problems. The spending variable represents an 
estimate of PV spending whereas all but the Tsongas v ote conc ern other 
solar programs as well _2 6 Photov oltaics and solar expenditures by state 
or district are probably positively correlated, but PV spending probably 
has lower significance levels than solar spending would. Finally , the PV 
manufacturer data only refer to a single point in time and do not 
distinguish between large and small manufacturers or take account of 
25 An additional reason for bet ter performance of t he PV manuf acture 
variable in the later votes is that these votes are closest to the time 
(1980) when the PV manufacture data were compiled. 
26 No e stimates of district solar funding are available in convenient 
form . I do not know whether a "bottoms up" approach to collect this 
information for each of the other solar programs , such as was used for 
photovoltaics, is possible. However , if such data were available in the 
form available for PV, it would require sev eral man-months of effort to 
collect. 
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several manufacturers being present in the same area. 
There is also weak evidence that distributive effects of PV 
expenditures or PV manufacture are more likely to lead to pro-photovolta ic 
votes for Republicans than for Democrats, which is the opposite of the 
effect found by Cohen for government expenditures in the Clinch River 
study. Table 35 shows that the coefficient of the spending variable for 
Republicans is greater than for Democrats in all but the Anderson vote, 
although the difference in coefficients is significant onl y in the 
Richmond and Brown vote . The coefficient of the PV manufacture variable 
is greater for Republicans than for Democrats in all but the Gravel, 
Anderson, and Jeffords vote , although the difference in coefficients is 
never significant . The latter three votes are special in different ways: 
Gravel because of the large increase proposed , and Anderson and Jeffords 
as the only amendments of the nine proposed by Republicans. 
Instead of focusing just on whether the responsiveness to PV spending 
and manufacture differ by party, one can d etermine whether all 
coefficients are stable across party lines. Table 36 shows that in some 
cases, notably Richmond, Brown, and Anderson, there do seem to be 
different effects for all variables as a whole across party lines. 
The distributive politics hypothesis receives a different kind of 
test from the coefficients on when the terms of Senators end. Our 
hypothesis suggests that party and ideology factors and expendi turej 
manufacture factors lead to a negative coefficient on term whereas 
consumption factors cause a positive one. The results presented to date 
suggest that party/ideology and consumption factors are the most 
important , so the likely effect on the coefficient of term is unclear . 
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Table 35 
Differences in Responsiveness to PV Spending and PV Manufacture by Party 
Restricted Unrestricted 
PV Spending PV Manu . PV Spending PV Manu. 
Gravel l. 83 -.25 5.23 - 1. 35 
(. 46) (. 20) ( . 80) ( . 68 ) 
Glenn 5. 7l 4.50 l.ll 4 .16 
( 1. 00) (1.17) ( . 18) ( 1. 10) 
Hart 2.30 .74 2 .24 . 05 
(. 88) (.56) ( . 66) (. 03) 
Richmond 4 . 23 1.45 4 . 04 .38 
(2.81) ( l. 28) (2.48) ( . 30) 
Anderson -46 . 4 -.35 - . 01 - . 35 
(. 07) ( . 31) (.01) ( . 31) 
Brown 2.33 . 95 2.23 .46 
( l. 84) ( . 99) (l. 74) (. 46 ) 
Jeffords 69.4 -7 . 22 . 15 -7.25 
(. 03) ( .13) (. 07) ( .13) 
Tsongas .13 .38 .07 .34 
(. 20) (. 32) ( .12) (. 27) 
Fuqua .88 .97 .78 .59 
( l. 24) (. 6 7) ( l. 06) (. 39) 
Note : The "restricted" results assume that there are no party effects on 
the other variables . Thus the entries under "restricted" for PV spending 
a s sume that there is no party effect on PV manufacture . The 
"unrestric ted" assume there are no party effects on variables other than 
PV spending and manufacture. For example, for PV spending , the former is 
the negative of the coefficient of (part y*PV spending ) in the estimation 
(p denotes party) 
V = . . . + (bl-b2 ) (p*PVsp) + b2*PVsp , and the latter is the n egati ve of 
the coefficient of (p*PVsp) in the estimation 
V = . .. + (bl-b2) (p*PVsp) + b2*PVsp + (b3 - b4)(p*PVman) + b4*PVman 
where neither has p as a separate variable. 
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Table 36 
Stability of Coefficients (Equation Taken a s a Whole) Across Party Lines 
Republican Democrat Sum Combine d Sign. Leve l 
Gravel Failed -29.8 NA -42.1 NA 
Glenn -13.6 -19.7 -33. 3 -38.7 42. 0 
Hart -10.7 -25.5 -36 . 2 -42.6 65 . 6 
Richmond -79.8 -143.3 -223.1 -239.5 99 .9 
Anderson -63 . 5 -125. 5 -189 . 0 - 1 94.0 47.0 
Brown -84.8 -142.2 -227.0 - 237 . 5 98.6 
Jeffords -75.8 -42. 2 -118.0 -121.1 See below 
Tsongas -78.1 -145 . 4 -223 . 5 -228.1 34.8 
Fuqua -77 . 0 -125.1 - 202 .1 - 210.0 90.9 
Note: Republican and Democrat columns are the log likelihood at 
convergence of each equation estimated separately (without party as a 
variable) for Republicans and Democrats. The sum column is the sum of 
these two . The combined column is the log likelihood at convergence of 
the equation estimated without party for the combined data set. The 
significance column lists the significance levels at which the Republican 
coefficient is different than (two-tailed test) the Democratic coefficient 
in the equation taken as a whole. This is determined by the likelihood 
ratio test with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables 
(including the constant) on the RHS . The unrestricted is shown in the 
"sum" column, the unrestricted in the "combined" column . In the Jeffords 
vote, the significance level for the 1-tailed test is 37 . 5%. 
With respect to the failure of the Gravel estimation for Republicans, Doug 
Rivers argued this is because the number of RHS variables (eight) exceeds 
the number of observations for one of the alternatives of the dependent 
variable (seven, since the Republican vote on this amendment was 7 yea, 
29 against) leading to perfect discrimination of the dependent variable. 
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In all three Senate votes (House votes are obviousl y no t appr opr i ate 
here), the further off one's e lect i on , the more likely one is to vote for 
PV . This positive relationship is significant in only one equation 
however. 
The positive coefficient on term suggests that the e c on omi c benefi t s 
of PV played a l a rger role in PV voting than ideology or expendi ture/ 
manufacture considerations. However, t his conclusion depends on 
assumptions regarding how the importance of various factors would vary by 
term. To test these assumptions directly, on e can estimate each vote with 
the observations segmented by term . The results are presented in Tables 
37-39. The party and ideology results strongly support the notion t hat 
these are most salient to those whose election is closest--the 
coefficients are more negative, the closer the election. This is t he 
predicted relationship for ideology27 and this patte rn is consistent with 
2 7 Kalt and Zupan (1984 ) found that the proportion of Senators voting 
against their ideology was largest for those nearing election, and 
concluded that ideological vo ting, "shirking," was l e ss prevalent for this 
group. Although the Kalt and Zupan methodology is not entirely clear, my 
attempt to replicate it for PV finds no difference between Senators with 
elections closest and all other Senators . Using the regression model from 
Table 34 (without the insignificant committee variables), I examined those 
cases in which the regression mode l predicted the incorrect vote. For 
each Senate vote, I determined how all Senators would vote if voting 
strictly based on ideology ( e.g. , i f 40 percent of Senators voted for an 
amendment, I assumed that the 40 percent of those voting with the highest 
ACA scores would vote for the amendment). Summing across the three vote s, 











of which Voted against ACA 
8 
11 
Thus there is no significant difference between these groups. There is 
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Table 37 
Coefficients of Party and Ideology, Sampl e Segmented by Term 
Near Future Medium Future Furthest Off 
Party 
Gravel - .69 Fail ed 2.26 
( . 32) (1.10) 
Gl enn -9 .01 2. 4 7 - .25 
(1. 72) (. 99) ( . 10) 
Hart -. 41 . 72 1.42 
( . 24) (. 23) ( 1. 03) 
Ideology 
Gravel -6.75 Failed 2.47 
( 1. 46) ( . 81 ) 
Glenn -16 .2 -3.89 -6 .84 
( 1. 68) ( 1. 38) ( 1. 44) 
Hart -3.54 -10.5 .47 
(1 .32) ( 1. 59) ( . 20) 
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Table 38 
Coefficients of Consumption Factors, Sample Segmented by Term 
Near Future Medium Future Furthest Off 
Electricity 
Gravel .10 Failed . 62 
( 0 38) ( 1. 59) 
Glenn - 0 01 .25 - 0 49 
(.OS) ( 0 45) ( 0 8 3) 
Hart -.02 -.51 . 36 
(.OS) ( 0 66) (1.19) 
Sunlight 
Gravel 3.64 Failed -7 . 04 
(1.11) (1.67) 
Glenn 14.9 10.1 3 . 16 
( 1. 40) ( 1. 50) ( 0 69) 
Hart -1.82 - 0 41 -.83 
( 0 58) (.OS) ( 0 28) 
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Table 39 
Coefficient s of Expendi ture/Manufacture , Sample Segmented by Term 
Near Future Medium Future Furthest Off 
PV Expend . 
Gravel 2. 77 Failed 22.5 
( 1. 43) (1. 72) 
Gl enn -9 .36 42 . 7 408 
(. 78) (1.47) (.20) 
Hart 6.84 27.2 30.0 
(1.87) ( 1. 24) ( 1. 09) 
PV Manu. 
Gravel -1.41 Failed 1.02 
(.90) (. 69) 
Gl enn 2.09 7. 43 53.0 
(. 99) ( . 11) ( . 15) 
Hart -4.01 2 . 41 8. 73 
(1. 72) (. 68) ( . 17) 
215 
the ex post theory set forth above concerning why Republicans support 
solar energy if one has controlled for ACA score_28 Electricity price 
works as predicted (it matters most to those whose election is furthes t 
off) but sunlight works in the opposite fashion. 29 Finally, expenditure 
and manufacture work opposite to predictions, being most important f or 
those with elections furthest off . 
The appropriate interpretation of the positive coefficient of term 
is therefore unclear . Actually, the expenditure and manufacture results 
make sense in a way. The Senate votes were taken at the outset of the 
program (1975-1976) , when spending was beginning to grow extremely 
rapidly. Because this pattern was likely to continue , those with 
elections the furthest off could expect expenditure and manufacture much 
larger (measured either as an average yearly amount or heavily weighted 
toward right before the election) than had been experienced with those 
however, a significant difference if one segments the "not up for 
reelection" group into those up for reelection in 1979 and 1981. Errors 
are 11 and 25 respectively, but voting against ideology are 2 and 9. Thus 
the nearest and furthest group behave similarly, with the middle group 
behaving differently. 
Thus, although the Kalt and Zupan methodology applied to PV does not 
find a difference in the two groups, it does if there are three groups. 
In any case, the methodology used in the text measures whether ideology 
is more significant in one group or another. What exactly is measure d by 
the Kalt and Zupan methodology is less clear. 
28 The distorting effect of party loyalty on ACA score would be 
greatest for Senators whose election is upcoming. 
29 The other consumption factor, population density , generally 
becomes stronger in the predicted direction (for the variable in the 
unsegmented regressions) the further off the e lection, following the 
prediction for consumption factors in general. However, no prediction had 
been made regarding the effect of term of this variable, because although 
the immediate benefits of PV would b e concentrated in nongrid (low-
density) applications , how immediate and h ence how these would be v i e wed 
by senators of different terms is unclear . 
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facing reelection in 1976 . If one accepts this ex post reasoning, one is 
left with distributive politics factors collectively (with the exception 
of sunlight) being more important than party/ideology factors. However , 
the results for the term coefficients are also consistent with the 
hypothesis that Senators are voting based on economic benefits to the 
nation as a whole, rather than their state . 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
The specification above of two variables--electricity price and PV 
spending, as well as the separate specification of electricity price and 
insolation as opposed to a combined benefits variable--is controversial 
on theoretical grounds. In this section, I examine the performance of 
alternative specifications in these areas. 
Electricity Price 
In earlier stages of this research, I had used electricity price in 
all regressions. It was one of the most significant explanatory 
variables . Upon further reflection, it seemed that per capita electricity 
expenditures was a better variable, or better still, per capita 
electricity expenditures as a percent of personal income. The rationale 
for these revisions was that, although areas where the per unit cost of 
electricity was high might benefit more by the development of a less 
costly alternative and therefore would support PV, the total cost of 
electricity or this total as a percent of total income would more 
accurately reflect the stake of these areas in the development of PV. 
The results with per capita electricity expenditures, electricity 
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expenditures as a percent of state personal income, and electricity price 
are reported in Table 40. These results indicate that price far 
outperforms expenditure or expenditure as a percent of income. The 
average significance level is highest for electricity price ( 2.17), 
followed by PCEE as a percent of per capita personal income ( 1. 16), 
followed by PCEE (. 98). As suggested above, the predicted sign is 
positive for all three variables. Five out of nine signs for PCEE, and 
six out of nine for PCEE as a percent of per capita personal income, are 
however negative, compared with positive signs for all nine for 
electricity price, with especially strong results in the House votes. 
One potential problem with the rationale for using expenditure, 
rather than price, is the interaction of two facts: (1) PV is likely to 
be a relatively high-cost source of power and (2) low prices increase 
consumption. Areas where power is relatively cheap are likely to consume 
relatively large amounts,30 and thus expenditures may be moderate rather 
than low. Yet these areas might have little interest in PV since it would 
not likely displace their cheap power. To investigate this possibility, 
I ran the regressions with expenditures as a percent of personal income 
but excluded the observations with the lowest 20 percent in electricity 
price. The results, also shown in Table 40, are not on the whole better 
than the results with all observations included. 
The results above indicate that the state average electricity price 
in the year of the vote outperforms state per capita electricity 
expenditure in the year of the vote or state electricity expenditure as 
30 The c orrelation between elec tricity consumption and price is -.71 
in 75 and - . 73 in 76 for the Senate votes, and in the House is -.79 for 
75, - . 82 in 76, -.83 in 1977 , and -.84 in 1980. 
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Table 40 
Coefficient of Electricity Expenditure and Pric e Variables 
(PCEE denotes state Per Capita Elec tricity Expenditure) 
Vote PCEE PCEE/ State PI Electricity Price PCEE/ Stat e PI<Exclu ) 
Grave l 9.64 -9 . 11 .30 - 27. 2 
( 1. 08 ) ( . 23 ) (2 .1 2) (.53) 
Glenn -5.07 - 58 . 1 .09 - 63 . 4 
( . 60) (1. 55 ) (. 68) ( 1. 23 ) 
Hart 1.03 - 6. 85 . 04 80 . 9 
( . 17) (. 21) ( . 30) ( 1.58 ) 
Richmond 5 . 31 10 . 0 .12 15. 4 
( 1. 46) ( . 61) (2 . 36) ( . 71 ) 
Anderson -5.11 2 .95 .20 10 .2 
(1.36) ( . 17) (3.43) (. 43) 
Brown -.25 -25 . 6 . 23 -45.6 
(. 08) (1.57) (3.99) (2.04 ) 
Jeffords 8.90 46.3 .17 18.0 
( 1. 90) ( 2 .14) ( 1. 82) ( . 64) 
Tsongas .39 - 20.9 . 15 -19.1 
( . 14 ) (1.51) (2 . 67) (. 99) 
Fuqua -4.10 - 31.6 . 12 -39.4 
( 2. 07) (2 . 48) (2. 13) ( 2 . 10 ) 
Average .98 1.16 2 .17 1.14 
T-stat. 
Note : Four sets of regressions were run with other model variables as 
specified in the text. In each set of regressions, one electricity 
variable was used: (1) state per capita electricity expenditures 
(thousands of current dollars) in year of vote, ( 2 ) state per capita 
electricity expenditures as a percent of state personal income, both in 
year of vote, expressed as a fraction, (3) average electricity price in 
year of vote (dollars per million BTU), and (4) state per capita 
electricity expenditures as a percent of state personal income, excluding 
20 percent of the 100 Senators and 435 Representatives (those with the 
lowest electricity price). 
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a percent of state personal income in the year of the vote . Howeve r , a s 
noted in Chapter 3 , there are several other specifications which merit 
investigation : 
-average residential price , the year of vote 
-projected 1985 average price for r e gion 
-projected 1985 marginal pric e for region 
- average price year of vote and percent change from 2 years earl i e r 
-average residential price and percent change f rom 2 years earlier 
Table 41 reports the t-statistics of the electricity price coefficient for 
the first three of the above, along with those for average electr i c i t y 
price in the year of the vote. Each model is estimated in unnested f o rm, 
i . e . , exactly one electricity price variable, due to the high collinearity 
between the alternative specifications. 31 The results indicate that 
current average price slightly outperforms the 1985 marginal price, with 
current residential and 1985 average trailing further behind . The 1985 
prices are only availabl e on a r egional basis and this probably hurts 
their performance somewhat. The ordering using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (Table 42) is the same . 32 
31 Correlations depend on which vote year is being used and whether 
the vote is Senate or House. The correlations are presented below: 
-average and residential electricity price is .97 
-average and 1985 average is .70- . 71 in the Senate and .81-.85 in the 
House 
-average and 1985 marginal is .6 9 - .72 in the Senate and .76- . 79 in the 
House 
-residential and 1985 average is . 75- . 77 in Senate and .85- . 87 in House 
-residential and 1985 marginal is .70-.71 in Senate and .72-.75 in House 
-1985 average and 1985 marginal is .74 in Senate and .71 in House 
32 This procedure is recommended in Amemiya (1981) for this problem. 
However, with the models differing only in the one variable, this 
procedure is almost certainly equivalent to choosing the model with the 
largest t-statistic for each equation (whether this equival ence carries 
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Table 41 
T Statistics for Alternative Specifications of Electricity Variable 
Average 1985 Marginal Residential 1 985 Average 
Gravel 2.12 1.44 2 . 13 2. 21 
Glenn .68 . 40 .91 1.1 7 ( - ) 
Hart . 30 1.16 .65 .43 
Richmond 2.36 1. 53 2 . 21 1. 60 
Anderson 3.43 3.30 3 .07 2 . 68 
Brown 3.99 3.33 3. 77 2.53 
Jeffords 1. 82 2. 77 1. 55 1. 85 
Tsongas 2 .67 2.07 2.41 2.50 
Fuqua 2.13 2.63 1.46 1. 46 
Average 2. 17 2.08 2 . 0 2 1 . 83 
t - statist i c 
Note: A minus sign after the t-stat istic indicates that sign of 
coefficient is negative. Models a r e estimated in unnested form, i.e ., 
exactly on e electricity price var i able per model. Electricity price 
variables are (1) average e l ectricity price , year of vote, in state, (2) 
1985 marginal price i n region, (3) average residential electricity price, 
year of vote, in state , and (4) 1985 average price in state. 
221 
Table 42 
Alternative Specifications of Electricity Variable 
(Using Akaike Information Criterion) 
Avera~e 1985 Marginal Residential 1985 Average 
Gravel 41.6 43.1 41.5 41.2 
Glenn 36.4 36 . 6 36.2 35.9 ( - ) 
Hart 42.6 41.9 42.4 42.6 
Riclunond 227.5 229 . 2 227. 9 229.1 
Anderson 192. 1 192 . 6 193.4 194.6 
Brown 234.1 237.1 235. 1 239. 4 
Jeffords 120 . 7 118.2 121.2 120 . 8 
Tsongas 226.1 227.5 226. 7 226.5 
Fuqua 204.5 203.2 205 . 8 205 . 8 
Average 147.3 147.7 147 . 8 148.4 
Not e: Th e Akaike Information Criterion= -unconstrained log likel ihood+ 
K where K is the number of parameters to be estimated. One chooses the 
model for which the AIC is the smallest. See Amemiya (1981). Since the 
number of variables is the same in each specification and the log 
likel ihood is negative, this is equivalent to choosing the model with the 
smallest (in absolute value) unconstrained log likel ihood. The latter 
are the numbers s hown in the table . A minus sign after the log likelihood 
indicates that the sign of the coefficient is negative. 
222 
Table 43 presents the results of whether price change ( ratio of 
current a v erage price to average price two years earlier) s hould be 
included with average e l e ctricity price. One would predict e i t her t hat 
t he coeffici ents would have no particular s i gn if onl y the current price 
level matters or that the sign would be positive, with more rapid pri ce 
increases expected to inc rease support for alternatives suc h as PV. The 
coefficient is negative in five of the nine. Only two of t he nine vo t es 
have coefficients with t-statistics in excess of unity, and these t wo are 
of diffe rent sign . Thus Congressmen do not seem to be voting based on 
the increase in the average electricity price. 
The c hange in residential price s fares little bette r. Table 44 
shows that while the significance level of the coefficient on price c hange 
exceeds unity in two votes , both of which have the predicted positive 
sign, the coefficient is negative on six of the nine votes. 
Photovoltaic Spending 
The spending variable used in the estimations above is the estimated 
federal photovoltaic expenditures to the district or state during the 
fiscal year of the authorization or appropriation being voted on , in real 
terms and discounted at 10 percent to FY76 dollars. Earlier in the 
research , estimated photovoltaic spending in the district/state over a 
longer period, FY 76-83 , was used for three reasons. First, logrolling 
and information cost considerations suggest that representatives might 
vote according to the total effect of the program on their district over 
through to averages over several votes is not clear). Henceforth I shall 












Coefficient of Change in Average Electricity Price 
(price year of vote divided by price t wo years earlier) 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Chan~e in Price Electricity Price Correlation 
1.03 .28 . 58 
( . 32) (1. 85) 
-2.44 . 13 . 58 
( . 80) (.92) 
- 1 . 33 .04 -. 18 
( . 37) (.30) 
. 53 . 10 .59 
( . 44) (1.75) 
- 4.27 .17 -. 40 
(2. 11 ) (2.90) 
-1.11 . 22 -. 40 
(.58) (3 . 67) 
3.09 .19 - . 40 
(1.25) (2.05) 
.25 . 15 -.30 
( . 13) (2.65) 
-1.48 . 13 .41 
( . 74) (2 . 27) 
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Table 44 
Coefficient of Change i n Average Residential Electricity Price 
(price year of vote divided by price two years earlier) 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Change in Price Electricity Price Correlation 
Gr avel 2.74 .26 .60 
( 0 74) ( 1. 54) 
Glenn -2.34 . 16 .60 
( 0 67) ( 1. 09) 
Hart -1.26 .10 -.10 
( 0 37) ( 0 69) 
Richmond 2.01 .06 .58 
( 1. 46) ( 0 99) 
Anderson -1.77 .17 -.36 
( 0 87) (2.85) 
Brown -1.18 . 21 -. 36 
( 0 61) (3 . 53) 
Jeffords 6 . 67 . 19 - .36 
(2.51) ( 2 0 07) 
Tsongas - .79 . 13 -.33 
( 0 3 7) (2 . 35) 
Fuqua - . 69 . 08 . 47 
( 0 33) ( 1. 45) 
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time, rather than the specific increments to the program provided for in 
the amendment or in that year's authorization. Second, estimates of t he 
spending in a particular district/ state for a given year a re l e ss reliable 
than the estimates over an eight- year period because of the way the 
spending file was constructed . Third, due to the inadequacies of the 
source material, the year-by-year estimates are poorest at the outset of 
the 76-83 period, which is when practically all t he votes occurred. The 
results of vote year spending vs. FY 76-83 spending are compared in Table 
45. Although the results are very similar, vote year spending slightly 
outperforms FY 76-83 spending . 
To test the theory of retrospective voting, total program spending 
was divided into past, current , and future spending. Reelection 
considerations suggest that past spending should be irrelevant,33 present 
spending the most important, 34 and future spending discounted more than 
it would be on economic grounds alone.35 To test this theory, I shall 
33 Past spending is that which was determined by votes before the 
last time the member was elected. The coefficient on this should be zero , 
since voters would have already used that information in deciding how to 
vote in the last election. 
34 Present expenditures are those that are determined in the time 
period between the last election and the next e l e ction for the member in 
question. 
35 Future funding is that which is determined after the next election 
for this member . The coefficient on future expenditures should be smaller 
than the coefficient on current expenditures due to this higher political 
discount rate. Thus since 
bl*current + b2*future is equal to 
(bl - b2)*current + b2*(current + future) 
the h y pothe sis that bl > b2 is teste d by a 1-tai l e d t - t es t on the 
coefficient of current in the second line. 
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Table 45 
Significance of Year of Vote Spending vs. FY 76-83 Spending 




















- . 21 
( . 3 7) 









( 1. 02) 
4 
all votes .96 
Average t-stat. 1.36 
wj correct sign 
Average t-stat . 
House,wj carr . sign 1 . 28 
Vote FY 76 - 83 
- 75 . 3 
( . 79) 
-144 
( . 92 ) 
82.5 
(. 68) 
39 . 0 
( 1. 1 5 ) 
-4 . 54 
(. 12 ) 
-47 . 8 
( . 96) 
-42.6 
( . 93) 
51.3 
( 1. 42) 
42.6 





Note: Models estimated in unnested form with one spending variable due to 
high correlation between year of vote spending and FY 76-83 spending : . 54-
. 61 in Senate and .76-.93 in House. FY 76-83 spending for Senate votes 
in thousands of FY 1976 dollars per capita , discounted at 10 percent; for 
House, in millions of FY 1976 dollars, discounted at 10 percent. 
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use the actual spending figures for these years rather t han e x pec ted 
expenditures, which are unobservable. The model t hus assume s perfect 
foresight--alternatively, one could use a model of adaptive expectat ions 
(suggested to me by Jeff Dubin) where the expected expenditures are a 
function of past and current expenditures . Although this more 
sophisticated method might be preferred on theoretical grounds, e ven t he 
simplest approach founders on the high degree of correlation among past, 
present, and future funding, as we shall see below. 
Note that the definition of past, present , and future spending 
implies that how spending is classified will vary among Senators f o r a 
given vote . Current expenditures are those that are determined (voted on) 
in the 6 -year period between their elections , with past and future 
spending defined accordingly. Since their terms differ, the definitions 
of these spending categories differ . All House members will consider 
current expenditures as those that are determined in the 2-year period 
between Congressional elections_36 
The precise definitions are shown in Table 46. To illustr ate, the 
Tsongas vote in September 1977 was a vote on the FY 1978 authorization. 
The last election was November 1976, at which point the FY 1977 
authorization/appropriation would have been approved (19 76 was an election 
year and hence Congress would be adjourned). Thus FY 76-77 is considere d 
past, FY 78-79 is considered present (since FY 1979 will generally b e 
36 Special elections are 
reelection are assumed to vote 
party 's candidate . 
i gnored . 
as if they 
Membe rs not standing for 
were, so as to help t h e ir 
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Table 46 
Definitions of Past, Present, and Future Spending for Different Votes 
(fiscal years) 
Past Present Future 
Vote and 
Date of Vote 
Gravel na 76-77 78-83 for terms ending 1/77 
7j3lj75 76-78 79-83 for terms ending l j79 
76-80 81-83 for terms ending 1/81 
Glenn 
12/75 Same as Gravel 
Hart Same as Gravel 
6j76 
Richmond na 76-77 78-83 
6j75 
Anderson 
Brown Same as Richmond 
Jeffords 
5j 76 
Tsongas 76-77 78-79 80-83 
9!77 
Fuqua 76-79 80-81 82-83 
6j80 
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determined prior to November 1978), and FY 80-83 is considered future.37 
The results are shown in Tabl e 47, with three estimations for eac h 
Senate vote, each defined by the set of Senators with a common term . For 
every vote, the sign of present spe nding is opposite t o that for future 
spending. I do not believe that one should try to interpret the se signs 
in the normal manner, e.g . , a negative sign on present spending indicating 
spending increases makes voting pro-PV less likely, etc. Instead , I think 
the pattern of opposite signs is purely a statistical artifact of the high 
correlation between these variables ( . 74-92 in the Senate votes depending 
on the group of Senators, and in the House, .73-.78 between present and 
future, .72-.82 between past and present, and .61- . 64 between past a nd 
future, for the years d e fined by the House votes). For example, t he 
reason that the past and future variables have the same sign in the two 
votes with three spending variables is probably because the correlation 
is lowest between these two. 
To produce more reliable estimates, a procedure whereby one uses 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to eliminate the collinearity between past, 
present, and future spending before e stimating the regression, was also 
37 How this procedure is implemented with respect to the Fuqua vote 
is somewhat arbitrary. For all votes, I have used a 1981 funding level 
of 139.2 million. This is the final figure reflecting cuts made in 1981 
after the 1980 e lection. I have classified 1980-81 funding as "prese nt" 
for the Fuqua v ote since the original 1981 funding was determined in t he 
same elec tion cycle as the Fuqua vote (in fact the Fuqua vote was on this 
1981 funding). A more complicated procedure would have been to use for 
Fuqua the original funding level of 160. 2 for 1981 funding, and put the 
cut into 1982 funding (future action). The 1978 supplemental, considered 
in October 1977, poses no problem since it occurs in the same election 
cycle as the original action. The 1 980 r escission was only for $7 
million, and t herefore is not large enough to worry a b out . 
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Table 47 
Signs of Past, Present , and Future Funding Coeffic i ents 
(t statistic s in parentheses) 
Gravel , term-77 NA 
term=79 Failed 
term=81 NA 
Glenn, term~?? NA 
term=79 NA 
term~81 NA 













( 1. 46) 
+ 
( . 82) 
( 1.36) 
+ 
( 1. 71) 
Future 
(1 . 24 ) 
(. 87) 
+ 




( 1. 49) (. 71) 
+ 
(. 88) ( . 4 0) 
+ 
( 1. 46) (2.22) 
+ 
(. 41) ( . 82) 
+ 
( . 64) (. 46) 
(. 72) (. 38 ) 
+ 
(. 65) (. 25) 
+ 
(.91) (. 89) 
+ 
(1.35) ( 1. 58) 
Note: Senate equations estimated without term for each group of Senators . 
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employed. 38 As is clear from Table 48, the same problem of opposite signs 
38 The following procedure 
Lien to deal with this problem . 
spending, respectively. 
1 . Regress F on P with OLS. 
uncorrelated with P. 
F = a + bP + e 
was suggested to me by Da-Hsiang Donald 
Let P and F represent present and future 
This produces a residual e that is 
2. Estimate the vote model using logit with P and residual from (1) on 
RHS, along with other variables. 
Vote = . . . + cP + de + error 
3. Use the estimated coefficients from the OLS and logit regressions to 
produce an estimate of the coefficients of P and Fin a vote model . From 
( 1) ' 
e = F - a - bP. Substitute for e in (2) to give 
Vote + cP + d(F-a-bP) 
+ . . . - ad + dF + (c-db)P 
The coefficient of F is therefore d and the coefficient of P is therefore 
(c-db). The significance of the coefficient of F is given by the t-
statistic for d; the significance of the coefficient of P can be 
calculated, with some effort . 
For the two votes with past , present, and future spending (denoted 
P, C, and F), a similar approach is employed: 
1. Regress C on P with OLS, producing a residual el. 
C = a + bP + el 
2 . Regress F on P and el with OLS, producing a residual e2. 
F = c + dP + fel + e2 
3 . Estimate vote model with logit , with P, el, and e2 on RHS, along with 
other variables. 
Vote = g + . . . + hP + iel + je2 + error 
4. Rearrange ( 1) to yield el = C - a - bP and (2) to yield 
e2 F - c - dP - fel 
F - c - dP - f(C - a - bP) 
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Table 48 
Past, Present , and Future Funding Coefficients 
(Using OLS multicollinearity procedure) 
Present 
Gravel , term=77 NA 6.61 
term=79 Failed 
term=81 NA . 75 
Glenn, term=77 NA - 9.57 







Hart, term= 77 NA 2.88 - .36 
term=79 NA 23 .8 -1 . 90 
term=81 NA -2.31 37.9 
Richmond NA -.11 . 10 
Anderson NA -.20 . 05 
Brown NA .20 -. 02 
Jeffords NA -.28 .04 
Tsongas .42 -. 25 .10 
Fuqua .04 -.40 1.46 
Note: Senate equations estimated without term for each group of Senators . 
Units of spending are dollars per capita for Senate and millions of 
dollars for House. 
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occurs throughout with this procedure. Thus, based on the results with 
the straightforward approach and the OLS approach, the theory o f 
retrospective voting cannot be tested with these data. 
Anothe r possibility is that rather than using year-of-vote spending 
(i.e., the total appropriation for that year), we should only use the 
spending being voted on in the amendment, i.e. , the increase in spending 
over what would exist without the amendment . To test this, the normal 
approach would be to enter both the amendment and single year estimates 
in the same model. Unfortunately the only estimate I have of amendment 
expenditures by state or district is simply total PV spending by state or 
district times the ratio of a mendment appropriation/total PV 
appropriation, and thus one cannot enter both in the same regression. 
Instead, one could est imate the model in unnested form with each variable . 
Since the model is the same except for the spending variable , and since 
the spending variables are perfectly correlated, the two sets of 
estimations would be identical in the following respects: 
-the coefficients and T-statistics on all variables except spending 
-the T-statistics on spending 
-the log likelihood of the regression 
and the preferred model will be the one with more stable coefficients on 
spending across votes. Unfortunately, the increase in PV spending from 
= F - c + (fb - d)P - fC + fa 
5. Substitute for eland e2 in vote model 
V g + + hP + i(C-a-bP) + j(F - c + (fb-d)P - fC + fa) 
+ [h- ib + j(fb-d)]P + (i-jf)C + jF 
to yield coefficien ts of P, C, and F in vote model . 
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several of the amendments (e.g. , Glenn and Hart) is not clear, and thus 
this shall not be pursued.39 
Finally, the voting decision need not respond to a change in PV 
spending according to the S-shaped response curve imposed by the logit 
estimation procedure . Although this is the response that one would 
predict, it is possible in principle to estimate directly the slope along 
various spending intervals. If three intervals are desired , one replaces 
spending on the RHS with three interaction terms: 
dl*spending, d2*spending, d3*spending 
where 
dl = 1 if the spending in the district was in the low range of 
funding by district (state for Senators) 
d2 = 1 if the spending in the district was in the middle range of 
funding by district 
d3 = 1 if the spending in the district was in the high range of 
funding by district 
The coefficients on these interaction terms then represent the slopes 
along the three sections of the curve. If the bottom group contains only 
those with no spending, the model should be estimated by replacing 
spending with 
d2*spending, d3*spending 
39 An a lternative would be to compare amendment spending to single 
year spending for solar, rather than PV, amounts. While the solar 
increases due to the amendments are clear, one has to assume that sol ar 
spending has the same geographic distribution that PV does. 
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since inclusion of dl*spending will result in a singular matrix since this 
product is always equal to zero if no member of the bottom group has 
spending . 
The results of three different definitions of three i ntervals are 
shown in Tables 49-51. In all three tables, the bottom group consists of 
exactly those with no spending. In the first table, only three of the 
coefficients of the middle group are larger (not in an absolute value 
sense) than for the high group, and two of these middle group coefficients 
have very low significance levels. To lessen the responsiveness in the 
high group, the high group was narrowed in the second table . Now four of 
the middle group coefficients are larger, but three of the four occur 
where the coefficient of the continuous form of the variable is of t he 
wrong sign . The last table narrows the high group even more, but the 
result is that only two of the middle group coefficients are larger. 
Thus, the results in all three tables do not support the hypothesis of a 
S-shaped response to spending . 
Benefits Model 
As discussed in Chapter 3, an alternative to the use of electricity 
expenditure or price and sunlight variables in the regressions is to 
combine these into a benefits variable. 
electricity developed there is 
PV cost 129.3/ S + .0099 in $/kWh 
The estimate of the cost of PV 
To transform our insolation data to use this e quation , one only needs to 
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Tabl e 49 
Piecewise Estimation of Spending Coefficient , Larges t High Gr oup 
Middl e PV Spending High PV Spe nding 
Gravel -4. 08 .35 
(2 . 28) ( . 99 ) 
Glenn .72 -2 . 18 
(. 06) (1.11) 
Hart 3.10 3.34 
(. 49) ( 1. 80) 
Richmond .29 - . 2l 
(.03) ( . 36) 
Anderson -4 . 33 - . 05 
( . 93) ( . 24) 
Brown -. 38 -.20 
( . 09) (. 69) 
Jeffords 4.84 - . 16 
( . 95) ( . 74) 
Tsongas -2.06 .40 
(.80) (1.52) 
Fuqua - .63 .27 
( . 26) ( 1. 03) 
Note: Approximately 25 states receive no spending. In the House, 381 
districts in FY 76, 364 in FY 77, 343 in FY 78 , and 315 in FY 81 receive 
no spending. High PV spending group consists of 9-10 states (Senate 
votes) and 35 - 40 distri cts . Middle PV spending group is defined as the 
rest that receive some spending . 
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Table 50 
Piecewise Estimation of Spending Variable, Smaller High Group 
Middl e PV Spending High PV Spending 
Gravel 13.8 2.83 
(2 . 72) ( 1. 86) 
Glenn . 59 -2.22 
( . 08) (1 . 01) 
Hart 2.40 3.48 
(. 6 7) (1. 79) 
Richmond -1. 35 - .14 
( .68) ( .24) 
Anderson - . 15 - . 05 
( . 14) (. 24) 
Brown .55 .26 
(.57) ( . 76) 
Jeffords .13 -.18 
( . 68) (.75) 
Tsongas .18 .39 
( . 18) (1.51) 
Fuqua -1.64 . 32 
( 1. 26) (1.11) 
Note: High grou p in Senate votes consists of about 5 state s and 18 
distri cts . 
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Table 51 
Piecewise Estimation of Spending Variable, Smallest High Group 
Middle PV Spending High PV Spending 
Gravel 4.36 3.24 
( l. 0 1 ) (. 92) 
Glenn 2.54 -2.43 
(. 36) (.80) 
Hart l. 78 11.6 
(. 79) (. 18) 
Richmond - 2.01 .18 
(1.67) (. 31) 
Anderson - .59 -. 03 
(. 72) (. 16) 
Brown -.38 -.18 
(.53) (. 63) 
Jeffords -.62 - .16 
(. 65) (.78) 
Tsongas - . 02 .45 
(.03) ( l. 45) 
Fuqua -.56 . 35 
(. 73) (1 . 12) 
Note: High group consists of about 3 states and 9 districts. 
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multiply by 1000 since the maximum value in our district insolation set 
= 2.4, whereas the maximum value assumed for S in the equation is 2400. 
Since price the year of the vote outperformed alternative specifications 
(electricity expenditure, average electricity price in 1985, marginal 
electricity price in 1985, residential price the year of vote, average 
price the year of vote combined with ratio of price the year of the vo te 
to price two years earlier, and similarly for residential), t his shall be 
used in our benefits model. However, it is necessary to "scale up" this 
price so that it is an estimate of electricity prices that might exist at 
the time when PV attains the parameters that result in the PV cost 
equation above. To scale up, I multiply by the ratio of the average 1985 
price to the average current year price . 4° Finally, since our PV cost 
estimate is in $/kWh and our electricity price in $/million BTU, the 
former is divided by .003412 to convert it to $/million BTU. 41 
This procedure produces the following benefit estimate: 
ben = elprice*mean(ave85)jmean(elprice) - (.129jins.+.0099)j.003412 
The results with this benefits variable are compared to the separate 
use of electricity price and insolation in Table 52. The benefits 
variable has the correct sign in every vote, whereas electricity price has 
40 The 1985 estimates for ten regions are converted to state and 
district estimates by assuming that each state and district in the region 
has the same price. Since the scale - up factor is somewhat arbitrary, the 
1985 and year of vote averages are the simple average of state (Senate 
votes) and district (House votes) estimates; they are not quantity -
weighted. 
41 U.S . Dept . of Energy (1984c), p. 229. The omission of the word 
"mill ion" in this source is clearly a mistake. 
240 
Table 52 
Separate Electricity Price and Insolation Variables vs . Combined Variabl e 











. 30 -1.1 7 
(2.12) (.85) 
.09 4.20 
(.68) (2 .62) 
. 04 l. 6 7 
( .30) (1.31) 
.12 1.89 
(2.36)(3 . 47) 
.20 1.37 
( 3. 43) ( 2. 2 7) 




. 15 -.52 
(2.67) (.97) 
.12 -1. 15 

















( l. 80) 
.03 
( l. 06) 
.02 




(3 .6 2) 
.06 





















Note: LRT denotes likelihood ratio test = 2 (log unconstrained maximum 
likelihood est imator minus log constrained maximum likelihood estimator). 
The Senate model has 10 variables in separate model and 9 in combined, 
whereas the House model has 9 in separate and 8 in combine d . Significance 
levels evaluated using SST. Levels for all House regressions reported by 
SST = 100 percent. 
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the correct sign in all votes and insolation in six of the nine. In a ll 
but one vote, the significance level of the combined benefits var iable 
lies between the significance levels of the el e ctricity price a nd 
insolation variabl e s ; in the Brown vote the significance level of benefi ts 
is slightly greater than the maximum of the significance levels of the 
other two variables . The significance lev els of the overall regression , 
as computed by the likelihood ratio test, show little difference. The 
levels for the separate specification are slightly gre ater in 2 of the 3 
Senate votes, and the significance of the combined specification in the 
Brown vote would be greater since the LRT value is higher and there a re 
fewer variables . 
The benefits variable performs much better than I would have 
expected, with low expectations resulting from the potential problems with 
scaling the electricity price and PV price variable (the latter derived 
from insolation) in order to subtract one from the other to get benefits . 
Because the numerical comparisons cited in the previous paragraph are not 
conclusive, the choice between the two specifications is probably best 
made in terms of the more philosophical considerations discussed in the 
chapter on benefits. 
The results for the model with all variable s (except the three 
insignificant committee variables excluded earlier) using the benefit 
specification are shown in Table 53. 
CONCLUSION 
The regression results indicate that the v otes of indiv idual members 
on PV roll calls was influenced by several measurable characteris tics of 
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Table 53 
Roll Call Regression Results 
(PV benefits, PV expenditures year of vote) 
(t stat i stics in parentheses) 
Independent Vote 
Variable Calendar Year of Vote 
SENATE HOUSE 
Gravel Glenn Hart Rich. And. Brown Jeffords Tsongas Fuqu a 
1975 1975 1976 1975 1976 1976 1976 1977 1980 
AUTH APP APP APP AUTH AUTH AUTH AUTH APP 
constant -6.11 -1.58 -32.0 3.36 2.93 . 17 3.98 2 .89 4 . 30 
(. 47) ( .11) (2 . 33) (4.84)(4.15) (. 28) (4 . 03) (4.21)(5 . 09) 
party .20 -.89 .23 -1.54 -.61 -.86 .36 -. 93 -1. 65 
(.28) ( l. 30) (. 35) (4.08)(1.69) (2 . 72) (. 95) (2.64)(3 . 88) 
term . 06 . 04 .41 - - - -- - - --- --- - - ------ --- ------ ----------
(.38) ( . 23) (2.35) 
aca -4.56 -4.10 -3.89 -4.61 -5.21 -1.25 -5.02 -4.22 -5 .80 
score (3.23) (3.50) (3.84) (7.31)(8.13) (2.42) (6.30) (6 .80) (6.85) 
app -.53 -1.74 -1.08 -1.28 -.38 -.41 -.04 -.81 -2.22 
dummy ( . 86) (2.60) (1 . 69) (3.38)(1.00) ( l. 12) (.08) ( 2. 36) ( 5 . 6 7) 
PV .OS .03 .02 .03 .06 . 06 . 04 .03 .02 
benefits (1.80) ( l. 06) (. 75) (2.38)(3 . 62) (4. 02) (1.95) (2.38)(1.29) 
log of -. 47 -.34 - . 46 -.12 - .16 - . 09 -.01 -.09 . 02 
pop. dens . ( 2 . 14) ( l. 42) (2.08) (1.89)(2.23) ( l. 49) ( .11) ( l. 34) (.31) 
PV 3.41 -1.90 3. 71 -.17 - . 03 - . 20 -. 15 . 33 .19 
spending ( 1.18) (1.33) ( 2 . 07) (.28) ( .14) (. 69) (. 72) (1.37) (. 77 ) 
PV manu. -1.24 2 . 03 -.55 .81 . 43 .68 -. 07 . 45 .56 
dummy ( l. 63) (2.15) (.68) ( l. 42) ( . 75) ( l. 4 1 ) (. 08) ( . 76) ( . 80) 
LRT 43.2 34.4 45.2 116.6 171.6 85.4 295.6 107 . 4 145.2 
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the member and the area he represented. Of the member characteristics 
examined, ideology and membership on the appropriations committee affected 
votes in the predicted manner, whereas predictions were not made for 
membership on the appropriations subcommittee, authorization commit tee, 
and authorization subcommittee, and these had little or no effect . The 
highly significant ideological results for ideology are consistent with 
the strongly ideological character of solar energy politics discussed in 
Chapter 1 . 
Several characteristics of the state or district relat i ng to the 
benefits of the federal PV program had important effects on voting. 
Sunlight, electricity price, and population density--three characteristics 
which would significantly affect the relative magnitude of PV benefits to 
the different districts or states of a successful PV program--all had 
important effects in the direction predicted. When sunlight and 
electricity price were combined into a benefit measure, this too had a 
significant effect. Less important, and not always of the right sign, 
were federal PV expenditures and the presence of PV manufacturers in the 
area . My guess is that these factors would be less important than 
ideology or economic benefits of the technology, even if the expenditure 
and manufacturer data were better. 
Because time series analysis of PV voting is not possible, one is 
forced to rely on these cross-sectional analyses to make inferences about 
the factors that led to the rise and the fall of the solar energy program. 
The regression results support the conclusion that a major factor in the 
rise and fall of the solar energy program were the changes in ideology in 
the Administration and the Congress. Similarly, the importance of 
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elec tricity price and sunlight (sunlight provides the cross-sectional 
variation in PV price that over time is a function of changes in t he 
technological outlook), or the combined benefits variabl e, in the 
regressions supports the conclusion in Chapter 1 t hat changes in the 
outlook for energy prices and PV prices were a lso instrumental in the rise 
and fall of the program. Finally, the weak results for the expenditure 
and manufacturer data suggest that the lack of a significant "pork barrel " 
aspect of the program may have contributed to the program's political 
demise in the 1980s. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
The data used in the econometric anal y sis are explained below and 
the source of the data indicated. I entered all data manuall y . 
Votes and Party 
Source: The year-end Congressional Quarterly vo te tabulations shown 
below: 
Gravel 1975 CQ Almanac, p. 53-S, vote 366. 
Glenn 1975 CQ Almanac, p . 84-S, vote 554. 
Hart 1976 CQ Almanac, p . 45-S , vote 312 . 
Richmond 1975 CQ Almanac, pp . 80-81-H, vote 255 . 
Anderson 1976 CQ Almanac, pp. 6 2 -63-H, vote 204. 
Brown 1976 CQ Almanac, pp. 62-63-H, vote 205 . 
Jeffords 1976 CQ Almanac , pp. 62- 63-H, vote 206. 
Tsongas 1977 CQ Almanac, pp. 156-157-H, vote 535. 
Fuqua 1980 CQ Almanac, pp . 98-99-H, vote 327. 
ACA Score 
Ratings by interest groups are highly correlated and thus the cho ice 
of the rating is unlikely to affect the results. Use of ACA scores in 
this study was motivated by the fact that ACA calculates score s base d on 
the ratio of favorable votes to votes cast by that member, whereas ADA 
s cores are based on the ratio of favorable votes t o total votes, and thus 
the absence of a vote is counted as equivalent to a conservative vote. 
Kalt (1981, p. 305) used a special ADA index whic h a v oided t his proble m. 
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Congressional Quarterly Issue 
May 22, 1976, pp . 1291-1307. 
February 5, 1977, pp. 220-235. 
April 15, 1978, pp. 914-929. 
March 21, 1981, pp. 516-522. 
Source: The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1976, pp . 343-345. 
Committee and Subcommittee Membership 
The appropriat ions subcommittee in both the Senate and House was t he 
Subcommittee on Public Works . In the House, the authorizing committee was 
the Committee on Science and Technology, and the subcommittee in 1975-1976 
was the Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development and Demonstration, 
in 1977 was the Subcommittee on Advanced Energy Technologies and Energy 
Conservation Research, Development, and Demonstration, and in 1980 was the 
Subcommittee on Energy Development and Applications. In the Senate, the 
authorizing committee in 1975-1976 was Interior and Insular Affairs, and 
the subcommittee was the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Water 
Resources . 
Membership on committees was determined by the lists printed at the 
beginning of authorization and appropriation hearing documents . Since the 
hearings do not show membership for the full Senate Appropriations 
Committee, this is taken from the 1975 CO Almanac, p. 52. 
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State Elec tricity Expenditures (1973-1981 ) 
State electricity expenditures in current d ollars in year of vote 
from U.S. Department of Ene rgy (1984c). State populat i on e stimates are 
as of July 1 of year of vote, inc luding Armed Forces stationed in a rea. 
from Statistical Abstract of the United States . State per capita personal 
income in year of vote in current dollars from Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U. S . Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, April 
1977 , August 1978 , and April 198 2 . 
State Avera~e Electricity and Residential Avera~e Electricity and Natural 
Gas Price (1973-1981) 
State overal l average electricity and average residential 
e lectricity and natural gas prices from U.S. Department of Energy (1984c). 
1985 Regional Electricity Price 
1985 marginal and average prices are t he 1985 midrange scenario, 
Series C with natural gas regulation from U.S. Department of Energy 
( 1978d), Vol. II Appendix. 
Insolation 
Insolation for district (House votes) and state ( Senate votes) are 
derived from insolation estimates for 235 l ocat ions , with 168 value s for 
each location, corresponding to 14 different tilt angles from 0 to 90 
degrees for each of 1 2 months . These are contained in Jeffrey H. Smith 
(1980). To pick a single number for each of these 235 locations , I 
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ignored the possibility of changing the array tilt each month or of 
interpolating between the array tilt angles given . I simply chose t he 
array tilt angle which maximized annual insolation, a nd used t he annual 
insolation figure resulting from year round use of thi s angle. This 
procedure also ignores the relatively small gains and losses from array 
shadowing and reflector augmentat ion. To obtain congressional district 
and state estimates, the following procedure was used employing the 
figures chosen above. If t he district had ( l ) exactl y l of the 235 
locations in the district, this figure was used; (2) more than l of the 
235, the figures were averaged; and (3) none , an e stimate based on values 
for nearby locations was used. State figures represent the average of the 
district values obtained above. 
PV Expenditures 
Information on annual expenditures in each contract was obtained 
from the following annual photovol taic program summaries: U.S. Energy 
Research and Development Administration (1976), U.S. Department of Energy 
(l978b, l978e, 1980a, 1981, 1982, 1983b, l984a ). The program summaries 
contain a one page description for each current photovoltaics contract or 
grant. I began with the last of the program summaries listed immediately 
above and then went back through each earlier volume adding those 
contracts which did not appear in later volumes . On contracts appearing 
in more than one volume, expenditure information appearing in the most 
recent volume was used in case of conflicting information between volumes. 
This process was complicated by the number of contracts 
(approximately two hundred in each volume) and the difficulty in 
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identifying the same contract across the years because of changes in 
contract identification numbers and descriptions. In additi on , 
identify ing year to year spending was sometimes arbitrary because 
sometimes only cumulative funding totals were available for a contract . 
The ensuing assignment of spe nding by year to districts and states 
proceeded as follows . The contract description provides a city name for 
each contractor . The corresponding congressional district was then 
identified as follows: 
(1) I looked for the city in the list of 9900 cities and their 
districts in the 1977 Con~ressional Staff Directory by Charles B. Bronson . 
(2) If multiple districts were listed for a city, then Congressional 
Quarterly (1974) was used. This lists major companies and universities 
in each district, and I often could find the contractor involved and thus 
resolve the district. 
(3) If the city was not liste d in Bronson , I used the North American 
Road Atlas, 1981 , to locate the city and then use d the district maps in 
Congressional Quarterly (1974) to determine the district. 
(4) In case of multiple districts which could not be resolved, I 
divided the money equally among the districts. 
( 5) In cases of projects built in one location by a contractor 
located in another, I divided the money equally between the two locations . 
This procedure is important because it determines the treatment of 
demonstration projects where the prime contractor is not located at the 
site. 
The resulting data for each district and state for each year were 
then multiplied by the ratio of appropriation in that year divided by the 
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sum of the contract/grant spending in that year , as determined by the 
above process. This procedure was used because the sum of contract/grant 
spending was often only 50-75% of the appropriation for that year, thus 
indicating that the process was s ome how missing some funding. 
Per capita spending is us ed in the Senate model. For simplicity, 
I used 1980 state population figures to compute pe r capita expenditures, 
rather than using state population estimates for each year in the FY76-83 
period . 
PV Manufacturers 
U.S. Department of Energy (198Gb ), pp. 31-34 contain lists of 
commercial flat photovoltaic modul e manufactur ers, concentrator solar cel l 
manufacturers, photovoltaic concentrator module manufacturers , and 
photovoltaic power s y stem suppliers compil ed by the Solar Energy 
Industries Association in September 1980. I did not find comparable lists 
for earlier years. 
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